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Life Insurer Risk-Based Capital: An Option Pricing
Approach
Samuel H. Cox* and Arthur M.B. Hogan t

Abstract
This paper uses an option pricing framework to estimate life insurer riskbased capital. Stock market data and statutory asset and liability data are
used to calculate the implied level of statutory risk-based capital for each of 18
insurers. We calculate the level of risk-based capital required to avoid subsidy
from the guaranty fund. Our results suggest that less capital is required than
that required under the New York actuarial risk-based capital formula. Firm
rankings, however, are similar under both methods, although the methods are
not directly comparable. We also determine the level of capital required if the
subsidy provided to the sample of insurers by a guaranty fund is the same
as that provided by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) to U.S.
banks. This level of capital is chosen because of the dominance of investment
products for life insurers. When the results are compared with those found
from a similar study of U.S. banks, it appears that the sample life insurers hold
relatively greater capital than do the sample banks.
Key words and phrases: guarantee fund, deposit insurance, bankruptcy cost,
solvency, New York formula
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Introduction

1.1

Background

In return for receiving policyholders' premiums, insurers promise
to pay claims, contingent upon the occurrence of specific events during the insurance contract period. As these premiums are invested,
policyholders provide the insurer with financing that is similar to a
bank deposit (Quirin and Waters, 1975). Thus, both banks and insurance companies assume liabilities, thereby creating pools of assets that
they invest. Banks and life insurers are competitors. l Both make their
money by investing the funds they generate at rates higher than their
costs. As a result, the principal risk faced by banks and life insurers
stems from their ability to maintain investment spreads and not suffer
disintermediation 2 in times of changing interest rates. This similarity
is reflected in their financial structure. Both have similar capital/asset
ratios: 6.2 percent for commercial banks and 6.6 percent for life insurers as of December 31, 1989, and both have liabilities that are interest
sensitive. 3
It is current public policy to protect the liability claims on both
banks and insurance companies. The U.S. federal government provides
bank deposit insurance, while states have established guaranty funds
for policyholders. Risk-based capital and/or guarantee fund assessments that reflect the insurer's risk of insolvency limit the incentive
that stockholders have to increasing asset risk following the issuance
of liabilities. An incentive for firms to increase risk arises because the
guaranty funds alleviate policyholders' concern about firm risk (Babbel
and Hogan, 1992).4 Cummins (1988) derive a method of determining
risk-based assessment for guaranty funds that models guaranty fund
1 For 1989 the American Council of Life Insurers reported in the Life Insurance Handbook that 70 percent of life insurer premiums were for annuities and investment products, which compete with bank certificates of deposit.
2 Disintermediation refers to the movement of funds from low yielding accounts from
traditional banking or insurance institutions to higher yielding investments in the general market.
3This excludes the Mandatory Securities Valuation Reserve (MSVR) held by life insurers. The MSVR is a reserve held against fluctuation in the insurer's asset portfolio.
It is required by state regulations.
4In a competitive market with perfect information and no regulation, the cost of an
insurer's debt capital (underwriting) would vary directly with the risk of the insurer.
All other things being equal, customers only would be attracted by riskier insurers'
products if the premiums were lower. Guaranty funds have weakened this market
discipline. The guaranty funds reimburse policyholders and third party claimants of
insolvent insurers. This reduces policyholder concerns about insurer risk.
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assessments as put options. In this paper we show that by modeling
the value of the guaranty fund to an insurer as a put option, there is
an equivalence between the risk-based guaranty fund assessments and
risk-based capital. 5
1.2

Risk-Based Capital

Risk-based capital is the theoretical amount of capital needed to absorb the risks of operating a business having financial obligations to
customers. A higher risk business requires more capital than does one
of lower risk. Specifically, risk-based capital is the amount of capital
necessary to insure that the business has an acceptably low expectation of becoming insolvent. Failure to recognize the consistency of risk
measurement may produce unintended market displacements, such as
reduced product availability. Because the measure of solvency risk can
be described as the expected value of policyholder deficit before guaranty fund recoupment, this measure is equivalent to using the probability of insolvency impairment, provided the probability distribution
remains the same.
U.S. regulators of the banking and thrift industries recently have begun phasing in a risk-based capital measure as one component of a new
set of supervisory ratios that will be used to assess capital adequacy.
The new standards are based on a framework, referred to by some as
the Basle Accord, 6 developed by an international group of bank regulators. Similarly, the National Association of Insurance Commissioners
(NAIC) has developed risk-based capital standards for insurers'? Under
the NAIC Risk-Based Capital Model Act, there are four levels of statutory surplus (the difference between statutory assets and liabilities) that
trigger required actions by management and regulators. These surplus
level triggers are based on threshold risk-based capital multiples under
which successively more severe regulatory activity is indicated. The
thresholds of the risk-based capital multiple are as follows:
1. Company action level event threshold is 100 percent of the formula risk-based capital value. A company action level event re5 An insurer's expected cost to the guarantee fund varies with its risk. If there is a
fixed risk-based capital level that is the same across all firm, this cost can be priced
using risk-based assessments. If there are fixed assessments, the risk of different firms
can be made equivalent by requiring different levels of risk-based capital.
6The Basle Accord is an agreement by the G-? countries and the European Union
which implements risk-based capital standards for banks.
7Some European countries have had risk-based capital requirements for their domestic insurers for more than 20 years.
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quires a company to submit a business plan to the state, to show
how the risk-based capital value will be improved;
2. Regulatory action level event threshold is 75 percent of the formula risk-based capital value. A regulatory action level event
could, in addition to the requirements under item 1, trigger a state
investigation or examination;
3. Authorized control level event threshold is 50 percent of the formula risk-based capital value. An authorized control level event
enables a state to take the company under supervision, although
it is not required to do so.
4. Mandatory control level event threshold is 35 percent of the formula risk-based capital value. A mandatory control level event
requires the regulator in the state to take the company under supervision.
If the surplus falls below 20 percent of the calculated risk-based capital,
then the insurance commissioner must move to place the company in
conserva tion.
The advantage of using risk-based capital over risk-based guaranty
fund assessment is that it is compatible with current guaranty funds.
With the exception of New York, insurance guarantee funds are based
on post assessments. The assessment to cover a failed insurer is prorated by line of business across the remaining insurers in the state.
There is an annual cap on assessments to each insurer, but required
funds in excess of the cap can be rolled over to the following years.
New York, on the other hand, charges each insurer a premium each
year for coverage against their failure. Thus, insurance guaranty funds,
except in New York, operate on a post-assessment basis, i.e., the solvent companies are assessed an amount equal to the shortfall in assets
of the insolvent firm. The assessment for a solvent company is a flat
percentage of premium volume. The guaranty funds, like bank deposit
insurance, have the industry as the primary obligator. The guaranty
funds differ from bank deposit insurance, however, in that there is no
contingent obligator and bank deposit insurance requires prior assessment premiums.
In many states the assessment that a solvent company pays to the
guaranty fund is credited against its state premium tax. The effect is to
pass the cost of insolvencies to the taxpayers because the premium tax
revenue is reduced by the cost of the insolvency. In other states policyholders bear the cost through increased premiums charged by solvent
companies. Thus, the losses arising from insurance insolvencies pass
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through the insurance system either to the taxing authority by reduced
insurance company taxes or to the policyholders by higher insurance
premiums (Barese and Nelson, 1991).
If it is not politically feasible to create a prior assessment system for
insurance, then there are only two means of reducing costs of the incentives for risky strategies: (i) rigid control of the asset and liability risks
of insurers; or (ii) adjustment of the leverage through the application
of risk-based capital adequacy standards.

1.3

Objectives

Merton (1977) pioneered the application of option pricing to deposit
insurance. Ronn and Verma (1986) use Merton's approach to study
risk-adjusted premiums for deposit insurance for U.S. banks. Cummins
(1988) extends the option pricing approach to the calculation of riskbased premiums for insurance guaranty funds for U.S. property-liability
insurers. The model used in this paper also is based on option valuation
principles. Although our aim is to establish risk-based capital levels
rather than guaranty fund premiums, we show that there is an inverse
relationship between capital levels and guaranty fund premiums: the
higher the level of capital per unit of claim an insurer has, other things
being equal, the lower the likelihood of default and, hence, the lower
the risk-based guaranty fund premium.
The objectives of this paper are as follows: (i) to develop a model
based on option valuation principles; (ii) to illustrate an equivalence
between risk-based capital and risk-based guaranty fund assessment
using an option-based model; (iii) to determine capital adequacy standards for a sample of 18 publicly traded insurers using the model; (iv) to
compare the risk-based capital calculated from the option model with
statutory value capital standards; and (v) to compare the level of riskbased capital held by life insurers with the level calculated by Ronn and
Verma (1988) for banks.

2 The Option Pricing Model
The liabilities of life insurers are composed of term life and investment products. 8 If a firm underwrites a suffiCient number of term life
policies the value of the liability is essentially fixed. Insurer investment
8Whole life, universal life, and variable life are contracts composed of term life insurance and investment products that can be used to pay premiums.
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offerings such as annuities are driven by the same market forces that
affect the insurer's assets. Thus, we assume that only one stochastic
process drives the change in the life insurer's financial position. This
is unlike Cummins' model for property/casualty insurers that has separate processes for both assets and liabilities. The advantage of using
the one stochastic process approach is that all of the variables in our
model are observable. In Cummins' model there are no dividends paid
to stockholders, so we have used the method of Roll (1977) to adjust for
dividends. Cummins' notation is used to the extent possible to allow
the reader to compare the models.
Let us assume that an insurer's asset/liability ratio follows a diffusion process:
dx = (r - 8)xdt

+ (J'xdz(t)

for 0::; t::; T

(1)

where
A
L

x
z(t)

8
r
T

The value of the insurer's assets;
The value of the insurer's liabilities;
Insurer's asset/liability ratio, i.e., x = AIL;
A standard Brownian motion process for x;
Dividend payout rate per dollar of assets;
Rate of change in capital structure for this company; and
Time until expiration of option, i.e., time until
the company's next examination.

The change in the asset/liability ratio, dx, is a function of the return
on the insurer's equity less any dividend payments, (r - 8)xdt, with
the addition of a white noise error term, (J'xdz(t). The term 8x represents a decrease in assets as dividends are paid. Dividend payout rates
normally are given as a percentage of equity. If f3 is the dividend rate in
terms of equity E, then the initial annual rate of dividend payment can
be calculated in two ways, giving the same result: f3E = 8A. Thus, f3
or 8 can be calculated from the other given initial values of assets and
equity.
Each year the state insurance regulators ascertain the values of equity. If the equity of the company falls below the required capital, the
company is placed into conservatorship by the regulator. If the company cannot be rehabilitated, the assets will be used to pay obligations
to policyholders.
Policyholders are protected by a promise from the guaranty fund to
pay the excess, if any, of the liability value L over the asset value A.
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This is similar to a financial put option written on x with striking price
of one. The guaranty fund payment is
max(O,L - A)

=

Lmax(O, 1 - x),

which is the same as the put option payment.

3 The Pricing Formula
3.1

Assumptions

The single premium for coverage until the next audit 9 at time T,
given current levels of assets A and liabilities L can be derived in the
same way Black and Scholes derived the formula for the price of a European option on a stock. For a derivation of the formula in its original
setting, see Black and Scholes (1973), Merton (1973), or Merton (1990).
The Society of Actuaries monograph by Boyle (1992) includes a good
discussion of the economic content of the assumptions underlying the
Black Scholes model.
There are six major assumptions underlying the Black and Scholes
(1973) formula. Boyle (1992) discusses all of these, although he explicitly lists only the first five assumptions. Hull (1993) gives a similar discussion. IO These authors also give the arguments leading to the
Black and Scholes formula. For a precise mathematical treatment of the
implications of these assumptions, see Duffie (1992). The assumptions
are:

x on which the option is written follows a
geometric Brownian motion, as described in the previous section.
The volatility parameter is denoted by 0'.

1. The asset liability ratio

2. The security pays dividends at a constant known rate 8.
3. There is a constant, default free rate of interest r.
4. There are no taxes or transactions costs. All traders can borrow
and lend cash at same rate r. Securities are infinitely divisible.
The ratio and the option written on it can be bought and sold
short by all traders.
9 All insurers annually file audited statutory statements with state regulators. Stock
insurers file annuallO(k) statements with the Securities Exchange Commission. Regulators examine insurers every three to five years depending upon the state of domicile.
All audits and examinations are paid by the firm.
IOThis textbook appears on the Society of Actuaries education syllabus.
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5. The ratio and the option on it can be trade continuously.
6. There are no arbitrage opportunities. This implies that two European style securities (or combinations of securities into portfolios)
that have the same payoff at time T must have the same market
value at time t < T.
The option in our model satisfies these assumptions (or fails to satisfy
them) to the same degree as options on stocks, with one notable exception: our option is not traded. The option pricing formula gives a
market value which traders would agree on, if it were traded. The option formula for stocks works well and is widely used, which suggests
its use in this model.

3.2

The Formula

The Blackand Scholes (1973) formula is adapted to our situation as
follows: let p(x, t) denote the premium at time t, given x = AIL. At the
time T of expiration, p(x, T) = max(O, I-x). The boundary conditions
are
p(O, t) = eY(T-tl and p(x, T) = max(O, 1 - x).
The Black and Scholes (1973) formula for the price p of a European put
option on a security with market value x and with striking price equal
to one is
(2)
where
_ In(x) + (r - O)T
0--jT
d 0--jT
+ 2 .
Here N(·) is the cumulative standard normal distribution, i.e.,
y

N(y) =

f

e-s2/2

--ds

-00

J2ii

and T = T - t.
The price of the guaranty in terms of the original variables is found
by multiplying by L:
P(A, L, T)

where

=

Le- rT N (-d

+ o-JT) - Ae- oT N (-d)

_ In(A/L) + (r - O)T
d 0--jT

+

0--jT
2 .

(3)

(4)

Equation (3) relates the price P of guaranty fund insurance to the variables A, L, r, 0, and T, which are known at the beginning of the insurance period, and to 0-, which is the unknown volatility parameter.
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Estimation of Volatility Parameter

(J"

Because the guaranty is invoked when the insurer falls below the required level of capital, the variability of all liabilities, not just the guaranteed liabilities, will affect regulatory action. To estimate the volatility,
we consider the position of the stockholders. The value of their rights
to the company amounts to an American call option on the assets with
exercise price equal to the liabilities expiring at time T. The notion that
equity of a levered firm (Le., a firm financed in part by issuing bonds)
can be thought of as a call option appears in most introductory corporate finance textbooks; see Brigham and Gapinski (1991, p. 700), for
example. Equity-financed life insurance companies typically do not issue bonds, but borrow instead from their customers. The life insurer's
liabilities consist of obligations to pay benefits, in effect repaying its
debt to policyholders.
If the assets AT at time T are worth more than the liabilities LT,
then the shareholders have a net value of AT - LT > O. If the assets
are less, AT < LT, then the shareholders can abandon the firm, leaving
it to the policyholders (lenders), and have no further obligation. Thus,
the shareholders' value at time T is max(AT - LT, 0), the payoff of a
European call option. As it usually is not optimal to exercise a call early
(see Hull, 1993, p. 235), we assume that the option will not be exercised early. In this case, the American call can be priced as if it were
a European call. The value of the call option C at time t depends on
A = At, L = L t , and T = T - t. The Black and Scholes formula for the
call option is derived in the same way as the put option formula for
P(A,L, T), which we discussed in Section 3. The boundary conditions
are C(A, L, 0) = max(A - L, 0) and C(O, L, T) = O. The firm pays dividends continuously at a rate of 6; it has volatility 0- 2 ; and the valuation
interest rate is r. By multiplying through by L, the Black and Scholes
call option formula gives the market value of the insurer's equity E,
which is equal to C (A, L, T) in the option notation:
E = C(A,L, T) = Le-<hN(d) - Ae-YTN(d - o-JT)

where

_ In(A/L) + (r - 6)T
d o-ft

+

°o-ft
2 .

(5)

(6)

The call option's value is equal to the firm's equity before the introduction of the guaranty fund. As insurer guaranty fund assessments
are ex post, the introduction of the guaranty funds does not, in anr: of
itself, change the variance of the portfolio. The value of the insurer's
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equity E is known at the beginning of the insurance period, as are all
of the other variables in the call formula except cr. Hence, this determines cr implicitly (Latane and Rendleman, 1976). Given the values of
E, A, L, D, r, and T, the implied asset liability ratio volatility cr 2 can be
calculated by simultaneously solving equations (5) and (6). In this way
we solve using the Newton-Raphson method ll for the value of cr for
which the calculated price equals the observed stock market price.l 2
We then use the implied value of cr to find the level of capital A by
solving equations (3) and (4.) This determines the desired level A using
the statutory accounting value of the assets and liabilities. The solution
again is found by using the Newton-Raphson method.
We examine the case where the guaranty fund provides no subsidy
to insurers. Because most life insurer premiums now are derived from
investment grade products, we have set the guaranty subsidy equal to
that used by Ronn and Verma (1988) in their study of banks. They use
a guaranty fund premium of 1/1200 of assets to find the implicit level
of required capital. In this model we use the stock price the day after
the deadline for filing statutory statements in 1990 and use an option
life of one year, which is the next time that statutory statements will be
filed and the next time that regulatory monitoring may be performed.

5

Estimates of Capital Adequacy Standards

The method described in Section 3 is applied to a sample of 18 stock
life insurers for which data are available. The characteristics of the
sample firms are shown in Table 1. The firm selection criteria are that
there are no material operations in the holding company's operations
other than life insurance, that the statement blanks can be obtained by
the authors, and that the firm is not a First Executive company (because
they were placed in conservation by regulators in the following year).

llThe Newton-Raphson method is used to determine the roots of an equation; see,
for example, Burden and Faires (1985).
12 An added benefit is that the technique avoids the problem of non stationarity of the
variance.

n
x

0

Table 1
Sample Firm Characteristics

Name
Acceleration Life
American Heritage Life
American National
Chesapeake Life
Durham Life
Equitable Life of Iowa
Financial Benefit Life
Independent Life & Accident
Integrated Resources Life
Jefferson Pilot Life
Kansas City Life
Kentucky Central Life
Lincoln National Life
Manhattan Life
National Western Life
Presidential Life
Protective Life
Washington National Insurance

Price
l2er Share
7.50
27.38
36.25
12.00
31.00
52.75
16.25
21.25
12.50
55.25
36.00
8.75
56.13
5.75
36.75
8.88
25.88
24.88

Number
of Shares
4,946,934
5,948,862
27,476,757
963,764
8,457,900
7,087,440
5,061,833
6,658
1,853
35,757,482
7,143,056
13,439,765
43,042,771
6,584,069
6,955,724
28,612,869
13,611,646
20,292,856

Dividends per Statutory
Share
Assets
104,737
0.28
770,915
0.90
4,079,900
1.89
43,953
1.00
732,195
0.92
1.27
1,842,833
690,079
1,080,502
0.87
77,874
4,284,743
1.36
1,694,614
1.28
1,303,927
0.40
23,530,710
2.92
471,793
2,100,663
2,069,631
0.20
2,495,755
0.83
1,577,842
1.08

llJ
::J

c..

Statutory
Liabilities
84,073
697,148
3,083,802
40,910
632,483
1,609,512
666,169
977,675
58,383
3,424,165
1,557,459
1,218,565
22,475,823
434,454
2,017,469
1,931,711
2,318,470
1,387,665

Statutory
Guaranteed
Liabilities
30,602
612,095
2,534,885
37,187
521,798
1,311,888
548
882,934
79,036
2,729,960
1,099,084
1,197,728
16,764,837
425,148
1,779,068
2,202,648
1,596,399

I

0

10
llJ
::J
;;JJ
VI

;:;'
OJ

llJ
VI

It>

c..

n

llJ
"0

,...
~

f-'

U1
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Table 2 presents the results of the option model calculation for each
firm when there is a guaranty fund subsidy equivalent to that of banks.
A detailed example of the calculations for the first firm is shown in
the appendix. The results are shown for two different types of guarantees: the column entitled guaranteed risk-based capital assumes that
the guaranty funds only will cover policyholder liabilities; the other assumes that all liabilities are covered. We examine the level of risk-based
capital for covering all liabilities because the nonguaranteed liabilities
may be held by sophisticated investors who may cashout their claims
before regulators are able to act. The sample firms carry from 22 percent to 61 percent more capital than required. Ronn and Verma (1988),
in their study of 43 banks, find that capital infusions of 5 percent to
43 percent are required to meet this implicit cost of deposit insurance.
This indicates that the subsidy received by the sample banks from deposit guarantees is greater than that received by the sample of insurers
from policyholder guarantees. On the other hand, Table 3 presents the
results of the option model calculation for each firm when there is no
guaranty fund subsidy equivalent to that of banks.
Table 4 shows the results of the calculation of the required riskbased capital using the actuarial formula implemented in New York.
We examine the New York model because it is used as the basis for the
National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC) model, and
unlike the NAIC formula, it can be calculated using publicly disclosed
information. 13
In the formula-based models, the amount of risk-based capital for
each source of risk (e.g., underwriting, investment, or credit) must be
such that the risk of insolvency (or other applicable impairment) is directly proportional to the amount of risk-based capital for each source
of risk. The formula has multipliers for the accounts (sources of risk)
that appear on the statutory statement. The amount of risk-based capital is the sum of the products of the multiplier and the item amounts.
The actuarial risk-based capital formula considers each account as a
separate risk that can be evaluated separately and that total risk is the
sum of the standard errors.14
13The NAIC is concerned that the insurers would use the ratio of their capital to required risk-based capital in marketing promotions. They feel that this could mislead
consumers into thinking that there are material differences between firms for which
none exist. Therefore, the NAIC has decided that risk-based capital results for individual companies should not be public.
14For this type of additivity to hold, pairs of risks X, Y must have correlation coefficient equal to one, i.e., PX.Y = 1. In other words, provided the second moments exist,
the standard deviation of X + Y is equal to the sum of the standard deviation of X and
the standard deviation of Y if and only if Px, y = 1.
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Table 2
Option Model Estimates of Risk-Based Capital Assuming Guaranty Fund

Name
Acceleration Life
American Heritage Life
American National
Chesapeake Life
Durham Life
Equitable Life of Iowa
Financial Benefit Life
Independent Life & Accident
Integrated Resources Life
Jefferson Pilot Life
Kansas City Life
Kentucky Central Life
Lincoln National Life
Manhattan Life
National Western Life
Presidential Life
Protective Life
Reliable Life

Implied
Variance
0.26
0.12
0.17
0.21
0.02
4.70
0.16
0.21
0.17
0.31
0.00
0.03
0.01
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
1.19

Guaranteed
Capital Excess
{Deficiency)
53,084,261
253,480,724
2,018,834,565
18,036,117
251,012,643
559,086,609
142,267,125
430,826,041
45,042,047
2,161,564,584
963,463,689
380,373,973
5,211,303,291
119,725,355
1,154,902,839
518,036,998
527,312,539
219,063,236

Guaranteed %
Capital
Excess
Excess
{Deficiency)
(Deficiency}
47%
53,006,216
38%
253,007,045
52%
2,016,068,098
41%
18,004,768
34%
250,469,370
33%
557,752,727
25%
141,849,889
42%
430,101,247
40%
44,955,558
55%
2,158,874,522
52%
962,091,518
29%
379,395,984
28%
5,197,229,745
25%
119,354,135
1,153,738,870
61%
22%
516,279,542
28%
525,869,501
57%
218,818,457
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Table 3
Option Model Estimates of Risk-Based Capital
Assuming No Guaranty Fund
Guaranteed
Guaranteed
% Capital
Capital Excess % Excess Capital Excess
Excess
(Deficiency) (Deficiency) (Deficiency) (Deficiency)

Acceleration Life
American Heritage
Life
American National
Chesapeake Life
Durham Life
Equitable Life of
Iowa
Financial Benefit
Life
Independent Life &
Accident
Integrated Resources
Life
Jefferson Pilot Life
Kansas City Life
Kentucky Central
Life
Lincoln National
Life
Manhattan Life
National Western
Life
Presidential Life
Protective Life
Reliable Life

51,604,853
220,258,828

46%
33%

51,526,807
219,785,112

46%
33%

1,307,755,545
16,016,556
167,229,558
312,095,070

34%
36%
23%
18%

1,304,988,248
15,985,206
166,686,160
310,760,531

33%
36%
23%
18%

140,680,341

25%

140,263,103

25%

397,514,797

39%

396,789,972

38%

31,568,690

28%

31,482,146

28%

1,947,590,616
467,200,586
331,336,111

50%
25%
25%

1,944,900,292
465,827,244
330,358,058

50%
25%
25%

4,289,858,928

23%

4,275,783,945

23%

90,218,902
1,123,218,068

19%
59%

89,847,599
1,122,054,076

19%
59%

470,986,004
384,294,881
212,789,180

20%
20%
56%

469,228,467
382,851,483
212,544,396

20%
20%
56%
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Table 4
New York Formula Calculated Risk-Based Capital
Name
Acceleration Life
American Heritage Life
American National
Chesapeake Life
Durham Life
Equitable Life of Iowa
Financial Benefit Life
Independent Life & Accident
Integrated Resources Life
Jefferson Pilot Life
Kansas City Life
Kentucky Central Life
Lincoln National Life
Manhattan Life
National Western Life
Presidential Life
Protective Life
Reliable Life

Formula Capital Excess
(Deficiency)

% Formula Capital
Excess (Deficiency)

15,394,363
88,567,275
628,316,718
7,510,633
65,102,344
226,956,248
10,624,307
191,536,623
3,448,566
465,811,716
210,042,906
210,623,736
1,455,672,163
24,318,229
106,808,768
134,899,050
187,268,805
36,846,203

14%
13%
16%
17%
9%
13%
2%
19%
3%
12%
11%
16%
8%
5%
6%
6%
10%
10%
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In contrast, the option-based model, which examines the risks as a
portfolio, makes no assumption about the correlation of the risks. The
excess or deficiency of capital as a fraction of the book value of the
firm's assists is reported.
The New York formula requires more capital than that imposed by
the option-based model. All other things equal, the lower level of capital required by the New York formula would provide a relatively greater
subsidy. There is a difference, however, in the regulatory actions assumed in developing the models. The option model assumes that the
regulator liquidates the insurer when there is insufficient capital. On
the other hand, the New York actuarial model provides for several levels of regulatory response that culminates in placing the insurer under
supervision when the insurer has less than 20 percent of its required
risk-based capital.
The New York formula requires an average of 37 percent more capital from the sample firms. The Spearman rank correlation coefficient
between the option and actuarial risk-based capital calculations is 0.21.
The difference between the New York formula and the option model
does not appear to be affected by firm size, because the correlation
of the difference of firm rankings by the two models with firm size is
0.01. This is probably due to the dominance of investment products (liabilities), which are correlated with the assets because of their shared
market risk.

6

Summary and Conclusions

This paper develops a risk-based capital calculation model for insurers, as ongoing concerns, by equating the cost of one year guarantees.
The model assumes that the asset to liability ratio can be described by
diffusion processes and that the guaranty fund will pay its obligations.
The differences in the calculated levels of capital by the actuarial-based
models, such as those used by the states of Minnesota and New York,
and the option-based models appear to arise from the difference in regulatory action assumed by the models when a firm has a capital shortfall. The divergence in firm rank between the two risk-based capital
models does not appear to arise from differences in measuring portfolio risk.
An additional application of our option model is to provide a means
of assessing the relative levels of required capital across financial intermediaries. The model provides guidance to regulators in determining
levels of capital and/or premiums to guaranty funds to create a level
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playing field across financial intermediaries. Thus, disintermediation
between financial institutions and the waste from economic friction associated with transaction costs of disintermediation could be avoided.
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Appendix
Using Acceleration Life as the example provides
E
A
L

d

$37,102,005;
$112,572,000;
$91,233,000; and
O.

Substituting into equations (5) and (6) yields an equation for the volatility parameter (T:
37,102,005

=

112,572, OOON(d) - 91,233, OOOOe- O.OB N(d -

where
d

=

(T)

In(A/89, OO~ 000) + 0.08 + ~.

Using the Newton-Raphson method to find the implied variance yields
(T2 =- 0.26. Solving for the required level of risk-based capital by substituting into equations (3) and (4), setting the exercise price equal to
the guaranteed liability value of $89,022,000, and setting the expected
cost to the guaranty fund to be 1/1200 of the firm's assets gives
98,310
where

=

89,022, OOOe- O.OB N( -d - -J(i) - AN( -d)

d _ In(A/89, 002, 000) + 0.08
')0.26
')0.26
+ 2

Using the Newton-Raphson method to solve for the required level of
capital A yields A = $59,487,739.
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Surveillance of Life Insurer Solvency: A Comparison
of Stock and The Multiple Scenario Cash Flow
Financial Stress Tests
Ronald W. Spahr* and Paul L. Gronewoller t

Abstract*
The solvency of life insurance companies may be threatened by interest
rate risk when the maturities of assets and liabilities are mismatched. The National Association of Insurance Commissioners' (NAIC) multiple scenario cashflow test (MSCFT) and the Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS) net portfolio value
model (stock) approaches to financial stress tests are illustrated and analyzed
with respect to their capacity to estimate the impact of potential changes in
interest rates on life insurance company capital and surplus. Each approach
is illustrated with the assets and liabilities of three hypothetical life insurance
company capital levels (high, average, and below average) and realistic interest
rate scenarios spelled out in the NAIC's standard valuation model law.
The supplement to the standard valuation law requires the appointed actuary to serve a dual employee/regulator role in which he/she is required to
*Ronald W. Spahr, Ph.D., is a professor of finance in the College of Business at the
University of Wyoming. He has a Ph.D. in finance from the University of WisconsinMadison. Dr. Spahr was a visiting scholar at the Office of Policy and Economic Research,
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in the initial design of the financial stress test currently used for the thrift industry.
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of Southern Colorado, an M.B.A. from the University of Northern Arizona, and a Ph.D.
.
in finance from the University of Nebraska-Lincoln.
Dr. Gronewoller's address is: Department of Economics & Finance, University of Wyoming, P.O. Box 3985, Laramie WY 80721-3895, U.S.A. Internet address:
paulf@uwyo.edu
fThe authors are indebted to Paul F. Kolkman, Douglas K. Dunning, Joseph Field,
Richard Phillips, the 1993 Western Economics International meetings, the 1993 American Risk and Insurance Association meetings, the 1994 Financial Management Association meetings, participants at the 4th International Conference On Insurance Solvency
and Finance sponsored by The Wharton School of the University of Pennsylvania, and
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develop an expert opinion concerning the prospective solvency of his/her employer. The numerical examples point out that the recommended MSCF approach may not identify problem companies. In addition, each appointed actuary's opinion will be based on a unique set of operating assumptions that
may preclude the results from being compared cross sectionally or to an absolute regulatory standard. For the stock approach, the OTS specifies the analytic
methodology and the set of consistent assumptions. The OTS staff performs
the calculations and interprets the results.
Key words and phrases: solvency monitoring, insurance regulation, standard
valuation law, thrifts, option pricing

Introd uction
One key function of insurance regulation is to collect, analyze, and
distribute relevant information to assure the solidity or solvency of
insurance companies (Kimball, 1961). This function presents a difficult challenge to regulators, however, who must balance the conflicting interests of insurers, insureds, and guarantee fund contributors. In
practice, regulation often evolves toward protecting the interests of the
insurers.} In this context, development and implementation of effective
solvency surveillance methods are necessary to minimize the potential
detrimental impact of insolvency for insureds and guarantee funds.
Recent trends in life insurance company insolvencies and expectations of future insolvencies provide sound incentive for analyzing and
redirecting the solvency surveillance mechanisms employed by regulators. In response, the National Association of Insurance Commissioners
(NAIC) has moved to strengthen solvency regulation in the life insurance industry. In 1990 the NAIC adopted the Actuarial Opinion and
Memorandum Regulation as a supplement to the standard valuation
law which mandates financial stress tests for life insurance companies. 2
Prescribed testing methods and assumptions subsequently have been
developed and adopted by the Actuarial Standards Board, in Actuarial
Standards of Practice No.7, Performing Cash Flow Testing for Insurers,
and No. 22, Statutory Statements of Opinion Based on Asset Adequacy
by Appointed Actuaries for Life and Health Insurers. The Actuarial Opinion and Memorandum Regulation requires an opinion by an appointed
ISee, for example, Stigler (1971), Posner (1974), and Becker (1983).
2The NAIC's standard valuation model law specifies the mortality and interest rate
assumptions to be used when valuing reserves. Either the current model law or similar
legislation has been adopted by every state.
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actuary regarding the adequacy of a life company's assets to retire its
liabilities. 3 Opinions will be required to accompany annual statements
for all accounting periods following adoption of the supplement. 4 The
supplement essentially adds a significant and different regulatory responsibility to the appointed actuary's managerial responsibilities.
The framework of the Actuarial Opinion and Memorandum Regulation prescribes, but does not limit the actuary to, a methodology to
be used in analyzing the adequacy of a life company's assets to retire
expected liabilities under designated interest rate scenarios. s The problem addressed in this supplement is interest rate risk or the impact of
changing interest rates on the value of assets and liabilities when their
durations and maturities are not matched. The NAIC's method, known
as multiple scenario cash-flow testing (MSCFT), requires forecasting the
cash flows of present and expected future assets and liabilities for prescribed interest rate scenarios and then comparing cash inflows to cash
outflows over their expected lives.
Prior to the NAIC's development of its financial stress test approach,
similar efforts were underway at the Office of Thrift Supervision6 (OTS)
to measure interest rate risk exposure of thrift institutions. The OTS
net portfolio value model is a stock or mark-to-market? approach that
relies on estimates of the present value of expected future cash flows
from existing assets and liabilities under its own set of interest rate
scenarios. These estimates of asset and liability market values for each
interest rate scenario are compared to illustrate the impact of potential
3The provision charges the appointed actuary to investigate asset default (C-l), underwriting (C-2), and interest rate risk (C-3). This paper is concerned only in the prescribed method for evaluating a life company's interest rate risk exposure. The stock
and MSCF approaches, however, may be adapted to analyze the independent and/or
dynamic impact of asset default risk, underwriting risk, and interest rate risk. A more
powerful solvency test would include the dynamic impact of C-l, C-2, and C-3 risks.
4The American Council of Life Insurance's General Bulletin No. 4836 reports that as
of August 19, 1994 the supplement will be in effect for annual statements of periods
ending December 31, 1994 and thereafter in 30 states and the District of Columbia. The
supplement also will be in effect for annual statement periods ending on December 31,
1995 and thereafter in six additional states and for annual statement periods ending
December 31, 1996 and thereafter in one other state.
sSee the "Report of the Special Advisory Committee on the Standard Valuation Law,"
NArC Proceedings, 1989, Vol. 2, p. 785.
6The Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS) is an agency of the U.S. federal government
created by the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act of 1989
(FIRREA). Its primary responsibility is to regulate and supervise the U.S. savings and
loans industry. The portfolio value model is the result of the FIRREA requirement that
thrifts be subjected to financial stress tests.
7The mark-to-market approach estimates the market value of all assets, off balance
sheet items, and liabilities for a firm. Market value net worth is estimated by subtracting the market value of all financial obligations from the market value of all assets.
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interest rate changes on the market value of net worth or net portfolio
value (market value of assets less market value of liabilities and off
balance sheet contingent liabilities).
The two methods (NAIC and OTS approaches) illustrate one key
question, identified by Kahane et al. (1989): should solvency surveillance approaches focus on existing assets and liabilities or should these
approaches be extended to incorporate the impact of expected future
changes in asset and/or liability structure?
In perfect capital markets 8 both approaches will produce similar
results, as expectations concerning the future impact of exogenously
determined variables necessary to forecast changes in expected future
cash flows will be known and consistent across market participants and,
therefore, also will be embedded in the market prices of assets and liabilities. But under imperfect conditions, e.g., in situations where these
expectations can vary, the approaches are likely to produce divergent
pictures of solvency.
The objective of this paper is to illustrate both approaches to financial stress testing and to analyze the feasibility of each as a regulatory
tool. We argue that in developing and testing operating strategies, incorporating the impact of assumed future changes in the asset and/or
liability structure that mayor may not describe actual future operations
is advantageous from a firm's managerial perspective, but clouds the
regulatory intent of the supplement.
To illustrate, numerical examples representing each approach are
developed from the assets and liabilities of three hypothetical life insurance companies. 9 The operational procedures and results of the
NAIC's MSCFT approach and the OTS stock approach are analyzed and
compared. An option-based model similar to the one used by the OTS
and on Wall Street is employed to estimate the present value and cash
flows of each firm's assets and liabilities. The option-based model is
essential in pricing the assets and liabilities of life insurance companies that contain embedded or explicit options and is the technically
superior method for valuing all fixed or adjustable rate instruments.
8Perfect capital markets typically are defined by the following characteristics: no
transactions costs or taxes exist; assets are perfectly divisible and liquid; no constraining regulations; perfect competition; markets are informationally efficient; and participants are rational expected utility maximizers.
9The three hypothetical insurance companies are developed to demonstrate how the
two different stress test approaches may be implemented and interpreted. These examples are not designed to provide a definitive statement about life insurance company
interest rate risk.
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Why is Solvency Surveillance Important?

At least three market imperfections necessitate effective solvency
surveillance in the insurance and thrift industries. First, information
concerning the quality of assets and liabilities of life insurance companies and thrifts is not known by all parties involved in insurance
and banking transactions. Second, the existence of deposit insurance,
state guarantee funds, and the limited liability of owners and managers
enhances the possibility of moral hazard-induced operating decisions.
Third, publicly available, negative solvency information may lead to a
herd or contagion reaction by policyholders or depositors and produce
runs on life insurance companies and thrifts. In each case, industry
regulators serve an important function in mitigating information asymmetry, monitoring company operations, and protecting the interests of
producers and consumers. An effective solvency surveillance system is
an important and necessary regulatory tool for mitigating these market
imperfections.

2.1

Role of Solvency Surveillance

One of the most important benefits of insurance regulation is to validate the solvency signals generated by life insurance companies. Correspondingly, current and potential policyholders are concerned that
after receiving premiums, life insurance companies will not be able to
satisfy future claims. Alternatively, for depository institutions, current
and potential depositors are concerned with the availability of their deposits. In addition, shareholders (owners), taxing authorities, and deposit insurers or state guarantee funds rely on regulators for regulatory
verification of solvency signals. Because the life insurance industry has
no guarantee system for policyholders, similar to the taxpayer-backed
deposit guarantees of the thrift and commercial banking industries, it
is imperative that regulators identify and resolve problems quickly with
life companies that are at risk of not being able to meet their obligations
in a timely manner.
Strong solvency surveillance also may reduce the moral hazard cost
associated with the limited liability of life company owners and managers. Because of limited liability and higher potential gains, stockholders have an incentive to take more risk because they will not share
in losses in excess of their stock value. The existence of deposit insurance for thrifts and the establishment of state insurance guarantee
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funds for insurance policyholders lo have provided vehicles that enable
owners and managers to shift the negative consequences of increased
risk taking from policyholders and depositors to their respective guarantors. Anecdotal evidence of increased risk-taking behavior may be
indicated by the changing asset/liability structure of the life insurance
industry during the late 1980s.
The shift by some companies to more risky asset/liability structures
is due to modern consumers demanding products with competitive investment components; however, the existence of state guarantee funds
has facilitated this shift. On the liability side, a shift has occurred
from traditional life insurance products with a mortality component to
pension-related products carrying interest rate guarantees with no mortality component, many of which can redeemed before maturity. The
life insurance premium to total income ratio!l declined from an average of 24.5 percent during the 1985-1987 period to 19 percent in 1990.
In contrast, the annuity consideration to total income ratio increased
from an 1985-1987 average of 27 percent to 58 percent in 1990. The
competition among insurers that produced growth in annuity contracts
also influenced some life insurers to seek higher returns by investing
larger proportions of their assets in higher yield, lower liquidity assets
such as junk bonds and commercial mortgages.

2.2

Role of State Insurance Guarantee Funds

State insurance guarantee funds are financed by ex post, pro rata
assessments of the remaining solvent companies in the state when an
insurance company fails. Thus, there is no 'a priori cost to the owners
or managers of the failing company. This current method of assessment
encourages a potential moral hazard cost to guarantee funds.l 2 Also,
part of the cost of funding a state guarantee fund is borne by taxpayers
in the form of state premium tax credits and federal income tax deductions. Thus, the financial consequences of insolvency are borne by
10 Since 1970 guarantee funds have been established in all 50 states and the District
of Columbia. Since 1988 the NAIC Life and Health Insurance Guaranty Association
Model Act has provided a consistent framework for the structure of state insurance
guarantee funds.
II See the 1991 Life Insurance Fact Book for the data involved in the calculations.
12Brewer et al. (l993a and 1993b) provide empirical evidence that the state premium
tax pass-through provision of guarantee funds encourages increased risk taking by
life insurance companies. The existence of moral hazard attributed to a third party
guarantor commonly is discussed in the thrift crisis literature. The existence of moral
hazard did not singularly cause the thrift crisiS; however, it was a factor contributing
to its severity.
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solvent companies and their policyholders, taxpayers, and, to a lesser
extent, policyholders of the insolvent company.13

2.3

The Negative Information Dilemma

Managers and actuaries employed by life insurance companies can
be assumed to act in the best interest of the owners. Consequently, they
may fail to reveal negative information in a timely manner. To delay
the loss of their jobs, managers and company-employed actuaries may
report that a company is solvent when the company may be mark-tomarket insolvent if solvency surveillance reporting requirements allow
considerable latitude in interpretation. It is reasonable to speculate that
a delay in reporting relevant negative information may allow employees
the time to seek employment elsewhere or time for the firm's fortunes
to turn for the better. Belth (1993, p. 198) supports the contention that
negative information concerning life insurer solvency may be delayed.
He observes that most of the major life insurance companies that failed
since 1991 had ratings in "A" or better categories from several rating
agencies until shortly before they were seized by regulators.
Reliance by regulators on book-value-based information seems to
facilitate delaying behavior. Prior to the Actuarial Opinion and Memorandum Regulation, the data and information relied upon by regulators
and policyholders to assess the financial viability of the company were
in book value terms.14 It is widely recognized, however, that financial
solvency only can be measured in market value terms.l s The problem
with relying on book-value-based information is the lag between the
time when market value measures will raise questions concerning solvency and the time when book value data will indicate the same problems. The insolvency of First Executive Corporation is an excellent example of this time lag.
In 1991 the assets of First Executive Corporation were seized by
California and New York regulators. 16 The seizure occurred after First
13Most states establish limits to the liability of the guarantee fund for death benefits,
cash value and guarantee investment contract withdrawals, annuity, and health benefits. Som~ states limit guarantee fund liability only to contracts written by domestic
insurers and/or to contracts held by residents.
14For example, the NAIC's insurance regulatory information system (IRIS) consists of
12 book-value-based ratios. Also, insurance rating companies typically rely on book
value data.
ISSee, for example, White (1991) for a thorough discussion of the implications of
book versus market value financial reporting.
16See Fenn and Cole (1992) for a description of the events leading to the seizure of
First Executive Corporations assets.
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Executive had written down $500 million in book value of junk bonds
in 1990 and another $450 million in 1991 that depleted its book value
net worth. The market value of the marked down assets, however, was
significantly below book values in 1990 and 1991. Observers relying on
mark-to-market net worth could have identified the insolvency much
earlier. After its seizure in 1991 the amount by which the current value
of First Executive's liabilities exceeded its assets was estimated to be
more than $1 billion. This loss will be passed to the guarantee funds
of California and New York.
The motivation underlying the NAIC's provision is to lessen the
impact of interest-rate-risk-induced insolvency. The key is to identify risky situations, via the stress test approach, in advance. The information developed under this framework can be used by regulators
and company management to develop operating strategies that reduce
or eliminate the possibility of insolvency resulting from interest rate
changes.

3 NAIC AND OTS Approaches
Both the OTS's net portfolio value model and the NAIC's MSCFT attempt to measure the impact of changing interest rates on the solvency
of their respective institutions using financial stress tests. The MSCFT
is a run-off approach that forecasts and examines the annual or quarterly net cash flows produced by the firm's existing and expected future
assets and liabilities under different interest rate scenarios. The OTS 17
stock approach involves pricing or marking to market the existing assets, off balance sheet items, and liabilities of the institution under
different interest rate scenarios. The first fundamental difference between the two approaches is their asset liability perspective. The NAIC's
approach starts with the firm's existing assets, liabilities, underwriting
policy, investment policy, and claims-paying policy and incorporates expected future changes in the asset and/or liability structure attributable
to future changes in underwriting, investment, and claims-paying policies. The NAIC's approach focuses on the question of whether under
different interest rate scenarios the expected cash flows of the assets
will be sufficient to cover the expected cash demands of liabilities. The
NAIC's approach illustrates the impact of interest rate changes on expected future firm liquidity and solvency.
17For a complete description of this approach, see The OTS Market Value Model, Capital Markets produced by Office of Thrift Supervision, 1700 G. Street, NW, Washington,
D.C. 20552 and Gordon (1993).
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In contrast, the OTS approach focuses on existing assets and liabilities and under different interest rate scenarios addresses the question
of whether the current market value of assets is greater than or equal
to the current market value of liabilities. The OTS approach also illustrates the impact of interest rate changes on a firm's liquidity and
solvency. For example, when interest rates rise, life insurance companies are likely to incur increased contract surrenders and policy loan
utilization at a time when the market value of the assets supporting
liabilities has declined. In a liquidity shortage the fair market value
of assets, rather than the amortized cost, is the amount of the firm's
assets available to cover a firm's obligations.
The second fundamental difference between the two approaches
is the procedure required for implementation. To operationalize the
MSCF approach, firm-specific assumptions must be made by the appOinted actuary concerning future underwriting, investment, claimspaying policies, and the reinvestment of cash inflows. These endogenous assumptions can influence the future asset and liability structure
substantially. The supplement provides that appointed actuaries may
rely on other company officials for these assumptions. The actuary
must document the assumptions and note their source in a supporting
memorandum. The NAIC's supplement also suggests that the actuary
consider the insurer's policies and practices relative to the sale of assets
prior to maturity and the disposal of assets with declining values. The
analysis must contain cash-flow projections for assets and liabilities
under seven interest rate scenarios:
1. Level with no deviations;

2. Uniformly increasing over ten years at 0.5 percent per year and
then level;
3. Uniformly increasing at 1 percent per year over five years and then
uniformly decreasing at 1 percent per year to the original level at
the end of ten years and then level;
4. An immediate increase of 3 percent and then level;
5. An immediate decrease of 3 percent and then level;
6. Uniformly decreasing over ten years at 0.5 percent per year and
then level; and
7. Uniformly decreasing at 1 percent per year over five years and
then uniformly increasing at 1 percent per year to the original
level at the end of ten years and then level.
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The appointed actuary's opinion must indicate whether the insurer has
established sufficient reserves to assure that its reserves plus cash flow
from its assets will meet the cash flow requirements of its liabilities.
Operationalization of the stock approach varies significantly from
that of the MSCF approach. Because the calculations are performed by
the OTS staff, the OTS need only specify a valuation methodology and
a uniform set of assumptions that will be consistent across all thrifts.
The OTS approach first marks to market all assets, liabilities, and off
balance sheet items to estimate the institution's mark-to-market portfolio net worth under the current interest rate environment (the current U.S. Treasury yield curve). Next, the model recalculates the in-.
stitution's mark-to-market net worth under different interest rate scenarios. Specifically, the model projects mark-to-market net worth that
would result from instantaneous, parallel shifts in the U.S. Treasury
yield curve of -400, -300, -200, -100, +100, +200, +300, and +400 basis
points. The change in the mark-to-market net worth of the institution
under the different interest rate scenarios provides a definitive measure
of the institution's exposure to interest rate risk is
There is a fundamental difference between the interest rate scenarios that will facilitate the NAIC's run-off approach and the OTS optionbased, mark-to-market approach. The option-based model requires interest rate scenarios that result in an instantaneous shift in the base
yield curve that produces a monotonically flat, increasing, or decreasing function. NAIC scenarios 3 and 7 do not facilitate use of the optionbased model as they must be interpreted as nonmonotonic yield curves
from the mark-to-market perspective. 19 A change in the slope from positive to negative or vice versa in the yield curve will result in negative or
large positive implied forward rates. The existence of a nonmonotonic
yield curve and either negative or very large positive implied forward
rates suggest that arbitrage opportunities would be available. The efficiency of the U.S. Treasury market makes it difficult to believe that an
interest rate scenario that creates arbitrage opportunities could exist
for any reasonable length of time. Therefore, NAIC scenarios 3 and 7
preclude the use of the option-based model and will not be analyzed in
this paper.
18 A measure of thrift solvency is the adequacy of the mark-to-market portfolio net
worth to meet regulatory capital standards with either a plus or minus 300 basis point
parallel shift in the U.S. Treasury yield curve.
19The apparent interpretation of the application of the NArC's interest rate scenarios
is that each scenario causes a series of (rather than instantaneous) parallel shifts in
the current yield curve. For example, NArC scenario 3 would result in the current yield
curve shifting upward by 1 percent each year for five years and subsequently shifting
downward by 1 percent each year for the final five years.
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A second difference between the NAIC and OTS interest rate scenarios concerns how each approach incorporates the risk of changing
yield curve slopes. NAIC scenarios 2 and 6 explicitly address changing yield curve slope risk. The OTS approach incorporates changing
yield curve slope risk in the interest rate process used to estimate the
current market price of each contract. The interest rate process uses
each base interest rate scenario to simulate 300 random possible interest rate paths (yield curves) with varying slopes that are consistent
with U.S. Treasury yield curves observed between 1980 and 1990. Each
interest rate path is used to discount path specific cash flows that predict the path-specific current market price for each security or contract.
The estimated current market value of the security or contract is the
average of the 300 simulated path specific prices.
To evaluate each of the two approaches it is necessary to identify
the separate managerial and regulatory objectives of the supplement.
Management's perspective is to assess the impact of various operating
strategies on the market values of asset and liabilities or their relative
cash flow consequences under varying economic scenarios. Therefore,
it is important to incorporate firm-specific assumptions concerning
current and future operating strategies. These assumptions, however,
mayor may not describe actual future operations. From the regulatory perspective of validating firm solvency signals, the analytic method
of choice should be applied consistently under homogeneous assumptions over time and across firms to produce comparative results. Otherwise, it is possible that solvency opinions concerning similar firms will
vary significantly due to reliance on different operating assumptions.
Numerical examples are developed in the next section to facilitate a
comparison of each approach under consistent operating assumptions.

4

Numerical Examples

The assets and liabilities of three hypothetical 2o life insurance firms
are employed to illustrate the stock and MSCF models. The difference
between each firm is the degree of capitalization. The first firm's balance sheet is designed to produce a capital plus surplus to total asset ratio (capital ratio) of 0.15 which is over twice the recent industry average
20To maintain focus on the central main point of this paper, the assumptions lead·
ing to the hypothetical insurance companies are designed to be abstract from the full
scope of potential insurance company operations. Including more complex insurance
contracts, other types of assets, or lengthening the time period over which the methods are analyzed would add greater complexity to the results without altering their
fundamental structure or validity.
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of 0.065. The second firm's balance sheet is designed to approximate
the industry average with a capital ratio of 0.0627. The third firm's balance sheet is designed to approximate an undercapitalized firm with a
capital ratio of 0.029. Each initial balance sheet is illustrated in the base
case columns of Table I, Panels A, B, and C, respectively. The balance
sheets are designed to be simple yet representative of typical asset and
liability maturities.
The assets consist of cash, mortgage-backed securities (MBS), principal only strips 21 (PO), and ten year u.s. Treasury bonds (T-bonds). The
dollar investment in MBS is altered for each firm to produce the different capital ratios. $1.5 billion is invested in MBS for the first firm, $1.2
billion for the second firm, and $1.1 billion for the third firm. Both the
MBS and the PO have 30 year maturities and yield 7.5 percent. The MBS
currently are priced at par and the PO at 43.1938. Both the MBS and PO
assume a 0.004 loan servicing rate and carry a 66.6 basis point optionadjusted spread (OAS) above the current Treasury term structure. The
ten year T-bonds yield 6.6144 percent and currently are priced at par.
The liabilities consist of term insurance and deferred annuities. The
term insurance portfolio consists of $100 billion face value annually renewable term policies. Insured are 10,000 males at each age 25 through
59. The composition of the group of insureds is constant in time. Each
year new policies are written on 10,000 25-year-olds. All policies are
terminated at the end of the year in which each insured reaches age
59. Group mortality expense remain constant at the number of expected deaths in the group multiplied by the average policy face value.
Expenses are ignored, as they will not influence the balance sheet; however, they easily could be included. A 5 percent profit loading is added
to the pure premium of insurance products and carried to the asset
side of the balance sheet.
The single premium deferred life annuities were purchased by 10,000
60-year-old males five years ago, of which 9,393.83 survive at this time.
The annual annuity payment is $24,000 per annuitant and produces
an annuity consideration reserve of $2,131,512,400. A 5 percent profit
loading is added to this liability and carried to the asset side of the
balance sheet.

21 Mortgage·backed

secuntIes may be stripped into two cash-flow components:

interest-only cash flows (10) and principal-only cash f70ws (PO). The owner of a PO will

receive monthly payments amounting to the principal payments made by the borrower
into the pool of mortgages securitizing the mortgage-backed securities. The IO owners
will receive the interest component.
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Table 1
Mark-to-Market Life Insurance Company Balance Sheets
Panel A: Above Average Capitalized Firm (Capital + Surplus) I Total Assets = 0.15

Assets
Cash
Mortgage-Backed Securities
Principal Only Strip
Ten Year U.S. T-Bond
Total Assets
Liabilities and Net Worth
Net Term Policy Reserves
Net Annuity Reserves
Total Liabilities
Capital & Surplus
Total Liabilities and Net Worth
CS/TA
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(1)

(2)

(3)

Base Case
No Shift

300 BP Parallel
Upward Shift

300 BP Parallel Down
Shift

(4)
50 BP Per Year
Upward Shift

39,619,622
1,500,000,000
750,000,000
900,000,000
3,189,619,622

39,619,622
1,197,178,500
456,042,881
730,490,400
2,423,331,403

39,619,622
1,784,631,000
1,296,927,452
1,125,459,000
4,246,637,074

39,619,622
1,093,129,500
442,188,462
623,571,300
2,198,508,884
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577 ,000,000
2, 13 1,512,400
2,708,512,400
481,1 07 ,222
3,189,619,622
0.15084

577 ,000,000
1,716,720,052
2,293,720,052
129,611,351
2,423,331,403
0.05348

577 ,000,000
2,752,206,600
3,329,206,600
917,430,474
4,246,637,074
0.21604

577 ,000,000
1,532,675,460
2,109,675,460
88,833,424
2,198,508,884
0.04041
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Table 1 (cont.)
Mark-to-Market Life Insurance Company Balance Sheets
Panel B: Average Capitalized Firm (Capital + Surplus) I Total Assets = 0.0627

Assets
Cash
Mortgage-Backed Securities
Principal Only Strip
Ten Year U.S. T-Bond
Total Assets
Liabilities and Net Worth
Net Term Policy Reserves
Net Annuity Reserves
Total Liabilities
Capital & Surplus
Total Liabilities and Net Worth
CS/TA

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

Base Case
No Shift

300 BP Parallel
Upward Shift

300 BP Parallel Down
Shift

50 BP Per Year
Upward Shift

I.-
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III

39,619,622
1,200,000,000
750,000,000
900,000,000
2,889,619,622

39,619,622
957,742,800
456,042,881
730,490,400
2,183,895,703

39,619,622
1,427,704,800
1,296,927,453
1,125,459,000
3,889,710,875

39,619,622
874,503,600
442,188,462
623,571,300
1,979,882,984

577 ,000,000
2, 131 ,512,400
2,708,512,400
181,107,222
2,889,619,622
0.06268

577 ,000,000
1,716,720,052
2,293,720,052
-109,824,349
2,183,895,703
-0.05029

577,000,000
2,752,206,600
3,329,206,600
560,504,275
3,889,710,875
0.14099

577 ,000,000
1,532,675,460
2,109,675,460
-129,792,476
1,979,882,984
-0.06555
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Table 1 (cont.)
Mark-to-Market Life Insurance Company Balance Sheets
Panel C: Below Average Capitalized Firm (Capital + Surplus) I Total Assets = 0.029
(1)

Base Case
No Shift
Assets
Cash
Mortgage-Backed Securities
Principal Only Strip
Ten Year U.S. T-Bond
Total Assets
Liabilities and Net Worth
Net Term Policy Reserves
Net Annuity Reserves
Total Liabilities
Capital & Surplus
Total Liabilities and Net Worth
CS/TA

(2)
300 BP Parallel
Upward Shift

(3)
300 BP Parallel Down
Shift
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(4)
50 BP Per Year
Upward Shift

39,619,622
1,100,000,000
750,000,000
900,000,000
2,789,619,622

39,619,622
877 ,930,900
456,042,881
730,490,400
2,104,083,803

39,619,622
1,308,729,400
1,296,927,453
1,125,459,000
3,770,735,475

39,619,622
801,628,300
442,188,462
623,571,300
1,907,007,684

577 ,000,000
2,131,512,400
2,708,512,400
81,107,222
2,789,619,622
0.02907

577 ,000,000
1,716,720,052
2,293,720,052
-189,636,249
2,104,083,803
-0.09013

577,000,000
2,752,206,600
3,329,206,600
441,528,875
3,770,735,475
0.11709

577 ,000,000
1,532,675,460
2,109,675,460
-202,667,776
1,907,007,684
-0.10627
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The MSCF example is further simplified by omitting the impacts of
expected changes in the asset liability structure. Making the assumption that no changes will occur in the future asset liability structure
is reasonable because too many possibilities exist to develop a reasonable outlook for each. The forward nature of insurance and annuity
contracts imply that by omitting expected future changes in the assetliability structure, the MSCFT results will be conservative assessments
that are consistent across firms. It also is assumed that reinvestable
funds are invested at the one year implied forward U.S. Treasury rate.
Numerical examples of both the stock and MSCF approaches are
developed with the three insurance firm balance sheets under the four
rational interest rate scenarios. The interest rate scenarios are:
• Level with no deviations;
• A 300 basis point parallel upward shift in the term structure;
• A 300 basis point downward shift in the term structure; and
• A 50 basis point upward shift in the term structure in each of the
next ten years.
The appendix contains a brief discussion of the theoretical differences
in each approach.

5 Numerical Results
The results of the stock analysis are shown in Table 1 with Panels A,
B, and C representing the three levels of capitalization. The above average capitalized insurance company (Table 1, Panel A) always maintains
a mark-to-market capital and surplus that is positive; thus, it is anticipated that this firm would be able to withstand significant increases in
interest rates and severe changes in the economy and still remain solvent. Alternatively, the capital ratios for the average (Table 1, Panel B)
and the below average capitalized (Table 1, Panel C) firms become significantly negative under both of the increasing interest rate scenarios.
Thus, it is anticipated that neither the average nor the below average
capitalized firms would remain solvent if the interest rate increases
were realized in the near future and a need to liquidate assets would
arise.
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Tables 2 and 3 display the results of the MSCF approach. Table 2
displays the first two years of the cash flow income statement for the
current term structure of the average capitalized firm. Table 3 displays
the first ten year cash flow revenues for each of the three companies
for the four interest rate scenarios. For ease of comparison, the capital
and surplus (mark-to-market net worth) and the capital ratios (CS/TA)
obtained under the stock approach in Table 1 also are listed in Table 3.

Table 2
Annual Cash Flow Revenues
(Base Case - Average Capitalization Firm)
Year 2
Cash Revenues:
Year 1
Mortgage-Backed Securities
88,332,528
91,006,273
Interest on MBS
10,989,281
10,374,911
Normal Payment of Principal
48,441,096
18,857,460
Prepayment of Principal
Principal Only Securities
Normal Principal Payment
Prepayment of Principal
10 Year Treasury Interest
Return of Reinvested Funds
Term Insurance Premium

605,849,980

6,868,301
30,275,686
59,529,596
1,283,731
605,849,980

Total of Revenue

803,888,450

851,570,240

Cash Expenses
Actuarial Cost of
Term Insurance
Actuarial Cost of Annuity

577 ,000,000
225,451,920

577 ,000,000
222,250,510

Total Cash Expenses

802,451,900

799,250,500

C.F. Earnings Before Taxes
Taxes and Dividends

1,436,544
215,481.6

52,319,744
7,847,962

Net Cash Flow After Taxes

1,221,062

44,471,784

6,484,319
11,785,913
59,529,596

o
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Table 3 demonstrates that the cash flow revenues generated are positive in all years for the above average capitalized company; whereas
for the below average and the average capitalized firms, negative annual cash flow revenues are found in the early years for the scenarios
involving increasing interest rates. With the average capitalized firm,
initial year cash flows are negative for the increasing interest rate scenarios; however, net cash flows in all subsequent years are positive.
With the below average capitalized firm, initial cash flows are negative
for the base case and increasing interest rate scenarios; however, for
all interest rate scenarios, net cash flows even for the below average
capitalized firm subsequently become positive.
The MSCF results do not seem to indicate future solvency concerns
for the average and below average capitalized firms. In contrast, the
stock approach test results indicate that the average and below average capitalized firms would have problems liquidating assets to satisfy disintermediation or run induced contract redemptions. The MSCF
method does not explicitly or implicitly address the possibility of disintermediation,22 runs,23 or the asset liquidity problems that recently
have plagued the life insurance industry. Many of the insolvencies that
have occurred since the early 1990s are the outcome of operating strategies developed in the late 1970s and early 1980s to deal with high interest rates and increased product market competition.
The net impact, that mayor may not be incorporated in the MSCF
approach, is that assets, whose values typically are reported in book
terms rather than lower market values, must be liquidated at a loss or
effectively marked to market. Such losses can deplete or eliminate net
worth or capital and surplus, as was the case in many of the early 1990s
insolvencies.

22 Disintermediation is the process where liabilities of the insurance company are
involuntarily paid off due to policy surrenders or terminations of deferred annuity
contracts and the funds are transferred to higher yielding investments in the general
market. Similarly for thrifts, this occurs when depositors withdraw their deposits and
reinvest them in higher yielding investments.
23The possibility of disintermediation and/or runs in the life insurance industry also
has received considerable attention in the media. This attention was initiated by announcements of significant losses in the value of commercial real estate owned by
Mutual Benefit Life and The Travelers and in junk bonds owned by First Executive Corporation. The prospect of runs is a difficult issue for regulators, as the potential impact
of negative solvency information is that the holders of interest-sensitive life insurance
and annuity contracts will redeem them. First Executive Corporation's two subsidiaries
reportedly experienced more than $3 billion in redemptions while Mutual Benefit Life
reportedly experienced more than $500 million in redemptions prior to being taken
over by regulators.
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Table 3
Net Cash Flow After Taxes
Panel A: Above Average Capitalized Firm
300 BP
Base Case
Shift UQ
Year
1
26,771,818
12,655,997
55,731,060
2
98,704,176
175,939,120
111,451,240
3
205,575,780
146,603,970
4
175,019,490
223,275,170
5
202,031,490
237,654,780
6
252,240,400
229,872,370
7
267,919,230
259,158,020
8
285,205,660
290,260,930
9
304,457,540
323,470,110
10
Capital &
Surplus *
CS/TA *

481,107,222
0.15084

300BP
Shift Down
135,832,940
477,233,090
720,375,870
694,296,510
629,518,780
557,733,630
489,598,590
428,027,900
374,258,880
328,775,970

50 BP
UQ Per Year
10,643,251
47,118,232
93,151,024
126,135,810
156,581,540
189,134,930
227,172,770
274,503,040
334,298,500
407,902,850

129,611,351
0.05348

917,430,474
0.21604

88,833,424
0.04041

Panel B: Average Capitalized Firm
Year
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10

Base Case
1,221,062
44,471,784
94,880,016
105,842,660
107,914,530
109,031,090
111,765,890
116,828,950
124,642,100
135,509,860

300 BP
Shift UQ
(11,115,062)
6,378,944
36,832,608
50,649,772
60,064,456
69,773,928
81,407,208
95,478,744
112,334,310
132,266,370

300BP
Shift Down
98,882,120
385,982,300
595,164,540
564,104,640
498,524,000
427,595,810
360,518,820
299,966,500
247,156,830
202,560,960

50BP
UQ Per Year
(12,791,344)
(702,140)
21,462,540
32,922,554
42,630,724
54,290,440
69,779,480
91,110,808
120,091,590
157,933,760

Capital &
Surplus *
CS/TA *

181,107,222
0.06268

(109,824,349)
-0.05029

560,504,275
0.14099

(129,792,476)
-0.06555
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Table 3 (coot.)
Net Cash Flow After Taxes
Panel C: Below Average Capitalized Firm
300 BP
300 BP
Shift U{J
Shift Down
Year
Base Case
(19,038,748)
85,432,368
(7,295,802)
1
(10,071,779) 351,036,190
26,394,336
2
67,860,352
11,959,786 544,235,710
3
72,537,664
18,665,076 510,393,860
4
69,461,072
21 746,182 444,536,990
5
25,688,116 374,286,210
66,156,600
6
31,918,874 308,232,480
64,941,088
7
40,919,028 248,872,110
66,465,540
8
53,025,528 197,334,530
71,120,872
9
68,531,872 154,047,970
79,193,888
10
Capital &
Surplus *
CS/TA*

81,107,222
0.02907

(189,636,249)
-0.09013

441,528,875
0.11708

50BP
U{J Per Year
(20,602,858)
( 16,642,266)
(2,433,584 )
1,851,504
4,647,175
9,342,330
17,315,084
29,980,058
48,689,252
74,610,688

(202,667,776)
-0.10627

* Note: The capital and surplus (mark-to-market net worth) and ratio of common
stock to total assets (CS/TA) from the relevant balance sheet in Table 1 are
included for comparison
The consequence of focusing on expected cash flows and ignoring
asset liquidity and the possibility of runs and disintermediation, especially during periods of rapidly changing interest rates, can be a failure
to identify life companies that are at risk of being unable to withstand
significant interest-rate-induced asset liquidations.
The advantages of the stock approach in detecting solvency problems is obvious when Tables 1, 2, and 3 are compared. The impact of
the different interest rate scenarios on mark-to-market capital and surplus is unambiguously apparent. The stock approach results provide a
definite answer to questions concerning the ability of a firm's existing
assets to retire its existing liabilities when interest rates change. 24 The
current balance sheet is marked to market based on the current, observable u.s. Treasury yield curve. The potential inconsistencies stemming
241n addition to its use by regulators, the potential impact on the firm's solvency given
different operating assumptions also may be illustrated using the stock approach.

Spahr and Gronewoller: Life Insurer Solvency

45

from the assumptions regarding endogenously determined variables
such as reinvestment rates, business growth rates, or future asset and
liability structures are not evident.
The advantage of the MSCF approach lies in its capability to facilitate
developing and testing operating strategies that will optimize, within
managerial and regulatory constraints, a life insurance company's interest rate risk exposure. Once a problem has been identified, it is
essential to analyze the economic consequences that various operating assumptions (such as product mix, pricing, and/or asset allocation
strategies) can have on rectifying the problem.

6

Conclusions and Recommendations

This study addresses requirements of the 1990 supplement to the
standard valuation law. We evaluate the regulatory effectiveness of
the NAIC's recommended financial stress test for life insurance companies, and we compare the NAIC approach to a similar stress test designed by the OTS for the thrift industry. The NAIC's MSCFT requires
the appointed actuary to forecast annual or quarterly net cash flows
over a reasonable period for different interest rate scenarios and give
an opinion concerning the expected solvency of the firm. From a regulatory perspective, the procedures necessary to implement the MSCF
approach may not lead to consistent opinions. Alternatively, the OTS
stock approach stress test marks to market all assets, off balance sheet
activities, and liabilities for the current U.S. Treasury term structure and
for different interest rate scenarios. The stock approach implementation procedures are clearly defined and are applied evenly across all
thrifts.
The MSCF approach indicates that the cash flows for each of this
study'S hypothetical insurance firms should be adequate to satisfy expected future liabilities or that the firm can be expected to remain solvent and have no liquidity problems. Alternatively, the stock approach
indicates (using the same hypothetical life insurance companies, time
frame, and data) that the current value of assets is less than the current
value of liabilities for the average and below average capitalized firm
during upward shifting interest rate scenarios. The stock approach results imply that the average and below average capitalized firms would
have problems liquidating assets in the event of a run or disintermediation.
In light of viable alternatives, M~CFT may not be the most effective surveillance tool. The results show that, relative to the OTS ap-
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proach, the MSCF approach may fail to identify potentially risky situations because of its dependence on assumptions concerning product
mix, pricing, the future asset-liability structure, and reinvested returns.
MSCFT is sensitive to these assumptions used to forecast cash flows
and may not adequately incorporate the liquidity risk associated with
assets. Also, no definitive criterion for assessing financial solvency is
apparent with the MSCFT method.
The MSCF approach is an effective managerial tool, however, in that
it facilitates the simulation of the cash flows for prospective operating
strategies under various economic scenarios. We suggest that employing both stress test methods will produce a superior solvency surveillance mechanism and better managerial strategies for dealing with the
interest rate, liquidity, mortality, and morbidity risks encountered by
life insurance companies.
In implementing the stress test approaches one additional critical
concern emerges. The responsibility for the stress testing of thrifts lies
with the OTS, while the responsibility for stress tests of life insurance
firms falls on an actuary appointed and employed by the firm being
tested. The conflicting incentive structure under which the appointed
actuary must operate can be expected to influence at least some opinions. Future amendments to the NAIC's supplement must address this
issue.

References
American Council of Life Insurance. 1991 Life Insurance Fact Book.
Washington, D.C.: American Council of Life Insurance, 1991.
American Council of Life Insurance. "State Adoptions of Valuation Actuary Requirements." General Bulletin No. 4836 (August 19, 1994).
Becker, G.S. "A Theory of Competition Among Pressure Groups for Political Influence." The Quarterly Journal of Economies, 97 (1983): 371400.
Belth, J.M. (ed.). "How Insurance Consumers Will Be Victimized By Misuse of Risk-Based Capital Data." The Insurance Forum 20, no. 11
(1993): 195-198.
Brewer III, E., Mondschean, T.H. and Strahan, P.E. "Why the Life Insurance Industry Did Not Face an'S & L' Type Crisis." Federal Reserve
Bank of Chicago Economic Perspectives (September/October 1993a):
12-24.

Spahr and Gronewoller: Life Insurer Solvency

47

Brewer III, E., Mondschean, T.H. and Strahan, P.E. "Do Government Guarantees of Life Insurance Liabilities Lead to Increased Risk-Taking?"
(Unpublished paper), Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago (1993b).
Fenn, G. and Cole, R. "Announcement of Asset Quality Problems and
Stock Returns: The Case of Life Insurance Companies." Proceedings
of a Conference on Bank Structure and Competition, Federal Reserve
Bank of Chicago (1992): 818-842.
Gordon, D.]. "Measuring Interest Rate Risk With The OTS Net Portfolio
Value Model." Paper presented at the Western Economic Association
International Conference, June 21,1993, Lake Tahoe, Nevada.
Kahane, Y., Tapiero, C.S. and Jacques, ]. "Concepts and Trends in the
Study of Insurer's Solvency." In Financial Models of Insurance Solvency (eds. ]. David Cummins and Richard A. Derrig). Boston, Mass.:
Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1989.
Kimball, S.L. "The Purpose of Insurance Regulation: A Preliminary Inquiry in the Theory of Insurance Law." Minnesota Law Review, 45
(1961): 471-524.
Office of Thrift Supervision. The OTS Market Value Model, Capital Markets. Washington, D.C.: Office of Thrift Supervision, 1989.
Posner, R.A. "Theories of Economic Regulation." The Bell Journal of Economics and Management Science 5 (Autumn 1974): 335-357.
Stigler, G.L. "The Theory of Economic Regulation." The Bell Journal of
Economics and Management Science 15, no. 1 (1971): 3-21.
White, L.]. The S & L Debacle: Policy Lessons for Bank and Thrift Regulation. New York: Oxford University Press, 1991.

Appendix
The theoretical difference between the NAIC's MSCF approach and
the OTS mark-to-market approach lies in the focus and methodologies
of the analysis.
The OTS mark-to-market approach focuses on the expectation of the
market value of the firm's current set of assets and liabilities. Equation
(2) below illustrates the process used in this paper to mark-to-market
the firm's assets and liabilities of each hypothetical firm under each
interest rate shift scenario:
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E[MVNW]

(1)

where:
E
MVNW
CFAijt

CFLijt

NA
NL
Mj(A)
Mj(L)
fijk(A)

The (statistical) expectations operator;
Current market value of net worth;
Cash flows generated during time period
by asset j for interest rate path i;
Cash flows generated during time period
by liability j for interest rate path i;
Number of assets;
Number of liabilities;
Time to maturity for asset j;
Time to maturity for liability j;
The time k implied monthly forward rate
interest path i and asset j.
The time k implied monthly forward rate
interest path i and liability j.

t

t

of interest for
of interest for

Equation (2) takes into account the impact of dynamic interest rate
changes on the current value of assets and liabilities. Both assets and
liabilities are priced given the cash flows generated under 300 different possible interest rate paths. Thus, each of the 300 different interest
rate paths will generate a different pattern of cash flows and a different
set of discount rates. For interest rate scenarios of parallel shifts up
and down of 300 basis points and up of 50 basis points per year for ten
years in today's Treasury yield curve, the results provide a clear expectation of the firm's capacity to absorb significant shifts in interest rates.
The stock approach results also illustrate the possible consequences of
disintermediation and/or runs.
The MSCF approach focuses on a series of static comparisons of estimates or forecasts of the future cash flows that can be expected to be
generated from both the current and expected future set of assets and
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liabilities. This process is depicted in equation (3). Forecasting future
cash flows requires assumptions concerning the future product mix, its
pricing, the future asset liability structure, and reinvested returns. If
e(.) denotes the set of assumptions, then
CFt =

NA

NL

j=l

j=l

L {CAjt I eA,d - L {CLjt I eL,k}

(2)

for t = l,2, ... ,M and k = l,2, ... ,K
where:
CFt
CAjt
CL jt

eA,k
eA,k
K

Net cash flows generated during period t;
Asset j's cash flows during period t;
Liability j's cash flows during period t;
Assumptions for assets under scenario k;
Assumptions for liabilities under scenario k; and
The number of operating scenarios examined.

The two methods will produce similar results when E[CFAijtJ = CAjtJ
and E[CFLijtJ = CLjtJ for all j and t. This condition occurs when eA
and eL in the MSCF approach are consistent with the assumptions of
the stock approach (which are the current operating and capital structure) and the analysis is concerned only with the run-off of the current
book of business. Small deviations from this condition can lead to significantly different results.
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HIV, AIDS, Markov Processes, and Health and
Disability Insurance
Steven Haberman*
Abstract t
This paper presents a Markov model of the transmission and development
of HIV and AIDS. The Markov model is used to derive functions needed in the
calculation of disability insurance premiums, reserves, and cash flows. An
application to health insurance and disability insurance is provided.
Key words and phrases: permanent health insurance, transition probabilities,
premiums, cash flows

1 Introduction
In the late 1980s the Institute of Actuaries AIDS working party developed a Markov model of the transmission and spread of AIDS among
(only) male homosexuals in the United Kingdom; see Daykin et al. (1988a,
1988b, 1990), This model is, in many respects, similar to other mathematical models proposed for the transmission and spread of AIDS.l
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IThe use of Markov models in actuarial mathematics has been proposed by a number of authors; for example, see Waters (1984, 1989), Amsler (1988), Haberman (1988,
1992), Hoem (1988), Wilkie (1988), Norberg (1988), Ramsay (1989), Continuous Mortality Investigation Report No. 12 (1991), Pitacco (1993), and Jones (1994). For a review
of the mathematical models proposed for the transmission and spread of AIDS, see
Haberman (1990). Markov models and their applications to life contingencies are included in the Institute and Faculty of Actuaries' syllabus for their professional subject,
actuarial mathematics (Subject D). See Chadburn et al. (1993).
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The emphasis of actuarial models of HIV/ AIDS has been the impact
of HIV and AIDS on life insurance underwriting, life insurance premiums, reserving, and, to a lesser extent, health insurance and pension
provision. The Institute of Actuaries working party's model attempts
(in their own words): "(t)o show the potential impact of HIV on mortality and morbidity and the implications for the use of existing actuarial
bases and standard tables for premium rating and reserving". To accomplish this, the Institute of Actuaries working party developed an
age-specific model that allows them to use the type of data that normally are available to an insurance company to do the following: (i) to
consider the progress of individuals of a given age and gender through
future calendar years, (ii) to consider the longer-term trend in transmission, and (iii) to produce numerical results (although not necessarily by
analytical means). For these reasons, equilibrium models are of less
interest.
The objective of this paper is to develop a modified version of the Institute of Actuaries AIDS working party model. This model then is used
to determine the permanent health insurance (PHI) valuation functions
needed for the calculation of net premiums and policy values. Examples are given to illustrate formulae and calculations that could be of
value in supporting actuarial decisions on pricing and reserving for PHI.
In practice, pricing is based on cash-flow models (as well as on present
value considerations) using realistic assumptions and allowing for the
cost of capital tied up in the establishment of reserves on a more stringent basis. A brief discussion of the equations needed for cash-flow
and profit-testing models is provided in Section 6.
The approach advocated in this paper permits the development of
partial derivatives of the key valuation functions so that their sensitivities to changes in the underlying parameters (e.g., force of interest,
transition intensities) can be measured explicitly. This information is
intended to supplement the calculation of sensitivities based on intensive computer-based calculations. An advantage of making these simplified assumptions to the Institute of Actuaries AIDS working party's
model is that the resulting simplified model provides an approximation to the transmission of HIV and development of AIDS without the
restrictions to the male homosexual population.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 provides a brief description of the Institute of Actuaries AIDS working party model. Section 3
describes the modified model used throughout the rest of the paper.
Section 4 describes the basics of PHI in the United Kingdom, while Section 5 provides expressions for several PHI valuation functions. Section
6 provides a mathematical description of the expected emerging costs
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and cash flows. Finally, Section 7 provides various extensions and modifications to the model described in Section 3.

2

Institute of Actuaries AIDS Working Party Model

The Institute of Actuaries AIDS working party model is a Markov
model of the transmission and the progression of HIV among male
homosexuals only, with each cohort (of a single age) treated independently. The model assumes that infection occurs from contact between
two individuals homosexuals within a single age group. 2 This assumption is artificial, but if infections between those of different ages balance, it may be a reasonable representation of reality. The transition
intensities between states are allowed to vary with attained age and
time. The model allows for immigration of susceptibles and for normal
mortality as well as extra mortality from AIDS.
The AIDS working party made several other simplifying assumptions, including the follOWing:
• That all males described as being at risk of infection behave in the
same manner at anyone time. As a result, the probability of infection depends on the age of the individual at risk and the particular
calendar year, but not on any subdivision according to frequency
of sexual contact or frequency of change of sexual partner.
• There are six states. The members of one cohort at age x may
be in anyone of the six discrete states indicated in Figure 1. Five
of these are live states: clear, at risk, immune, positive, and sick
from AIDS. The sixth state is the dead state.
Those in the clear state are those whose sexual activity puts them
at no risk of becoming infected with HIV. They form the normal
pre-AIDS population for comparative purposes. Those at risk are
at risk of acquiring HIV infection through sexual contact with infected persons. Those in the immune state are assumed to have
acquired HIV infection and to be infectious, but to be immune
from becoming sick from AIDS or dying from AIDS. Those in the
positive state are HIV seropositive, but not yet sick from AIDS;
they are infectious and not immune.
• It is possible to distinguish those who are HIV seropositive from

those who are sick from AIDS. In reality, there are several stages
2This model ignores the possibility of heterosexual transmission of the disease and
the effects of risk factors such as intravenous drug use and geographic location.
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Figure 1
Institute of Actuaries AIDS Working Party Model

Sick from
HIV + (1)

AIDS (2)

Dead (5)

in the transition from HIY infection to death from AIDS. Those
who are suffering from AIDS are highly infectious, but their sexual activity may be reduced considerably. The model makes it
possible to choose whether those sick from AIDS are treated as
contributing to further infections or not .
• The current age is part of the status and that transition intensities can vary by current age. In addition, because each age cohort
(or year of birth cohort) is treated separately, each transition intensity can be varied by calendar year; therefore, each cohort has
its own set of transition intensities. Durations since entry to the
states immune, positive, and sick from AIDS are also relevant to
the transition intensities.
Possible transitions are as shown in Figure 1. Those in any of the live
states may die, and those who are sick from AIDS may die from AIDS or
from causes other than AIDS. Those who are at risk may change their
behavior and become clear, for example, by giving up sexual activity or
by restricting themselves to one equally monogamous partner. There is
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no representation in the model of transfer from clear to at risk. Those
who are at risk may become infected; at that point, these persons immediately are allocated either to the immune state or to the positive
state in proportions that may depend on age (and on calendar year,
although it seems unlikely that calendar year would exercise any influence). Those in the positive state may become sick from AIDS, if they
do not die first. Infection is possible from the immunes, positives, and
sick.
In order not to increase the basic underlying numerical complexity
inherent in the model, the Institute of Actuaries working party avoided
introducing elements that depend on detailed assumptions about sexual behaVior.
The working party proceeded by establishing a complex series of ordinary and partial differential equations for the probabilities of survival
in a state and of transition between states and then solving these equations by numerical methods, given assumptions about the form of the
various transition intensities. In most applications, the working party
considered the following functional forms for the transition intensities:
• Transition from state 0 to state 1: Ao is a function of calendar
time, attained age, and number of persons infected;
• Transition from state 0 to state 3:
time;
• Transition from state 0 to state 4:

Vo

is a function of calendar

A6 is zero;

• Transition from state 1 to state 2: Ai is a function of duration in
state 1;
• Transition from state i to state 5: J1i is a function of attained age
for i = 0 or 3 or a function of calendar time and attained age for
i = 1,2.

3 The Modified AIDS Model
Given the complexity of the Institute of Actuaries AIDS working
party model, Haberman (1992) suggested that it be modified along the
lines described below so that Markov processes techniques can be applied. Figure 2 depicts the modified version of the model, with the
identified states and the corresponding transition intensities. The arrows indicate the directions of the transitions that are permitted in this
model.
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Figure 2
Modified AIDS Model (Version 1)
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The proposed model is a continuous time Markov process with constant transition intensities. Thus, a person in state 0 is subject to a
constant force of progression out of state 0 into state 1, out of state
o into state 3, and to a constant force of mortality out of state 0 into
state 4. For a person in state 1, the possible transitions are to states 2
and 4. For a person in state 2 or 3, the transitions are to state 4 only.
Once a life leaves a state, it cannot return to that state. The constant
transition intensities are as depicted in Figure 2, i.e.,

Ai
l1i
Vo

Transition intensity from state i to state i + 1, for i
Force of mortality in state i, for i = 0,1,2,3; and
Transition intensity from state 0 to state 3.

=

0,1;

Because the transition intensities remain constant while an individual
is in any state, a memoryless property exists. The length of time spent
in the current state has no effect on the future length of time that the
person will remain in this state.
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We now consider how the model of the Institute of Actuaries AIDS
working party (as described in Section 2) has been modified to fit with
these assumptions.
• First, the immune state is removed.
• Second, the viewpoint is changed from that of the population as
a whole to that of an individual male at risk who is considered
to progress from state to state over time. We are concerned not
with the spread of HIV in a population, but with the outcome for
a particular individual.
• Third, it is assumed that all transition intensities are constants,
independent of attained age, duration in current state, and secular time. We acknowledge that this assumption contradicts the
arguments of Daykin et al. (1988a, 1990) that explain the importance of these variables, in particular attained age, to an actuarial
assessment of the effects of HIV and AIDS on survival prospects.
Two arguments support this seemingly extreme assumption:
1. The magnitude of the AIDS-related transition intensities out-

weighs the normal age-related mortality risk. Many of the
AIDS working party simulations assume intensities that do
not vary with respect to age;
2. The desire to reach some analytical results does require, at
least initially, some heroic assumptions. We believe that the
results are, nevertheless, of value in pricing and reserving.
• Fourth, it is assumed that the transition intensity from the at risk
state to the seropositive state is constant and does not depend
on the numbers of persons infected. This again is a simplifying assumption to keep the resulting mathematical manipulations
tractable. 3 As noted by Daykin et al. (1990), a constant transition
intensity from at risk to seropositive would be consistent with the
exponential development of new cases of AIDS in the early stages
of the epidemic.
An advantage to making these simplifying assumptions to the original model is that the model is now flexible enough to approximate the
transmission of HIV and the development of AIDS without the restriction to the male homosexual population mentioned in Section 2.
3To allow for the effect of heterogeneity of risk and behavioral change, it would be
reasonable to postulate an intensity that decreases with time as the epidemic develops.
This assumption is not pursued here on the grounds of mathematical tractability.
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Given these assumptions, the next step is to determine the transition probabilities. To this end, let Pi} (t) be the transition probability
that a life now in state i will be in state j at t years from now. There
are a number of different ways to set up equations for the required
transition probabilities. A common approach used by actuaries (for example, Ramsay (1989), Haberman (1992), and Jones (1994)) is to use
the Chapman-Kolmogorov backward system of difference-differential
equations. Because the transition intensities are assumed to be constant, we obtain simple recursive solutions to these equations. 4
Assume that insurance is issued to a life in state i at time of issue,
i.e., at t = O. It can easily be proved that
POO(t)

e- lXot

(1)

Pll(t)

e- lX1t

P22 (t)

e- JJ2t

P33 (t)

e- JJ3t

(2)
(3)
(4)

podt)

Ao
(e-lX1t _ e- lXot )
lXo - lXl

(5)

_A--,,1'-(e-JJ2t _ e- lX1t )

(6)

lXl - JJ2
AoAl
[ -(lXl - JJ2)e- lXO t
(lXo - lXd(lXo - JJ2)( lX l - JJ2)
+ (lXo - JJ2)e- lX1t - (lXo - lXl)e-JJ2t]
Vo
(e-JJ3t _ e- lXot )
lXo - JJ3

(7)

(8)

where lXo = Vo + JJo + Ao and lXl = Al + JJl. We note from the representation of the model in Figure 2 that Pi} (t) = 0 for i < j and that
P13(t) = P23(t) =

O.

The associated probabilities of dying (being in state 4) are given by
the following expression:
3

P04

1-

L POj(t)
j=o
3

P14

1-

L POj(t)
j=l

4For a thorough discussion of the Chapman-Kolmogorov backward system of
difference-differential equations, see Cox and Miller (Chapter 4, 1965) or Karlin and
Taylor (Chapter 4, 1975).
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1 - e- J1zt
1 - e- J13t •

Alternatively, the equations for Pi} (t) can be obtained using matrix
methods; see Cox and Miller (Chapter 4.5, 1965).

4

Individual Permanent Health Insurance (PHI)

Individual PHI policies are designed to provide a weekly or monthly
income to an individual if he/she is prevented by sickness from working. In this sense, PHI policies provide disability income protection. s
Policies are typically for a fixed term, usually ceasing at age 65 for males
or age 60 for females. Once the insurance company has offered formally
to provide the necessary cover and the first premium has been paid, the
company cannot cancel the policy as long as the policyholder obeys the
policy conditions, hence the name permanent health insurance. 6
Under the most common type of PHI policy, a weekly or monthly
income is paid to the policyholder when he/she has been sick for longer
than the deferred period'? The benefit continues to be paid until"the
policyholder recovers or dies or until the age at which the policy term
ceases. Because the insurer cannot cancel the policy, a policyholder
who is sick permanently, or indefinitely, will receive the benefit until
one of the above events occurs. With most poliCies, the premiums are
waived while the income benefit is being paid.
Some poliCies pay a benefit of a fixed level amount, while others provide a benefit that increases to protect the policyholder from inflation.
There are various methods by which increases in benefit are provided,
some of which are more effective than others.
Another common feature in policy design is a benefit level that reduces with duration of the sickness claim. This is designed to encourage a return to work. The availability of the PHI benefit may lengthen the
duration of sickness because of its effect on the minimum acceptable
salary that would entice the sick individual to return to gainful employment (Le., the so-called reservation wage). We allow for the presence of
such stepped benefits in our valuation formulae in a later section.
SIn applying the model to disability insurance poliCies, it is assumed that at the start
of the policy the individual policyholder is in state 0 and healthy and that the insurance
company's underwriting or selection process ensures that this is true.
6In the U.S. the descriptions noncancellable and guaranteed renewable are used.
7The deferred period is the minimum period of time that the illness must last before
the benefit begins. The deferred period is usually four, 13, or 26 weeks.
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As PHI policies usually are affected to supplement the sickness benefit available from an employer or the benefit payable from the national
or state government (e.g., in the United Kingdom, the national insurance scheme), the deferred period chosen by the policyholder tends to
reflect the length of time after which these benefits reduce or (in the
case of benefits from an employer) cease. The longer the deferred period, the cheaper the cover and, hence, the lower the premium. Let us
now consider the effect of introducing a deferred period of d years on
the value of the policy.
For the moment let us assume that a sickness claim is admitted only
when full AIDS develops, i.e., the policyholder is in state 2. To calculate
present values, we need the probability that an individual starting in
state 0 is sick throughout the time interval (t - d, t), i.e., that the underlying stochastic process is in state 2 throughout this time interval.
In the absence of the deferred period, the probability that the policyholder is in state 2 at time t given that the policyholder was in state 0 at
time 0 is P02 (t). It can be verified by appealing to the Markov property
tha t P02 (t) can be written as
P02(t) =

f~ POdU)P22(t);).qdu.

(9)

We can adapt equation (9) for the presence of a deferred period. Let
us define qd (t) to be the probability that a person in state 0 at time
zero is in state 2 throughout the time interval [t - d, t]. Adapting the
integral definition (9), we can write the following:
qd(t) =

f~-d POdU)P22(t -

u)?qdu,

for t > d.

(10)

If t :::; d, qd (t) = O. A more formal derivation of qd (t) is provided by Waters (1984). Such probabilities have been suggested for unemployment
insurance by Haberman and Bloomfield (1990) and used extensively by
eMIR (1991) for the calculation of PHI-based functions.
To deal with sickness claims that are paid while the policyholder
is in state 1 or state 2, let us define rd(t) to be the probability that a
person in state 0 at time zero is in state 1 or state 2 throughout the
time interval [t - d, tJ. Clearly,

Jor -

t d

rd(t) =

POO(U)(Pll (t - u)

+ P12(t

- u))i\odu,

for t > d. (11)
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Given the earlier results [equations (3) and (5)], it follows that equation (10) becomes:
q,dt) =

AOAle-J.l 2 t [1 -

e-(OQ-J.l2)(t-d)

«Xo - (Xd

«Xl - iJ2)

1 - e-( OiO-J.l2)(t-d)]
- .
«Xo - iJ2)

(12)

Similarly, from equations (I), (2), and (6), equation (11) becomes

AO

[A I e-J.l2 t (1

«Xo - (Xl)

+

- e-( Oi l-J.l2)(t-d))

«Xl - iJ2)

(iJl - iJ2)e- 0i1t (1 - e-( OiO-J.l2)(t-d))]
«XO - (Xl)

.

(13)

5 PHI Valuation Functions
Following Daykin et al. (1988b), we recognize that a major difficulty
in estimating the impact of HIV infection and AIDS on PHI business
is knowing at what stage a PHI claim will be presented to the insurer.
For the purposes of illustration of the methodology and the results, we
consider here two extreme cases.
Case 1: We assume that a claim only is admitted when full AIDS develops. In the case of a PHI policy with a d week deferred period,
we assume that no benefit is payable until d weeks after AIDS has
developed (Le., after entry to state 2).
Case 2: We make the equally extreme assumption that claims are admitted on the basis of HIV seropositivity alone (Le., on entry to
state 1) without requiring evidence of AIDS or any of the intermediate stages.
Let A j (n, d) be the actuarial present value (under Case j) of a PHI
benefit of one unit (per year) in an n year policy (with the n years measured from the inception of the policy) with deferred period of d, for
j = 1,2. It follows that:
Adn,d)

f:

e-

8t

qd(t)dt

AOAI [(al + a2

Case 1;
- a3)e-(O+J.l2)d - ale-(o+J.l2)n

_a2 e -( Oi O-J.l2)d e -(o+ Oi o)n
fun e-otrd(t)dt

+ a3e(Oil-J.l2)de-(o+0iJ}n]

Case 2;

(14)
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Ao [AlaI (e-(o+fJ2)d

- e-(O+fJ2)n)

+ a3 {f.1I - /12 )(e-(o+cq)d _ e-(o+oC!)n)
- (Ala4e«()(O-fJ2)d + as (/11 - /12)e«()(o-()(lld)
x (e-(o+()(o)d _ e-(o+()(o)n)]

where the

akS

(15)

are constants such that their reciprocals are given by

all
a 1

z

(0<0

ail

(0<1

a;j1

(0<1

as

(0<1

1

+ /12)
-/12)(0<0 - 0<1)(8 + 0<0)
-/12)(0<0 - 0<1)(8 + 0<1)
-/12)(0<0 -/12)(8 + 0<0)
-/12)(0<0 - o<d(8 + 0<0).

(0<0 -/12)(0<1 - /12)(8

Given these results, it is possible to investigate the explicit forms for
the partial derivatives of Al (n, d) and A2 (n, d) with respect to d. To
illustrate, we present some numerical values for Adn, d) and A2 (n, d)
based on equations (14) and (15) for different combinations of some of
the key parameters.
Following Daykin et al. (1990), we set /12 = 0.35 and /10 = /13 = 0.001
throughout. 8 We also set Vo = 0.10 and d = 0.07. Tables 1 to 3 present
the magnitudes of Al (n, d) and A2 (11, d) for the values of Ao, AI, /11, n,
and d shown. For convenience, we set Ao = Al in this presentation. The
results indicate that Al (n, d) and A2 (n, d) both increase with increasing 11, decreasing d, decreasing /11, and increasing Ao = AI. They further
indicate the relative sensitivities of Al (11, d) and A2 (n, d) to changes
in these parameters and that the ratio A1(n,d)/A2(n,d) decreases as
Ao = Al increases. These results are as expected.
We can compare these results with those given by Daykin et al.
(1988b) for the discounted present value of additional sickness benefits under a PHI policy allowing for the two extreme cases described
above. Daykin et al. use different morbidity and mortality assumptions
(intermediate between the sets underlying Tables 2 and 3). It is impossible to rerun their full model on modified assumptions; however,
we can consider from their appendix tables the values of Al (n, d) and
A2 (n, d) and the ratio of the present values under Cases 1 and 2 for
comparison with Tables 1 through 3. The details appear in Table 4 for
a deferred period of six months and two alternative terminating ages.
BThe values /-10 = /-13 = 0.001 are approximately equivalent to the value of the force
of mortality for a male age 30 to 34 according to English Life Table No 14.
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Table 1
Present Values of PHI Benefits: Ao = A, = 0.001
Deferred Period: 3 Months
15
20
Policy Terms {Years)
5
10
0.00077
0.00341
0.00655
0.00935
100 AI
.764
2.442
3.673
4.842
100 A2
992
716
561
518
Ratio
III = 0.01
0.00332
0.00631
0.00889
0.00076
100 AI
2.172
3.511
0.752
4.569
100 A2
654
566
514
Ratio
989
III = 0.05
0.00073
0.00299
0.00538
0.00721
100 AI
0.700
1.900
2.904
3.599
100A2
635
540
499
Ratio
958
Deferred Period: 6 Months
Policy Terms {Years)
100 AI
100 A2
Ratio
III = 0.01
100 AI
100 A2
Ratio
III = 0.05
100 AI
100 A2
Ratio

5
0.00061
0.687
1130

10
0.00293
2.127
726

15
0.00576
3.543
615

20
0.00830
4.705
567

0.00061
0.675
1110

0.00286
2.059
720

0.00555
3.381
609

0.00790
4.432
561

0.00058
.623
1070

0.00258
1.788
693

0.00474
2.776
586

0.00642
3.465
540

The magnitude of Al (n, d) and A2(n, d) and the ratios are intermediate
between those appearing in Tables 2 and 3 and display similar trends.
In particular, we note the stability of the ratios as we consider different
age ranges. Similarly, expressions for the present value of premiums
and expenses can be developed, including the value of expenses related
to the timing of the payment of the sickness benefit. Also, allowance
can be made for a waiver of premium benefits and for stepped sickness
benefits, i.e., a level of sickness income that depends on the current
duration of sickness.
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Table 2
Present Value of PHI Benefits: Ao = Al = 0.01
Deferred Period: 3 Months
Policy Terms (Years)
100 Al
100 A2
Ratio
III = 0.01
100 Al
100A2
Ratio
III = 0.05
100 Al
100 A2
Ratio
Deferred Period: 6 Months
Policy Terms (Years)
100 Al
100 A2
Ratio
III = 0.01
100 Al
100 A2
Ratio
III = 0.05
100 Al
100 A2
Ratio

5
0.0755
7.507
99.5

10
0.3257
21.567
66.2

15
0.6130
34.655
56.5

20
0.8586
44.890
52.3

0.0746
7.385
99.0

0.3178
20.911
65.8

0.5906
33.149
56.1

0.8168
42.418
51.9

0.0710
6.784
96.9

0.2863
18.320
64.0

0.5049
27.515
54.4

0.6660
33.621
50.5

5
0.0600
6.745
112

10
.2802
20.458
73.0

15
.5396
33.405
61.9

20
.7629
43.584
57.1

0.0593
6.625
112

0.2736
19.806
72.3

0.5201
31.904
61.3

0.7265
41.117
56.6

0.0566
6.125
108

0.2472
17.231
70.0

0.4458
26.288
59.0

0.5937
32.339
54.5

For example, let us take Case 1 (as discussed above, allowing for
a waiver of premium benefit) where a sickness claim is admitted only
when a transition is made to state 2 (the development of full AIDS).
Also, let Pt be the annual premium payable at time t = 0, 1, ... , n - l.
Then the actuarial present value of annual premiums (APVP) is given
by:
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Table 3
Present Value of PHI Benefits: Ao = Al = 0.10
Defened Period:
3 Months
5
10
15
Polici' Terms {Years2
21.527
33.260
6.092
100 Al
150.480
206.611
63.091
100 A,
10.4
7.18
6.18
Ratio
!ll = 0.01
6.026
20.793
32.223
100 Al
62.129
146.437
198.228
100 A,
7.04
10.3
6.15
Ratio
!ll = 0.05
18.916
28.203
5.745
100 Al
170.037
58.097
130.326
100 A,
Ratio
10.1
6.88
6.03
Defened Period:
6 Months
Polici' Terms {Years)
!ll = 0.001
100 Al
100 A,
Ratio
!ll = 0.01
100 Al
100 A,
Ratio
!ll = 0.05
100 Al
100 A,
Ratio

5

20
40.081
233.975
5.84
38.545
224.077
5.81
32.804
187.542
5.72

10

15

20

4.895
56.689
11.6

18.475
142.179
7.70

29.524
196.820
6.67

35.867
225.057
6.27

4.845
55.748
11.5

18.081
138.163
7.64

28.616
189.466
6.62

34.503
215.189
6.24

4.630
51.809
11.2

16.485
122.173
7.41

25.088
161.403
6.43

29.398
178.784
6.08

If the deferred period were d 1 and the level of sickness benefit were

u where d 1 < u :::; d 1 + d z and
the level of sickness benefit were C per annum « B) for sickness of
durations u where u > d 1 + dz, then the actuarial present value of the
benefits (APVB) under Case i (where i = 1,2) is given by
B per annum for sickness of durations

66

Journal of Actuarial Practice, Vol. 3, No.1, 1995

Table 4
Present Value of PHI Benefits
According to the Daykin et aI. (1988b) Model
Deferred Period Six Months
Terminating Age of Policy: 60
Policy Terms (Years)
10
15
20
Assumption A
0.67
1.76
2.18
100 Al
16.77
24.26
26.12
100A2
14.00
25.00
12.00
Ratio
Assumptions Be
1.02
1.28
0.48
100 Al
13.88
15.25
9.49
100 A2
20.00
14.00
12.00
Ratio
Assumptions F
1.36
1.71
0.65
100 Al
6.88
9.33
10.11
100 A2
11.00
7.00
6.00
Ratio
Note on assumptions made by Daykin et al. (1988b)
A.
110' Ill' 113 England and Wales population mortality
'Ao
0.7 at ages 25-50, reducing to zero at ages 15 and 70
'AI
Max [exp( -8.4 + l.4d), 2.5] where d = duration in state 1
112
Normal mortality +0.7
Yo
0

Be.

F.

As for projection A
As for projection A, but reducing linearly from 1987 to
1992 to half initial intensity at all ages
As for projection A
As for projection A
0.10
110' Ill' 113
'Ao
'AI
'A 2
Yo

As for projections A and Be
As for projection Be
As for projections A and Be
Normal mortality +0.35
As for projection Be
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Table 4 (cont.)
Present Value of PHI Benefits
According to the Daykin et al. (1988b) Model
Deferred Period Six Months
Terminating Age of Policy: 65
Policy Terms (Years)
Assumption A
100 Al
100 A2
Ratio
Assumptions Be
100 Al
100 A2
Ratio
Assumptions F
100 Al
100 A2
Ratio

10

15

20

0.34
8.81
26.00

1.57
22.36
14.00

2.13
25.70
12.00

0.25
4.71
19.00

0.90
12.13
13.00

1.25
14.83
12.00

0.38
3.96
10.00

1.25
8.54
7.00

1.65
9.93
6.00

Note on assumptions made by Daykin et al. (1988b)
flo, fll' fl3
England and Wales population mortality
A.
A,o
0.7 at ages 25-50, reducing to zero at ages 15 and 70
A,I
Max [exp( -804 + lAd), 2.5] where d = duration in state 1
fl2
Normal mortality +0.7
Yo
0

Be.

F.

As for projection A
As for projection A, but reducing linearly from 1987 to
1992 to half initial intensity at all ages
As for projection A
As for projection A
0.10
flo,

fll' fl3
A,o
A,I
A,2
Yo

As for projections A and Be
As for projection Be
As for projections A and Be
Normal mortality +0.35
As for projection Be
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Emerging Costs

These ideas also can be applied to emerging costs and cash flow
considerations. For illustration, we choose a simplified example. We
consider a nonprofit PHI policy for a term of n years with a zero deferred period (to simplify the algebra). The policy has annual premiums,
Pt , being paid at times t
0,1, ... , n 1. The premium is not paid if
the policyholder is sick at time L. We use Case 1 for the definition of
sickness for purposes of illustration.
Let us take the benefits provided by the policy to be:
• A death benefit of D t payable at the end of the policy year if the
policyholder dies during the t-th policy year (for t = 1,2, ... , n);
• An income benefit if Bt payable at the end of the t-th year if the
policyholder is then alive and sick (for t = 1,2, ... , n).
We assume that the rate of interest in the t-th policy year is it and that
the expected cash flow for the t-th policy year per policy alive and in
j
state j at the start of the t-th policy year is CFi ). It follows that

cFi

jj

(1

=

{

(1

+ idPt -1
+

pj2(l)B t - PjJ,(l)Dt
-P22(I)B t - P24(l)D t
idPt -1
- P34(l)D t
-

if j = 0 or 1
if j = 2
if j = 3.

Then, we define the expected costs (or cash flow) for the t-th policy
year per policy originally issued to be ECt where
3

I

EC t =

( 'j

CF/ POj(t - 1).

j=O

The above argument can be extended to allow for deferred periods,
varying benefits, and transition intensities that are functions of attained
age. If the Pts are net premiums (in the traditional sense of the term),
then the equation of value for such a policy would, by definition, be
given by
00

I

e- iit ECt

=

O.

t=l

This provides an extension to the results given by Hare and McCutcheon
(1991) in respect to conventional life insurance profit testing.
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Further Modifications to the Model

7.1

Separating Incidence of Disability

The discussion earlier is based on the model depicted in Figure 2
and considers the two extreme cases (Case 1 and Case 2) of timing of a
claim for disability income from a PHI policy. A more satisfactory approach is to recognize explicitly the existence of an intermediate state
between HIV positive and AIDS for those who are sick and, hence, eligible for a claim. Figure 3 depicts the new model needed, with the states
renumbered and the transition intensities as shown. A PHI claim would
be accepted once a policyholder has entered state 2 (and the income
benefit would be payable while he/she occupies either states 2 or 3).
Figure 3
Modified AIDS Model (Version 2)

At Risk

Clear
vi0

(4)

,I,.

ftt

A0

(0)

,I,.

~ HIV +

to

(1)

," ?-'

'\.

/

A,

Sick

(2)

,Vt'J.

'\.

-,

A1-

AIDS

(3)

'v (3

Dead (5)

This approach leads to no conceptual difficulties. We still must develop the Chapman-Kolmogorov system of differential equations and
solve for the transition probabilities Pij(t). The solutions are similar
to that given in equations (1) to (6); see Ramsay (1989). For example,
(17)
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(18)
where (Xo = Vo + 110 + i\o, (Xl = i\l + 111 and (X2 = i\2 + 112.
To deal with sickness claims that are paid while the policyholder is
in state 2 or state 3 in the presence of a deferred period d, we define
Sd (t) to be the probability that a person in state 0 at time 0 is always
in state 2 or state 3 during the time interval [t - d, tJ. Then as for
equations (8) and (9), we obtain
Sd(t) =

rt - d
Jo POdU)(P22(t -

u)

+ PZ3(t - u))i\ldu, for t > d. (19)

Substitution from equations (5), (17), and (18) leads to the following:

[1 -

i\oe- J1zt

e-(CXj-cxz)(t-d) _ (1 - e-(CXo-CXZ)(t-d))]

((Xo - (Xl)
i\oe- J13t

((Xo - (X2)
j
[i\l (1 - r(cx -J13)(t-d))

((Xo - (Xd((X2 - 113)

((Xl - 113)

+

((Xl - (X2)

_ i\2(l - e-(CX O- J13 )(t-d))]

((Xo - 113)
_

i\0i\2e-cxzt

[(1_r(CX 1 -CX 2 )(t-d))

((Xo - (Xd((X2 - 113)

((Xl - (X2)

(1 - r(cxo-cxz)(t-d)) ]
((Xo - (X2)
.

(20)

The actuarial present value of a PHI benefit of one unit (per year) in
an n year policy with deferred period of d would be:
A3(n,d)

f:

e- r5ts d(t)dt

i\0i\dI12 - 113)(e-(8+cx 2 )d - e-(8+cx 2 )n)
((X2 - 113)((XI - (Xz)((Xo - (X2)(8 + (X2)
i\0i\1i\2 (e-(8+J13)d - e-(O+J13)n)

+

+

----~~~--------------~--

((X2 - 113)((XI - 113)((Xo - 113)(8 + 113)
i\0i\dI12 - 113)e(CX j -cx z )d(e-(O+cxj}d - e-(o+cx1)n)

((Xo - (Xd((Xl - (XZ)((X2 - 113)(8 + (Xl)
i\0i\1 (112 - 113)e(CXo-cx z )d(e-(o+cxo)d - e-(o+cxo)n)

~~~--~~----~--------~----~

((Xo - (Xd ((Xo - (X2)((X2 - fJ3)(8 + (Xo)
i\0i\1 i\2e(CX1-J13)d (e-(O+cxj}d - e-(o+cx1)n)
((Xo - (Xl)((X2 - 113)((XI - 113)(8

+ (Xl)
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As an illustration of the numerical effect of separating the incidence
of disability and receipt of the income benefit from the onset of AIDS,
we present some sample values of A3 (n, d) in Table 5.

Table 5
Present Value of PHI Benefits: Modified Model
Values of 100 A3
Deferred Period: Three Months
Policy Terms (Years)
!:!I

!:!?

AI

11,2

0.01
0.01
0.01
0.01
0.05
0.05
0.05
0.05

0.05
0.05
0.05
0.05
0.10
0.10
0.10
0.10

0.1
0.1
0.2
0.2
0.1
0.1
0.2
0.2

0.1
0.2
0.1
0.2
0.1
0.2
0.1
0.2

5
8.702
8.454
15.577
15.121
7.784
7.600
13.962
13.622

10
37.190
34.488
60.273
55.690
30.408
28.602
49.696
46.619

15
66.396
58.916
99.365
87.587
50.480
45.928
76.950
69.704

20
86.776
74.394
122.436
104.136
62.490
55.514
90.890
80.376

5
7.384
7.139
13.289
12.837
6.563
6.380
11.833
11.496

10
34.163
31.467
55.606
51.032
27.743
25.942
45.521
42.450

15
62.369
54.898
93.641
81.874
47.066
42.519
71.942
64.705

20
82.265
69.892
116.331
98.043
58.757
51.788
85.607
75.102

Deferred Period: Six Months
Policy Terms (Years)
!:!I

!:!2

AI

11,2

0.01
0.01
0.01
0.01
0.05
0.05
0.05
0.05

0.05
0.05
0.05
0.05
0.10
0.10
0.10
0.10

0.1
0.1
0.2
0.2
0.1
0.1
0.2
0.2

0.1
0.2
0.1
0.2
0.1
0.2
0.1
0.2
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We retain the parameter values used in earlier tables (/10 = /14 =
0.001, Vo = 0.10, 0 = 0.07, /13 = 0.35); we focus on Ao = 0.10 for direct
comparison with Tables 3 and 4. Values have been chosen such that
(Xi '* (X j for i '* j. As expected, the values of A3 (n, d) are intermediate
between the two extreme estimates of Ai (n, d) al!d Az (n, d) presented
earlier. We note the extent to which A3 (n, d) increases with increasing
n and decreases with increasing d, decreases with increasing forces of
mortality, and its relative sensitivity to the choice of Ai and relative
insensitivity to the choice of Az. As expected, A3 (n, d) increases with
increasing Ai (representing the rate of flow into the claiming state) and
decreases with increasing Az (representing part of the rate of flow out of
the claiming state). Space constraints prevent pursuing the sensitivities
of A3 (n, d) further.

7.2

Dependence on Time of Occupancy

It would be more realistic to allow some transition intensities to depend on the time spent in the current state since the latest transition
into that state. This idea of duration dependence leads to the introduction of semi-Markov processes (Cox and Miller, 1965).
The semi-Markov process can be described by a pair of continuous
time stochastic processes {S(x),Z(x)} for x ~ O. Let S(x) represent
the state of an individual at time (or age) x where S(x) E 1,2, ... , k. Let
Z(x) denote the duration for an individual at time x of the temporary
stay so far in the current state, Le.,
Z(x)

= max{z : z

n

:s; x

and S(x - u) = S(x) for all u

E

[0, z]}.

The event {S (x) = j Z (x) = z} represents an individual being in state
j at time x with a duration of z since the last transition into state j.
We can follow the approach of Section 3 and define transition intensities and probabilities and construct equations for the latter (which will
be mixed integro-differential equations). The resulting expressions are
complex. A useful approximation to the semi-Markov model is to follow
the suggestion of Cox and Miller (1965) and introduce a number of substates; this has been applied to actuarial problems by Norberg (1988) in
considering select survival models and by Jones (1994) in considering
multiple state models.
The replacement of a state by a pair of states labeled "stable" and
"unstable" together with the transition intensities that are independent
of the time spent within each substate mimics approximately the behavior of a semi-Markov model. Figure 4 illustrates part of such a
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model structure where we seek to approximate a duration dependence
for transition from state 1 to state 2. State 1 becomes "HIV positive:
unstable", and we add a further state 6, "HIY positive: stable". This
modification can be implemented for the model discussed earlier and
depicted in Figures 2 and 3.
Figure 4
Part of Modified AIDS Model (Version 3)

,....

Sick

HIV + Unstable
,

(1)

II'

\11
II

,

(2)

HIV+ Stable

I

(6)
,II

I

Dead
(5)

I

Another approximation that can be made is to model nonconstant
intensity functions as piecewise constant functions. This preserves the
mathematical tractability of constant forces while giving the flexibility of using nonconstant functions. For a further discussion, readers
are referred to Cox and Miller (1965) and to Jones (1994) for actuarial
applications.
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Obtaining a Life Table for Spinal Cord Injury
Patients Using Information Theory
Patrick L. Brockett* and Yun Song t

Abstract
We present a mortality table adjustment method based on a constrained
information theoretic methodology. The objective is to adjust a standard mortality table to reflect a particular known characteristic of the population while
remaining as close as possible to a given standard table. To illustrate these
techniques, the medical results concerning survival of spinal cord injury patients are incorporated into a standard table to obtain a mortality table pertinent for paraplegic and quadriplegic indiViduals. The desired adjusted mortality table can be used by actuaries for special purposes such as wrongful injury
damage award compensation calculations and determining life insurance premium for medically impaired lives.
Key words and phrases: mortality rate, mathematical programming, prior
knowledge incorporation
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Introduction
A mortality table is an indispensable tool for actuaries. It can provide the actuaries with information on such items as survival probabilities, average remaining lifetimes, and annuity values. The standard
mortality table that actuaries use often comes from U.S. Bureau of the
Census data or internal (large) company data sets. In practice, however, it is frequently necessary to adjust the mortality table in order to
reflect certain mortality characteristics of a subpopulation that is not
intrinsic to the summary aggregate population from which the various
available standard mortality tables are developed. This is the case, for
example, in situations involving medically impaired underwriting and
in obtaining structured payment schemes for wrongful injury lawsuits
and potential settlements. In these situations it is deSirable to adjust
the mortality table to remain as close as possible to the chosen standard
table while still obtaining a table reflecting the known characteristics
of the individual.
We provide an information theoretic method for actuaries and other
financial analysts to incorporate new medical research results with the
standard mortality table to generate the specific adjusted mortality table needed to reflect the special aspects of the individual under study.

2

rnformation Theory

The information theoretic approach to statistics has been applied
successfully to actuarial science in such important applications as univariate and multivariate graduation, construction of loss distributions,
etc. (cf., Brockett, 1991). Brockett and Zhang (1986) use this approach,
for example, to create a model for graduating mortality rates. They later
extended their results to encompass the quadratically constrained case
(Zhang and Brockett, 1987). Brockett et al. (1991) also provide a new
multivariate graduation method based upon a constrained information
theoretic methodology. An application of the information theoretic approach to obtain a unifying approach to actuarial analysis can be found
in Brockett (1991).
Information theory originated in engineering communications theory as a method to quantify the amount of uncertainty in an information
transmittal (Shannon and Weaver, 1949). In the statistical literature,
Kullback and Leibler (1951) first developed a measure of informational
distance between two measures. Akaike (1973, 1977, 1978) points out
how to use information theory to solve a number of important problems
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in statistics, such as how to estimate the order in an autoregressive time
series model, how to estimate the number of factors in a factor analysis
model, and how to analyze contingency tables. There are many applications in the social sciences and in business-related subjects. Examples
are shown in Charnes and Cooper (1974), Guiasu (1977), and Brockett
and Cox (1984).
In information theoretic notation, the expected information for distinguishing two measures p and q is denoted by I(plq). This expected
information is mathematically quantified by the expected log-odds ratio, i.e.,

where p and q are discrete with positive masses Pi and qi for i = a, a +
1, ... , b for some pair of integers a and b.
Applying Jensen's inequality to the function h(x) = x In(x) implies
that I(plq) ~ 0 with I(plq) = 0 if and only if p = q. As a consequence,
I(plq) can be thought of as the (pseudo-) distance or closeness between
p and q within the space of all measures having equal total mass.
In our application q will correspond to a standard mortality table,
and p will correspond to the adjusted mortality. The adjustment will
be done in such a way that I(plq) is minimized, i.e., we adjust as little
as possible while still remaining true to the known constraints.

3 The Data
Small clinical studies often report information about certain disease
and other factors that can affect mortality. One such study that will be
used in this paper to demonstrate our methodology is the DeVivo et al.
(1987) study of the mortality and morbidity of 5,131 individuals who
sustained a spinal cord injury. They reported the overall seven year survival rate and the effect of several prognostic factors on survival. Their
report shows that spinal cord injury mortality rates are significantly
higher than the mortality rates in the standard table.
More speCifically, four classes of injuries were investigated: incomplete paraplegia (abbreviated as "ip" in this paper), complete paraplegia
(cp), incomplete quadriplegia (iq), and complete quadriplegia (cq). Patients at the beginning of the study are classified into different groups
identified by severity of injury (ip, cp, iq and cq, respectively) and also
cross classified by age at injury (1-24, 25-49, and 50+). Data consisting of a seven year history of survival data are collected and analyzed.
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Their results show that each level of injury severity has a different effect on the expectation of life. The authors conclude that age at injury
and neurologic level and extent of lesion are all factors that have a statistically significant impact on survival. The overall cumulative seven
year relative mortality ratios l from DeVivo et al. (1987) for this series
of 5,131 patients are listed in Table 1.
Table 1
Cumulative Seven Year Relative Mortality Ratios
for Spinal Cord Injury Patients
Age at Time of Injury
1-24 25-49
50+
Neurologic Level
4.82
6.59
3.26
Incomplete Paraplegia
3.26
4.93
6.93
Complete Paraplegia
4.22
6.71
3.95
Incomplete Quadriplegia
12.40 20.78
14.11
Complete Quadriplegia
Source: DeVivo, M.l. et al. "Seven-Year Survival Following
Spinal Cord Injury." Arch Neurol, 44 (1987): 872-875.

4

Adjusting a Standard Table

In implementing our mortality table adjustment process, we will use
the force of mortality as our basic unit of analysis. A mortality rate
is the number of deaths during a given time period divided by some
measure of the number of lives exposed to the risk of death during
this time period (cf., Brown, 1991). The simplest mortality rate is the
so-called crude mortality rate, which is the ratio of observed number
of deaths during age x to the number of persons who were alive at
(age) x. For our purposes, however, we shall assume a constant force
of mortality within each age interval, Le., /-lx+t = /-lx for x = 0,1, ... and
o =::; t < 1, where /-lx+t is the force of mortality at age x + t. We find
these two mortality rates (crude mortality rate and /-lx) are extremely
close in absolute values_
As noted in the DeVivo et al. (1987) report, the modified mortality
table obtained for spinal cord injury is affected most by age at injury,
I The relative mortality ratio is defined as the number of persons dying during the
study divided by the expected number of deaths during the study.
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neurologic level, and extent of lesion. We first investigate how different
medical injury severity affects the mortality profile. We assume that the
level of injury (ip, cp, iq and cq, respectively) will influence the mortality
force relative to the standard mortality rate J.lx by increasing the standard force by a constant amount J.lip, J.lcp, J.liq, and J.lcq, respectively.
Thus, the force of mortality is J.lx + J.lip for incomplete paraplegics, etc. 2
The problem now becomes how to estimate J.lip in such a manner that
the adjusted mortality table obtained exhibits the seven year relative
mortality ratio given in Table 1.
In order to obtain numerical results and model the relative mortalities given in Table 1, we need to determine the exposure level, Ex, within
the study population. DeVivo et al. (1987) only give a partial breakdown
by the three age categories, as in Table 1 (with some additional information such as mean age at injury, percentage of male). To be most
accurate, one should take Ex as defined by the study population. When
using secondary data, however, this information is often unavailable.
Accordingly, one solution is to build a model to derive the values Ex for
the study population distribution. The next section shows how one can
use information theoretic techniques to develop this set of exposure
values Ex that are consistent with the information about the patient
profile given in DeVivo et al. (1987). These values are used to develop
equations for mortality rates used later on in this paper.
As commonly used in the mortality table, we take the upper age
limit as 110. Accordingly, we set qllO equal to 1. It is common to
have J.lo higher than J.lx for the early years, which indicates a relatively
high infant mortality rate. Let Lx denote the number of lives age x last
birthday, and qx be the probability of a life now age x dying before
reaching age x + 1. Table 2 shows some of these values for the 1980
U.S. Life Table. Note that J.lx = -In( 1 - qx) in Table 2.
2 A more general way of defining the adjusted mortality rates would be p~ = apx +Pk,
where k indicates the spinal cord injury level k. This definition, however, requires
more information (a second equation in addition to equation (1)) in order to solve for
parameters a and Pk. Because in this case we don't have enough information, we do not
give numerical illustrations. In London(1985) this additional information is provided
by the assumption that the average ages at death in the graduated and ungraduated
series are equal. For spin,,] cord injured patients there is no information relating the
expected average age at death of the injured patient to that of an uninjured person
following the standard mortality curve. Hence, only the single equation (1) is imposed,
and a single parameter Pk is introduced. If we did have enough information, the more
general adjustment process should yield better results.
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Table 2
The Standard Mortality Table
(1980 U.S. Life Table)*
qx
Lx
J1x
0.01268
100,000
0.01260
0.00093
0.00093
98,740
98,648
0.00065
0.00065
0.00050
98,584
0.00050

x
0
1
2
3

33
21

109
110

0.36364
1.000000

0.45199
00

* Source:

Bowers, N.L., Jr., et al. Actuarial Mathematics. Itasca, Ill.: Society of Actuaries, 1986.

The modified force of mortality are given as:

,
x
J1

=

J1x
J1x
{ J1x
J1x

+ J1ip

+ J1cp
+ J1iq
+ J1cq

for
for
for
for

incomplete paraplegia,
complete paraplegia,
incomplete quadriplegia, and
complete quadriplegia,

where x = 1, ... , 1l0.
The relative mortality ratios for each category shown in Table 1 are
calculated in the standard actuarial manner as the ratios of observed
to expected deaths. We can use these relative mortality ratios to compute the expected deaths of spinal cord injury patients in terms of the
standard mortality table. We constrain the expected number of deaths
in the modified (derived) table to equal the number of deaths observed
in the study. In other words, the following relationship should hold:
Expected number of deaths

=

Actual number of deaths

where the expected number of deaths is taken from the modified table.
Because the DeVivo et al. medical study only gives seven year mortality
rates, the above relationship becomes
110

L Ex(l -

x=l

110

7P:)

=

fk

L Ex (1 -

x=l

7Px)

(1)
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where:
Pr[a life injured at age x survives t years,
using the modified or adjusted table;]
Pr[a life injured at age x survives t years,
using the standard table;]
The exposure (number of persons) age x in the study;
The relative mortality ratio for neurologic injury
severity level k, where k = ip, cp, iq, cq.

tP:
tP x
Ex
fk

In this context, fk is different for three age categories (cf., Table 1).
We take the starting age as 1 to be consistent with the age categories
in Table 1. Rewriting equation (1), we have
110

6

L Ex(l- exp(- L (J.1x+j + J.1k))) =

x~l

j~O

fk

110

6

x~l

j~O

L Ex(l- exp(- L J.1x+j))

(2)

Because Ex and J.1x+ j are assumed to be known, we may solve equation
(2) to obtain:
_

1

J.1k - --In
7

[I~~OlEx(l-fk(l-eXp(-IJ~OJ.1x+j)))]
110

6

IX~lExexp(-Ij~oJ.1x+j)

.

(3)

Upon applying the actual data, the results obtained are presented in
Table 3.
Table 3
Values Found Using Equation (3)
Value
J.1ip

0.013826

J.1cp
J.1iq
J.1cq

0.014248
0.015494
0.074946

Intuitively, the inequalities J.1cp > J.1ip and J.1cq > J.1iq should hold
(because within each pair a complete lesion is more extreme than an
incomplete lesion). Accordingly, we expect a larger mortality rate for
cp and cq than for ip and iq, respectively. The computed results support
this intuition.
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The standard mortality table is adjusted by a level amount for each
neurologic level without consideration of different age categories. This
is done to ascertain in general how much a spinal cord injury can affect a person's expectation of life. The results show that this level is
increasingly ordered as incomplete paraplegia, complete paraplegia, incomplete quadriplegia, and complete quadriplegia. The effects of the
first three neurologic levels are close, whereas complete quadriplegia
has a much larger influence on mortality.

5 The Study Population Distribution
As mentioned in the previous section, an interesting subproblem of
this study is how to derive Ex, the number of patients at age x in the
study. DeVivo et al. (1987) only give a partial breakdown of Ex by three
age categories, as in Table 1. One solution is to apply an information
theoretic approach to minimize the information distance between the
desired population distribution and a standard population distribution.
For example, if we assume the standard population is a stationary
population where Lx is the number of persons alive between age x and
x + 1 in the entire population, we can develop an information theoretic
model as follows:
/1

minI(EIL) =

I

Exln(Ex/Lx)

(4)

x=a

subject to
Number of patients between ages a and b
in the study (given);
/1

I

Average age of exposure of patients

xEx

x=a

times number of patients; and
Ex

;::

Oforx=a,a+l, ... ,b.

Essentially, the solution of this information theoretic problem provides exposure values for imputation into equation (1) and subsequent
equations. If the injured population were a random sample from the
general population, the correct choice of Ex would be Lx from the standard table. Because the average age within each interval is given and is
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not equal to the average age within each interval for the standard table, however, an adjustment must be made. The process described can
be thought of as determining an exposure distribution that is as close
as possible to that which would be obtained were injuries randomly
occurring in the population subject to the constraint expressed in the
medical study concerning average exposure age in the interval. This is
akin to applying the generalization of Laplace's principle of insufficient
information, as described in Brockett (1991).
DeVivo et al. (1987) present the following information concerning
the study population.
Table 4
The Study Population in DeVivo et al. (1987)
CQ
IQ
CP
IP
Age Interval 1-24 Years
741
417 688
688
Number of Patients
19.0
19.0 19.3 18.9
Average Age of Patients
Age Interval 25-49 Years
Number of Patients
Average Age of Patients

424
33.7

656
33.8

506
34.6

426
32.7

Age Interval 50+ Years
Number of Patients
Average Age of Patients

113
59.3

118
57.5

247
61.3

107
62.2

Notes: IP = Incomplete Paraplegic; CP = Complete Paraplegic; IQ =
Incomplete Quadriplegic; CQ = Complete Quadriplegic.

Using the incomplete paraplegic exposure determination, for example, we estimate Ex to be the solution of:
24

min

L Ex In(Ex / Lx)
x=l

subject to
24

LEx
x=l

417
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24

I

19.0 x 417

xEx

=

7923

x=l

Ex

:2:

0 for x

=

1,2, ... ,24.

These are the exposures used in our computations. If other information
about the study population were given, it could be incorporated as a
constraint.

6

The Information Theoretic Approach

We would like to incorporate the relationships obtained thus far to
build an information theoretic model for mortality table adjustment. In
the previous calculations we examine each level of the neurologic injury
separately. Now we will relax this assumption. We want simultaneously
to find four series of mortality rates Ox,k corresponding to each neurologic level and extent of lesion k. We do this using an information
theoretic approach-namely, we choose Ox,k to minimize the information theoretic distance of the Ox,k'S from fJx'S, which also satisfies the
previously known constraints on the Ox,k'S.3 These constraints imply
the Ox,k series should:
• Increase with age;
• Be convex;
• Be smooth;
• Have the number of deaths in the adjusted table using Ox match
the number of deaths found empirically by the DeVivo et al. (1987)
study;
• Have an ordered relationship between different neurologic severity levels; and
• Be nonnegative.
Accordingly, the modified mortality table is obtained as the solution
to:
110

minI(lllfJ)

=

I I

Ox,k In(ox,k/fJx)

(5)

k x=l
3 Any distance measure on the space of probability distributions could have been
used in the objective function with similar results. There are strong conceptual and
interpretation reasons for selecting the information theoretic distance, as discussed in
detail in Brockett (1991) and Kullback (1959).
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subject to
:::::

0,
0,

(6)
(7)

~

M,

(8)

:::::

110

L Ex(l -

x=l

x=l
6

exp(-

L Dx+),k))

fk

)=0

6

x=l

)=0

L Ex(l- exp(- L 11x+))) (9)

Dx,cq ::::: Dx,iq

Dx,cp ::::: Dx,iP
Dx,k

110

:::::

0,

(10)
(11)

where x = 1, ... , 11 0; k = ip, cp, iq, cq. As in Brockett and Zhang (1986),
the constraints (6), (7), and (8) may be rewritten in matrix notation for
easy input into commercial nonlinear programming codes.
This nonlinear mathematical programming model is solved using
GAMS 4 (general algebraic modeling system). The optimal solutions are
found qUickly using this computer program (cf., Brooke et al., 1992).
Any commercial nonlinear programming code could be used to solve
this problem, however. According to Brockett (1991), the resulting series Dx,k can be interpreted as the adjusted mortality rates for different
neurologic injury levels that are empirically least distinguishable from
the standard mortality table and that satisfy the given set of constraints.
The numerical series depicted in Figure 1 are obtained using the
value of the parameter M in equation (8) set to the value I (6. 3 I1x) 2 corresponding to the smoothness in the standard table used. The choice of
M determines the smoothness of the adjusted table and has the same
effect on the final mortality table appearance as the smoothness tradeoff parameter does in ordinary Whittaker-Henderson graduation. We
choose M to be the value I(6. 3 I1x)2 calculated using the standard mortality rates I1x to force no more smoothness on the resultant table than
that intrinsic in the standard table. If there were biological (or other)
reasons to assume the adjusted table should be more (or less) smooth
than the standard table, a smaller (or larger) value of M could be used.
For the standard 1980 U.S. life table used in our illustrative example,
we calculate M which was used in constraint (8)
"" (6. 3 I1x) 2 = 0.008.
M = L

4GAMS is designed to construct and solve large or complex mathematical programming models. It can solve various types of mathematical programming problem, such
as linear programming, nonlinear programming, and mixed integer programming.

Figure 1

00
00

Adjusted Mortality Using Information Theory
0
-1
-2

C-

o
c

(l)

.....
cO

"""'
::s

P::: -3
:>.....

. -./~. . . . . -..-.. ---..-.-. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .::::::>'

;:::l
cO

..... -4
~

0

0

-5

...c

~.

.'

....~-;...
.

~......

-+>

»
n
PJ

......

::;s
'+-4

~
0

~.

.~

.'~..'. /

.'

Ea -6
0.0
0

,....l

,..
.
.l

~

-7

\

-8

,_.

..

~

..-- ..-..-..-..~..

~.

.~

Legend
_ •• _ •• In(std)

PJ

_._._ .. In(ip)

...
n

- - In(cp)
............. In(iq)

!P

-0
-.

PJ

n

<
0

--In(cq)

w
Z

~

,. ..i
•

,:J

\0
\0
Ul

-9

0

20

40

60

80

100

120

Brockett and Song: Life Table for Spinal Cord Injury

89

Figure 1 shows the logarithms of the adjusted mortality rate for
each neurologic level that are derived by the information theoretic approach. We also plot logarithms of the standard mortality rate in each
chart. We note that In(ox,ip), In(ox,cp), and In(ox,iq) all have a smooth
pattern and are consistently higher than In(Jix) (shown as In(std) in
Figure 1). In(ox,cp) is larger in absolute value than In(ox,ip)' The differences between the adjusted mortality rates In(ox,ip), In(ox,cp), and
In(ox,iq) and the standard mortality rate Jix appear to be the largest
between age 40 and 50, while the disparity becomes smaller after age
55. At the latest years of life these differences almost disappear, perhaps because at this stage the natural driving force of mortality is so
large that other reasons are not as important. Complete quadriplegia
seems to have such a big influence on the mortality rate that age is a
much less important factor. The adjusted mortality rate for complete
quadriplegia shows only a moderate increase as age increases.

7

Conclusion

This paper provides actuaries with a method of modifying a standard
mortality table by incorporating results from a medical study. Although
we often don't have a complete information set, we still may pursue the
construction of a mortality table for the compared or substandard life
using grouped medical study results and reasonable statistical assumptions.
The information theoretic approach utilized in this paper provides
an effective method for incorporating such information into the mortality table. Poor information about the age distribution of participants
in the medical study hurts the precision of our model. Additional information, if available, could be incorporated into the analysis by adding
to the constraint set of equations (6) through (11).
Other methods for incorporating information can be developed, for
example, by using Cox's proportional hazards model (Cox, 1972). This
method of incorporating covariate information into a mortality table
adjustment is presented in Brockett and Cox (1983). The Cox proportional hazard model uses different information than that used in the adjustment methodology presented here; however, it is a well-developed
methodology for use when covariate (as opposed to relative mortality)
information is available at an individual level of data (as opposed to
published summary grouped data). See Brockett and Cox (1983) for
details of the mathematics within an actuarial context. A recent paper by England and Haberman (1993) also proposes an approach based
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on multiplicative models for the force of mortality function with various observed covariates affecting the force of mortality. Models are fit
and parameters estimated using the theory of generalized linear models. Their results provide a statistically rigorous method for deriving
mortality tables for impaired lives when there is covariate information
available about the individuals.
Of potential importance in constructing a mortality table for impaired lives is the advent of medical advances to decrease relative mortality differentials in the future. Such adjustments also can be incorporated into this analysis provided there are adequate data to allow
analysis. Competing risk models (cf., Arnold and Brockett 1983) can be
used to obtain a mortality table appropriate for analysis when a particular cause of death has been eliminated. Cause-specific mortality
tables must be used, and such tables are not available for spinal cord
injury persons at this time. Research also is being done on how to use
other secondary grouped data and how to make the results from several
studies with different formats compatible.
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Simulation of Investment Returns for a Money
Purchase Fund
M. Zaki Khorasanee*

Abstract t
This paper examines the problem of investment risk in money purchase
pension plans. The disadvantages of modeling equity returns as independent, identically distributed random variables are conSidered, and a modified
stochastic model of equity returns is proposed. This modified stochastic model
is used to estimate the variability in a plan member's retirement fund and to
compare various alternatives to investing 100 percent of the assets in ordinary shares. Varying conclusions are drawn about the likely success of these
alternative investment strategies in reducing investment risk.
Key words and phrases: pension plan, defined contributions, dividend yield,
investment risk

1
1.1

Introduction
Defined Benefit and Money Purchase Pension Plans

In defined benefit pension plans the pension benefit is calculated
from a set mathematical formula. The most common approach is for
the pension to equal a fixed fraction of the member's salary close to
retirement multiplied by the number of years of service with the employer. Such arrangements usually are described as final salary plans.
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From the employees' perspective, final salary plans have the advantage of providing pensions linked to their retirement income needs.
New entrants to the plan can predict what fraction of their earnings
will be replaced by the plan should they stay in service until retirement. Moreover, provided that an employee's salary increases at a rate
not lower than the rate of price inflation, the real value of the pension
(in terms of its future purchasing power) has a lower bound.
A money purchase pension plan is fundamentally different; it is a
defined contribution plan where the objective is to set aside a fraction of
the member's salary for contributions to the pension plan. The fraction
is determined by an agreed upon mathematical formula. The pension
at retirement is an annuity purchased by the member's accumulated
fund, the value of which depends on investment returns over the same
member's period of service.
A comparison by Bodie (1989) based on historic United Kingdom
investment and earnings data for a money purchase plan in which contributions of 10 percent of earnings are invested in ordinary shares
shows that the pension of a United Kingdom employee with 20 years
of service retiring in one of the years from 1970 to 1987 would have
varied between 13 percent and 41 percent of final salary.
Nevertheless, money purchase plans have become increasingly prevalent in both the United States and the United Kingdom for a variety of
reasons. This paper examines the problem of investment risk in such
plans and assesses the validity of various strategies that may be employed to limit this risk.

1.2

Outline of Paper

Our approach is first to develop a stochastic investment model for
equity returns net of wage inflation. The reasons for focusing on returns net of wage inflation are twofold. First, contributions to money
purchase plans are usually a fixed percentage of the employee's salary.
Second, it is desirable for an employee's retirement fund to be measured relative to the projected salary at retirement. Thus, it is natural
to use currency units adjusted for future wage inflation, in which case
returns also must be measured relative to wage inflation.
In particular, in Section 2 we derive formulae for the mean and variance of a money purchase fund, assuming net annual returns are independent and identically distributed lognormal random variables. It is
shown that this model, however, overstates the variability in the retirement fund. In Section 3 we develop a modified stochastic investment
model that employs certain aspects of Wilkie's (1986) model. This mod-
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ified model is used throughout the rest of the paper. Sections 4, 5, and
6 examine the impact of switching the fund to low risk assets near to retirement, the impact of balanced investment strategies, and the use of
derivative-based investment products, respectively. Section 7 contains
a summary and implications for pension plan design.

1.3

Notation

We assume that a contribution of one unit is paid annually at the
start of each year into a pension plan member's fund. All amounts and
returns are expressed in terms of constant earnings.

Let
Xo

y
n

x
t
F(t)
F(O)

8t

Youngest entry age to a money purchase plan;
Normal retirement age, e.g., 62 or 65;
y - Xo = Maximum number of years to normal retirement;
Xo + to = Current age of a plan member in mid-career;
Time since member was age xo, with t = 0,1, ... ;
Actual fund at time t;
0; and
Average force of interest between t and t + 1.

It follows that:
F(t

+ 1)

=

(F(t)

+ l)e Dt •

(1)

2 The Independent Lognormal Returns Model
We now derive expressions for the expected value and variance of
the fund at retirement for a member at any age. The following assumptions are needed:
Assumption 1: The annual investment returns (net of wage inflation)
form a sequence of independent, identically distributed, lognormal random variables; and
Assumption 2: A member age x, where Xo :s: x < y, already has accumulated a fund equal to its expected value on entering the plan at
age Xo.
Assumption 1 implies that

(2)
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and that the annual investment return (net of wage inflation) in any year
is independent of the fund value at the start of that year. This independence makes it easy to derive expressions for the mean and variance of
F (t). The second assumption is intended to cover the case of members
who enter the plan in mid-career, bringing with them transfer values.
2.1

Mean and Variance of the Fund

Because eO t is lognormally distributed, then from Assumption 1 and
equation (1) we can deduce that:
E[F(t + 1)] = (E[F(t)] + 1)e!1+~u2.

As F(O)

=

(3)

0, equation (3) yields
E[F(t)]

=

(1

+ r) ((1 + r)t

- 1)

(4)

r

where

I

?

r = e!1+zlT" - 1

is the expected annual return net of wage inflation.
We now derive the variance of the projected retirement fund of a
member age x who has accumulated a fund equal to its expected value.
It is well known [see, for example, Bowers et al. 1986, Chapter 2, equation (2.2.11), p. 29] that for any two random variables Wand V,
Yar[W] = Yar[E[W!Vll + E[Yar[W!Vll.

(5)

So, from equation (1), let
W = F(t + 1) = (F(t) + l)V

and V

=

eO t .

Note that V is a lognormal random variable with
E[V] = e!i+ zu
1

2

2

and Yar[V] = e !1+U (e U - 1).
2

2

It follows from Assumption 1 above that

Yar[F(t + 1)]

Yar[(E[F(t)] + l)eO t ] + E[e 20t Yar[F(t)]]
(E[F(t)] + 1)2Yar[eO t ] + e2!1+ 2U2 Yar[F(t)]
U2
e2!1 W2 ((E[F(t)] + 1)2(e -1)
+ e2!1+ 2U2 Yar[F (t)]).

(6)
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Now equation (6) is the first order linear difference equation in
Var[F(t)]. From Mickens (1987, Chapter 2.2), the solution to a first

order linear difference equation of the form
Yt+l = PtYt

for t

=

+ qt,

t = 0,1,2, ...

1,2, ... , is given as

(7)
To solve equation (6), let
e 211+2cr 2
2

2

e 2JJ +cr (ecr -1)(E[F(t)]

Hence, as Var[F(O)]

=

0, we have
t-l

Var[F(t)]

+ 1)2.

= e2tJJ+(2t-l)cr2(ecr2

-1)

L e- 2i (JJ+cr

2

) (1

+E[F(i)])2.

(8)

i=O

This equation can be simplified further because of the simple form that
E [F (t)] takes in equation (4).

2.2

Parameters Estimated From Past Equity Returns

Estimators for the mean and standard deviation of the force of interest are obtained from United Kingdom equity index returns and average
earnings data from 1950 to 1993. The equity returns are taken from the
BZW 1 equity index and the earnings data from government statistics.
The following estimators are obtained for J1 and u:

p = 0.052 and

a- =

0.2556

The estimate a- is larger than expected, particularly if one believes
that equity returns are correlated, to some extent, with wage and price
inflation. The data suggest, however, that there is little correlation
IThe BZW equity index is a representative stock price index for ordinary shares
traded in the United Kingdom. This index is compiled by the investment bank Barclays
de Zoete Wedd (hence BZW). We have used annual returns on the index as calculated
by BZW, which allow for the reinvestment of gross dividends.
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when returns are measured over annual intervals. 2 In addition, the
period covered includes the crash/recovery scenario of 1974 and 1975,
which has a significant effect on the measured standard deviation.
Using equations (4) and (8) and the above estimates P and fr gives,
for example:
E[ho] = 54.5 and U(F20) = 55.8.
Although it is possible (given the skewed nature of the distribution)
for the standard deviation of the fund to exceed its expected value,
the figure obtained is nevertheless implausibly high and not consistent
with the empirical studies to which Bodie refers.
It may be incorrect to assume that annual equity returns net of wage
inflation are independent when estimating the variability in funds accumulated over long periods. In making such an assumption, we ignore the fact that the average dividend yield on ordinary shares tends
to fluctuate around a central value that may be comparatively stable.
This effect will tend to reduce the variability in returns over long periods, without necessarily affecting the measured variability in annual
returns.
A central feature of Wilkie's stochastic model 3 for the simulation of
equity returns is the explicit treatment of dividend yield. This aspect
of Wilkie's approach is adapted next to simulate equity returns net of
wage inflation.

3 Modification of the Simple Lognormal Model
The end-of-year dividend yield on the BZW equity index ranges from
4 percent to 6 percent in 35 of the 44 years from 1950 to 1993. This has
had a profound effect on long-term stability in equity returns, as there
has been a tendency for the market to correct itself when overvalued
or undervalued by historical standards.
2 Economic theory implies that equity returns and wage inflation should be correlated
over long periods, as both arc driven by growth in the national income. Over relatively
short intervals, however, there is little evidence of this correlation.
31n the mid-1980s, A.D. Wilkie developed a stochastic investment model that simulates United Kingdom investment returns that since has become a standard tool for
many United Kingdom actuaries. Wilkie devised four connected models: (1) for United
Kingdom price inflation; (2) for ordinary share dividend yields; (3) for growth in ordinary share dividends; and (4) for yields on fixed interest government bonds. The
price inflation time series from model (1) is used as an input variable for each of the
subsequent models. Model (2) assumes that the natural logarithms of share dividend
yields are correlated over adjacent periods. This is probably the most robust feature
of Wilkie's models as far as adherence to the data is concerned.
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United Kingdom actuaries implicitly have recognized this phenomenon by using a discounted cash flow (or actuarial) value for equities in
valuations of defined benefit plans. Actuarial values differ from market
values in that price changes arising from fluctuations in dividend yields
(as opposed to a rise or fall in dividend income) are not recognized.
Following Thornton and Wilson (1992), the actuarial force of net
interest, Yt, is defined by the relationship
Yt

=

Dt + d t - dt-l

(9)

where d t = In(D t ) and D t is the average equity index dividend yield at
the end of year t. Equation (1) now can be rewritten as:
F(t + 1)

=

(F(t) + l)eYt+dt-l-dt.

(10)

We now model the Yt'S (the actuarial force of net interest) as a sequence of independent, identically distributed, normal random variables. The historical data over 1950-1993 give the following estimates
of the mean and standard deviation of Yt:
j1(yd = 0.0428 and u(yr) = 0.0646.

The variability is reduced compared with returns on market values, Dt.
What matters for a plan member, however, is the market value of the
fund at retirement. Given F(to), let F(t, to) denote the value of the fund
at time t (to ~ t ~ n). Then,
t

F(t, to)

F(to) exp[d to - d t

+

2.:

Yk]

k=to+ 1

t

t-l

+

2.: exp[dj -

j=~

dt

+

2.:

Yk].

(11)

k=j+l

We therefore require a model for the way that dividend yields change
over time.
3.1

Dividend Yield Model

Dividend yields (Dr) must lie in the range zero to infinity, so it may
appear reasonable to assume that d t can be modeled as a normally
distributed random variable with mean Ild and standard deviation O"d.
Wilkie (1986) observes that the average dividend yield on United
Kingdom equities tends to vary about a long-term average and that
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yields in adjacent periods exhibit significant positive correlation. We
estimate the autocorrelation 4 of d t from the year-end dividend yield on
the BZW equity index from 1919 to 1993.
k
1
2
3
4

p(d t , dt+k)

0.512
0.204
0.030
-0.008

where p(d t , dt+k) is the correlation coefficient between d t and dt+k.
It seems that dividend yields in adjacent years exhibit significant
positive correlation, which is consistent with the idea that changes in
market valuations occur in response to a continuous stream of price
sensitive information. The data confirm that an autoregressive 5 model,
as used by Wilkie, is appropriate. Wilkie uses an autocorrelation parameter of 0.6 for d t and d t - 1 and also assumes that the rate of price
inflation has a direct effect on d t . Because we require a model that operates in real values, we ignore the latter feature of Wilkie's model and
use an autocorrelation parameter of 0.5 for d t and d t - 1 in accordance
with our own data.
This leads to the following first order autoregressive formula for d t :
d t = 0.5d t - 1

J3
+ 0.5fJd + TO'dNt

(12)

where the Nt's form a sequence of independent normal random variables with mean zero and unit variance. The coefficients in equation
(12) have been selected so that E[dtJ = fJd and Var[dtJ = O'J. The
historic data give the following estimates of the mean and standard
deviation:
Pd = -3.008 and a-d = 0.240.

3.2

Expected Value of Fund

Assuming that the change in the equity dividend yield over any period is independent of the actuarial return over the same period, we can
deduce expected value of the fund at age Xo + t for a new entrant age Xo
as follows: let to = 0 and F(O) = 0 in equations (9) and (11). Assuming
4The term autocorrelation refers to the correlation of a sequence of random variables
with itself.
sFor a more detailed description and analysis of autoregressive processes, see Box
and Jenkins (1976, Chapter 3).
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that the change in dividends dj - d t and the
we see that
E[F(t)]

E

[~ exp[d

j -

Yk'S

dt +
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are independent, then

kt

t-1

t

j=O

k=j+1

L E[e(drdr)]E[exp[ L

Yki]
Yk]

t-1

L E[e(dj-dtl ]e(t- j)(!1J'+~a-~).

(13)

j=O

But from equation (12), we have
(14)

where f3 = 2-(t- j). Although the value of this expression does not
depend on t and j, we find that for our estimate of <rd, it is fairly close
to unity for all t and j. Thus for the purpose of estimating the fund in
mid-career, we shall use the approximation:
t-1

'" e(t-j)(!1)'+!a-~) .
Fto ~
~ L

(15)

j=O

3.3

Use of Simulation to Obtain Percentiles

As Bodie notes, the standard deviation is not a particularly useful
parameter for the skewed distribution of the fund at retirement. What
is required are values of the fund at various percentiles so that we can
estimate the probability of a plan member's benefits lying within a particular range. The relevant probability density function is difficult to
obtain, so these values have to be estimated through simulation.
For n = 40 and to = 0,20,30, and 35, there are 1000 simulations
performed for each combination of 11 and to using the modified stochastic model described in Section 3.1 above. The values of the retirement
fund at various percentiles, as a multiple of its mean value over each
run of 1000, are shown in Table 1.
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to
0
20
30
35

Table 1
Percentile Points
5th 25th 50th
0.49 0.71 0.93
0.54 0.74 0.94
0.58 0.77 0.95
0.60 0.80 0.97

of F40
75th
1.18
1.21
1.18
1.16

95th
1.82
1.63
1.56
1.52

There are two main conclusions to be drawn from Table 1.
• Even though the stochastic model allows for long-term stability
in dividend yields, the variability in the projected fund of a new
entrant 40 years from retirement is still high; the ratio of the 75th
percentile to the 25th percentile is 1.66. In other words, an employee whose working career coincides with a period of moderately favorable equity returns would end with a fund 66 percent
greater than that of an similar employee whose working career
coincides with a period of moderately unfavorable equity returns.
• The variability in the projected retirement fund reduces slowly as
the employee gets closer to retirement. At only five years from
retirement, the ratio of the 75th percentile to the 25th percentile
is as high as 1.45. There is still a 1 in 4 chance that the fund will
be less than 80 percent of its expected value and a 1 in 20 chance
that it will be less than 60 percent of its expected value.
The results obtained over a 40 year period of service are broadly
consistent with those of Knox (1993), based on the experience of an
Australian managed fund. This appears to be a coincidence, however,
as the stochastic model used by Knox assumes independent, identically
distributed returns combined with a low standard deviation. Hence
for periods of service less than 40 years, Knox's model would imply
significantly less variability in the fund.

3.4

Practical Problems Created by Investment Risk

Some practical implications of the results shown in Table 1 are discussed below.
• Uncertainty in future benefit levels: An employee in a money
purchase plan may have little idea of what the real value of his or
her future pension will be, which makes planning for retirement
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difficult. The projected future pension arising from a given rate
of contribution can be estimated, but these estimates need to be
updated frequently and may be wide of the mark. Even if the
contribution rate is varied, following regular benefit projections
the plan member may find that either:
1. The retirement fund is too small to purchase the required
pension; or
2. The retirement fund is larger than required, and the surplus
savings it contains must be used to purchase an annuity.
The second problem is a consequence of United Kingdom legislation that limits the amount of a member's fund that can be taken
as a lump sum.
o

Inequity between employees: It can be argued that a money purchase plan is the most equitable form of pension provision, as the
same contribution rate can be paid for each employee, who always
would receive his or her asset share by definition.
We believe this definition of equity is valid only for individual
pension contracts, where the member effectively hires an insurance company to manage his or her personal savings and retains
control over the choice of insurer and type of fund.
In an employer-sponsored plan, the member usually has less control over the money invested on his or her behalf. Furthermore,
the option to receive salary in lieu of pension contributions is
not normally available. It follows that the benefit being provided
by the employer is not the contribution, but the pension derived
from the contribution. In a money purchase plan, this pension will
depend on whether the employee's period of service happens to
coincide with a period of favorable or unfavorable investment experience. Thus, different generations of employees with identical
salary and service histories may end with different pensions.
If a government requires its citizens to invest social security contributions in money purchase arrangements, the economic consequences of inequity between the generations could be severe, as
an entire generation of newly retired pensioners could end with
inadequate pensions and could require additional financial support from the working population.
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Switching to Low Risk Assets

The results obtained in Section 3 are for a money purchase fund invested fully in ordinary shares. The first variant from this investment
strategy to be examined is one frequently employed: switching the existing fund and future contributions to low risk assets at some time
close to retirement.
Before investigating the optimal time to switch, we should consider
what low risk assets are appropriate for such a switch. Most insurance
companies in the United Kingdom writing unit-linked 6 business have
funds invested in cash and/or government bonds, specifically to meet
the needs of risk-averse policyholders. Individuals with unit-linked
pension policies can switch their assets into these funds at any time,
sometimes subject to a small administration fee. Cash and fixed interest bonds give no guaranteed protection against inflation, however, so
switching into a fund investing in index-linked government bonds may
be more appropriate.
The real yield (net of price inflation) on United Kingdom index-linked
bonds usually has been around 3 percent to 4 percent, which is approximately 1 percent above the annual growth in United Kingdom average
earnings over the post-war period. We assume for modeling purposes
that a pension plan member always can switch into assets that guarantee a fixed return of 1 percent above the increase in United Kingdom average earnings. Let F(sw) (n, to) be the fund at retirement after
switching at time to. Then:
F(SW) (n, to) = F(to)(l.Ol)(n-t o )

+ Sn-tol

(16)

evaluated at 1 percent.
Switching to index-linked assets partly solves the problem of having
an unpredictable pension at retirement-at least the real value of the
fund is now fairly predictable, although one still must contend with
uncertain future annuity rates. The earlier the switch is made, the easier
it is to plan for retirement and to afford any extra contributions that
may be required to obtain the desired pension. If the switch is made
too early, however, the projected fund at retirement will be far below
the fund expected from continued investment in equities.
Under the stochastic model used in this paper, the equity dividend
yield at the time of switching has an important bearing on the decision.
6 A unit-linked product offers its policyholders a number of investment funds in
which their assets can be invested. As with mutual funds, no investment guarantees
are provided, and the policyholder's maturity value is linked directly to the market
value of the underlying assets.
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The argument for switching would be strengthened if the dividend yield
were below its long-term average, because of the greater risk of a fall in
the equity market. The reverse would apply if the dividend yield were
above its long-term average.
Simulations are performed to compare the fund obtained after switching into index-linked bonds at time to with that obtained by remaining
in equities, assuming that the equity dividend yield at to were either
equal to, 1 percent below, or 1 percent above its long-term average.
Table 2 shows the value of the fund obtained after switching into
index-linked bonds, as a fraction of the mean fund from continued investment in equities, for switches made at different durations from
retirement and at different equity dividend yields. For comparison, the
25th and 50th percentiles of the fund obtained from continued equity
investment (from Table 1) also are shown.
Table 2
Fund Obtained by Switching to Low Risk Assets
Switch to Low Risk Assets
Stay in Equities
Percentiles
Value of Dto
6.08%
25th
75th
to 4.08% 5.08%
0.40
0.40
0.40
0.71
0
0.93
20 0.61
0.52
0.47
0.74
0.94
30 0.82
0.67
0.58
0.77
0.95
35
0.98
0.79
0.67
0.80
0.97
As one might expect, the ratio of the switched retirement fund to the
mean fund from continued investment in equities is always less than
one. The amount by which this ratio falls below unity is the insurance
premium paid in order to obtain a guaranteed fund at retirement.
By comparing these ratios with the percentiles from continued investment in equities, we can assess the degree of risk protection obtained by switching. If the fund remains in equities, the probability of
ending with a retirement fund below the 25th percentile is 0.25, a significant risk. If by switching to low risk assets we can guarantee a fund
equal to or higher than this, the case for switching is reasonably strong.
According to Young (1994), the most commonly recommended time
for a switch to low risk assets is approximately five years before retirement, which corresponds to the case to = 35. Table 2 confirms that
at this duration, the risk of a lower retirement fund by remaining in
equities is significant but the magnitude of this risk depends greatly
on the prevailing equity dividend yield. (At to = 0, however, the initial
dividend yield is irrelevant, as there is no fund to switch.)
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Ideally, the following conditions would hold before switching into
low risk assets:
• The projected fund after switching will meet the member's requirements;
• The equity market is overvalued by historic standards;
• There are fewer than ten years before retirement.
If the first condition is true, one would expect the member to be riskaverse, as he or she virtually can guarantee the required fund without
having to pay extra contributions. Thus, even a small probability of not
achieving the necessary fund might be unacceptable.
If the second condition is true, the first condition is more likely to
be true (as the market value of the accumulated fund will be greater),
and the risk of ending with a lower retirement fund by remaining in
equities would be greater.
If the third condition is true, the risk of ending with a lower retirement fund by remaining in equities would be significant under most
conditions. But if the third condition is true and the first condition
is not true, there is less time to obtain the required fund by paying
extra contributions. A member therefore might prefer to risk continued equity investment in the hope of obtaining the target fund through
superior investment performance, Le., by taking a calculated gamble.
In summary, we can conclude that switching to low risk assets at
some point within ten years of retirement is likely to be a suitable strategy for most members of money purchase plans. The precise timing of
this switch should flexible, however, depending on the member's projected fund after switching and the level of the equity market at the
time of the switch.

5

Balanced Investment Strategies

This section examines the results of following a balanced investment strategy? throughout an employee's period of service and compares them with the results obtained for 100 percent investment in
equities.
The following balanced investment strategies are considered:
7 A balanced investment strategy is one involving a combination of different asset
types, with a view to achieving a suitable compromise between risk and return.
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• 75 percent equities, 25 percent index-linked bonds, realigned annually by market values; and
• 50 percent equities, 50 percent index-linked bonds, realigned annually by market values.
Again, 1000 simulations are performed simultaneously for each investment strategy, so that each set of simulations is based on the same
sequence of equity returns. This enables the number of times that a
particular investment strategy leads to a higher retirement fund than
does an alternative strategy to be calculated.
The simulations are carried out for the case n = 40, to = 0, i.e., for
a new entrant at the youngest permitted age of entry, with no accumulated fund. The values of the retirement fund at various percentiles, as
a multiple of the mean fund from investing fully in equities, are shown
in Table 3.
Table 3
Comparisons of Different Investment Strategies
Investment Strategy (% in Equities)
C = 50%
Percentile A = 100% B = 75%
5th
0.49
0.53
0.53
0.64
0.72
0.71
25th
0.73
0.93
0.86
50th
0.84
1.20
1.05
75th
1.00
1.75
1.37
95th
0.75
1.00
0.90
Mean
As one would expect, a lower allocation to equities reduces the mean
value of the retirement fund, but also reduces its variability. In order to
determine whether a balanced investment strategy has anything to offer
the individual plan member, the following probabilities are estimated
from the simulations:
Strategy A (100 percent in equities): Probability of obtaining a fund
of less than one-half the mean is equal to 0.056;
Strategy B (75 percent in equities): Probability of obtaining a fund of
less than one-half A's mean is equal to 0.031; and
Strategy C (50 percent in equities): Probability of obtaining a fund of
less than one-half A's mean is equal to 0.024.
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We can summarize the results by saying that a more balanced investment strategy would result in a lower retirement fund for the majority
of members, but also would reduce the already small proportion of
members who obtain a severely substandard fund.
So, we could sell investment strategy B to a member by explaining
that although his or her expected fund would be 10 percent lower, the
risk of ending with only half the expected fund is reduced from 5.6
percent to 3.1 percent. Most members might not feel this is a good
deal, and the case for strategy C would be even weaker.
The main advantage of investing in low risk assets is that inequity
between different members is reduced significantly. The ratio of the
retirement fund at the 75th percentile to that at the 25th percentile is
1.67 for strategy A, 1.48 for strategy B, and 1.31 for strategy C. These
ratios have been achieved by leveling down;8 the actual fund value at
the 25th percentile is highest for strategy A.
The results obtained therefore suggest that the case for investing
a significant proportion of the fund in low risk assets as a long-term
strategy is weak. This does not necessarily argue against short-term
tactical switches from the equity market based on the judgment of the
fund manager.

6 Guaranteed Equity Products
The final investment strategy to be considered as an alternative to
100 percent investment in equities is one involving the use of guaranteed equity products (GEPs).
GEPs have been marketed by United Kingdom insurance companies
as a means of allowing policyholders to participate in the underlying
growth of an equity portfolio while also benefiting from a guaranteed
minimum fund, either at termination of the contract or at intermediate
durations. These guarantees are designed to protect against adverse
movements in the equity market.
A typical contract may provide a return on the investor's capital
equal to the increase in an ordinary share price index, while guaranteeing that the investor will be repaid the initial capital should the index
fall over the term of the contract. In such a contract, the absence of
reinvested dividends would pay for the guarantee. Dodhia and Sheldon
(1994) describe how the creative use of financial options has enabled
8 Leveling down means a reduction in the inequality between two groups, achieved
by making the better off group poorer, rather than making the worse off group richer.
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the design of a wide variety of contracts, each offering a different type
of guarantee.
Consider a contract that provides a rolling guarantee at one year
intervals coinciding with the annual investment of contributions to the
pension fund. We assume that the contract guarantees a fraction of the
capital invested at the start of the year plus the actual equity return
(if positive) applied to the minimum guaranteed capital. For modeling
purposes we further assume that:
• The guaranteed capital increases in line with United Kingdom average earnings over the year;
• The equity return is based on the equity price index with dividends
reinvested, as opposed to the more usual practice of using the
price index alone.
Dodhia and Sheldon, on commenting on the feasibility and propriety of
the first assumption for pension fund contracts, state that such a guarantee would be possible to provide and would be suitable for pension
contracts.
The GEP investment return net of wage inflation in year between
times t and t + 1 is given by:
R t = fmax{e.5 t , 1} - 1

(17)

where f is a constant with 0 < f < 1. The expected value of the retirement fund will be sensitive to the value of f chosen, as this factor
will compound over the years to retirement. We choose values for f
that produce approximately the same expected fund as from investing
in the equity portfolio alone, which trial simulations show to be in the
range 0.92 :$ f :$ 0.93.
Using the modified stochastic model, we perform simultaneously
1000 simulations for contracts with f equal to 0.92, 0.925, and 0.93,
respectively, and for investment in the underlying equities alone. As
before, these are done for a new entrant at the youngest age with 40
years until retirement. The values of the retirement fund at various
percentiles, expressed as a multiple of the mean fund from investing
in equities alone, are shown in Table 4.
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Table 4
Investing in Guaranteed Equity Products (GEPs)
GEPs for Various f Values
Percentile f = 0.92 f = 0.925 f = 0.93 Equities
5th
0.44
0.50
0.57
0.50
25th
0.62
0.71
0.82
0.70
50th
0.80
0.91
1.05
0.93
75th
1.05
1.21
1.40
1.20
95th
1.58
1.82
2.11
1.78
Mean
0.89
1.02
1.18
1.00
Table 4 indicates that the expected fund from investing in a rolling
one year GEP contract is sensitive to the level of guarantee offered.
More important, there appears to be no reduction in the variability of
the fund at retirement compared with a strategy of investing in the
underlying shares alone.
Guaranteed equity products reduce variability in investment returns
over short periods, so it is perhaps surprising that a rolling one year
contract fails to reduce the same variability over longer periods. An
intuitive explanation follows from the fact that the return from a rolling
GEP contract depends on how variable the underlying equity returns
are. The greater the variability in equity returns, the greater the return
from the GEP, as the investor benefits from large positive equity returns
while being protected against large negative ones.
Over long periods, however, the variability in equity returns also may
be variable-perhaps there will be several crash/recovery scenarios as
in 1974 and 1975; perhaps there won't be any. It follows that the longterm return from a GEP may be as variable as the long-term return from
the underlying shares.

7 Summary and Implications
7.1

Summary
The main findings of this paper are summarized below.
• Modeling equity returns as an independent, identically distributed,
lognormal random variable appears to overestimate the variability in funds accumulated from the investment of annual contributions over relatively long periods.
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• In the United Kingdom stochastic models that allow for tendency
of the equity dividend yield to move toward a central value produce results that are more consistent with empirical studies. Even
when such models are used, however, the variability in the retirement fund of a new entrant to a money purchase plan is large, and
this variability reduces only slowly as the member approaches retirement.
• A strong case exists for the individual plan member to switch his
or her fund to low risk assets in the period close to retirement.
Although the case for switching becomes stronger as the member
approaches retirement, the optimal time to do so depends also
on the member's target fund and the prevailing equity dividend
yield.
• A balanced investment strategy in which a significant proportion
of the member's fund is invested in low risk assets throughout
his or her period of service reduces both the expected value of
the fund at retirement and its variability. Most of the reduction in
variability occurs from leveling down-the reduction in the member's downside risk is not significant.
• Over a 40 year period a rolling one year guaranteed equity contract of simple design results in no significant reduction in the
variability of the retirement fund, compared with investing purely
in equities.

7.2

Implications for Pension Scheme Design

The arguments for investing long-term savings in ordinary shares
are strong, both from the viewpoint of maximizing returns and hedging
against wage and price inflation. Equities are a highly appropriate asset
class for pension plans other than those that consist mainly of retired
employees.
In money purchase pension plans, however, investment in equities
results in pension benefits that depend excessively on whether the employee's period of service happens to coincide with a period of favorable
or unfavorable investment experience. This makes it difficult for individual members to plan for retirement and results in inequity between
different generations of employees.
Three strategies for reducing the investment risk associated with
equities are examined in this paper:
• Switching to low risk assets close to retirement;
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• Balanced investment strategies; and
• The use of derivative-based investment products.
Of these three, only the first is found to offer significant advantages to
the individual member. Moreover, a switching strategy does not deal
with the fundamental problem-by the time a member gets close to
retirement, the damage already may have been done.
A great advantage of defined benefit plans is the implicit smoothing
of variable investment returns for different generations of employees,
brought by the use of a fixed benefit formula. A good example of such a
formula is found in the United Kingdom State Scheme, where a pension
equal to a fixed fraction of career-average revalued earnings is granted.
The rate of revaluation applied to each year's earnings figure is the
increase in an index of average earnings between the year concerned
and the year prior to retirement. This example is similar to a money
purchase plan in which a fixed percentage of salary is invested for each
employee. The only difference is that a guaranteed rate of interest,
equal to the increase in the average earnings index, is applied to each
member's contributions.
Defined benefit plans have become less popular in both the United
Kingdom and the United States. Aside from the costs of complying
with increasingly complex legislation, employers have been less willing
to accept the open-ended liability of such plans, which may require
them to increase their contribution rate to cover a shortfall created by
unfavorable experience.
A way must be found to apply the defined benefit principle to defined contribution plans. In some ways, this would be similar to a withprofits insurance fund, and a few United Kingdom pension plans are
run on this basis. Unlike a with-profits fund, however, there should
be explicit formulae for calculating the benefits paid, ideally based on
career-average revalued earnings as used in the United Kingdom State
Scheme. In addition, there would have to be rules for varying the rate of
benefit accrual, should the experience of the plan deviate too far from
the assumptions made by the actuary.
A defined contribution plan with a defined benefit scale that could
be adjusted from time to time would represent a more equitable and
secure form of pension provision than arrangements based purely on
the money purchase principle.
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Appendix: United Kingdom Equity Dividend Yields
and Index Returns
Table Al
U.K. Equity Dividend Yields and Index Returns
Year

EQIDY

1919
1920
1921
1922
1923
1924
1925
1926
1927
1928
1929
1930
1931
1932
1933
1934
1935
1936
1937

4.8%
9.5%
8.9%
6.0%
6.4%
5.4%
4.8%
5.4%
4.9%
4.6%
6.1%
6.7%
6.8%
4.7%
3.9%
3.8%
3.7%
3.4%
4.6%

REQIN

Year

EQIDY

REQIN

1938
1939
1940
1941
1942
1943
1944
1945
1946
1947
1948
1949
1950
1951
1952
1953
1954
1955
1956

5.5%
5.4%
6.3%
5.2%
4.4%
4.1%
3.8%
3.8%
3.5%
4.3%
4.3%
5.0%
5.0%
5.4%
6.1%
5.4%
4.4%
4.8%
5.7%

5.1%
-1.6%
-7.1%
17.2%
37.5%
1.6%
-14.8%

EQIDY = Equity index dividend yield at year-end.
REQIN

=

Return on equity index net of increase in average earnings.

Sources: BZW Equity/Gilt Study. The abstract of statistics for social
security benefits and contributions and the indices of retail prices
and average earnings-Government Statistical Service.
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Table Al (continued)
U.K. Equity Dividend Yields and Index Returns
Year

1957
1958
1959
1960
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975

EQIDY

REQIN

6.3%
4.8%
3.6%
4.5%
4.8%
5.0%
4.1%
5.2%
5.2%
5.9%
4.2%
3.4%
4.0%
4.6%
3.4%
3.1%
4.4%
11.8%
5.7%

-6.5%
44.9%
46.6%
-5.2%
-3.6%
-2.9%
13.2%
-9.1%
3.6%
-9.3%
30.5%
29.8%
-18.7%
-13.7%
32.9%
5.3%
-39.9%
-60.8%
109.1%

Year

EQIDY

REQIN

1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993

7.4%
5.4%
5.6%
6.8%
5.8%
5.9%
5.2%
4.7%
4.5%
4.2%
4.1%
4.4%
4.7%
4.2%
5.4%
5.0%
4.4%
3.4%

-11.4%
43.7%
-1.1%
-8.4%
12.5%
1.8%
19.4%
18.9%
22.0%
11.6%
17.8%
-0.4%
2.1%
24.5%
-15.3%
13.4%
14.8%
24.7%

EQIDY = Equity index dividend yield at year-end.
REQIN

=

Return on equity index net of increase in average earnings.

Sources: BZW Equity/Gilt Study. The abstract of statistics for social
security benefits and contributions and the indices of retail prices
and average earnings-Government Statistical Service.
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Pension Valuations: An Expected Utility Model
Lisa Lipowski Posey* and Arnold F. Shapiro t

Abstract
Many of the criteria used by actuaries when selecting assumptions for pension plan valuations often conflict. As a result, actuaries must weigh the various costs and benefits associated with a particular set of assumptions. We use
expected utility theory to model the process of chOOSing actuarial assumptions
when faced with potentially conflicting criteria. The three criteria considered
are prudence, best estimate, and conservatism.
The actual contribution chosen by the actuary is found to depend on the
contribution level that triggers a red flag with respect to tax deductibility. If
this level is relatively low, the actuary chooses a high contribution that gives
weight to each criterion, incorporating the risk of a penalty by tax authorities.
If the tax deductible trigger is of an intermediate level, the actuary chooses this
level exactly and insulates the plan from tax scrutiny; if the level is high, the
utility maximizing contribution is below that level.
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Introduction

In the United States defined benefit pension plan valuations must be
performed periodically by the plan actuary. As noted by Shapiro (1990),
however, many of the criteria underlying the choice of assumptions for
these valuations often conflict. This observation is not surprisingwhile the ultimate choice of actuarial assumptions rests with the actuary, the actuary must balance his or her preferences and judgments
against those of a number of self-interest groups, including employees,
the employer, and tax and labor authorities.
The main purpose of this paper is to describe a methodology that
can be used by actuaries to resolve problems associated with conflicting
assumptions. The methodology uses expected utility theoryl to model
the process of choosing actuarial assumptions when faced with potentially conflicting criteria. To keep the model simple, only three criteria
are considered: prudence, best estimate, and conservatism. This is a
first attempt at modeling actuarial decision making.

2 The Criteria
The first criterion, prudence, is satisfied if the contribution that results is in the range of prudent contributions (that is, contributions that
would be developed by prudent actuaries in similar circumstances). The
context considered is the one where tax authorities are concerned with
the possibility of overfunding to escape current taxation and consequently define a deductible contribution as one that is below a certain
upper limit. 2 Because excise taxes and other penalties may result if
deductions are taken for nondeductible contributions, one limit on the
range of prudent assumptions is that such assumptions produce a safe
IThis is the expected utility theory developed by von Neumann and Morgenstern
(1947). See Schoemaker (1982) for a discussion of the pros and cons of expected utility

theory.
2In the case where, for example, the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC) is
concerned with the adequacy of plan funding, the range defined by a lower limit on the
contribution may be equally important. In this model concerns about plan solvency
are captured by the conservatism criterion. It is assumed that plan solvency is in the
interest of the actuary and the plan sponsor and is imbedded in the utility function.
Further pressure by the PBGC is not considered at this stage.
Editor's note: The PBGC is a self-financed public corporation that administered the
pension benefits insurance program for qualified plans in the United States. See, for
example, McGill (1984, Chapter 24) for more on the PBGC.
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harbor contribution. 3 It is assumed that whether the plan contribution
satisfies a safe harbor is not of concern, however, if the plan can meet
a facts and circumstance test. 4 Moreover, this test is characterized in
terms of the relationship between the actual contribution and the contribution that would have funded the plan accurately.
The actual contribution to the plan is denoted as C; the contribution
that would have funded the plan accurately is denoted C;5 and the contribution that triggers a red flag with respect to deductibility is denoted
C*. It is assumed the authorities do not investigate the assumptions
to determine if they are appropriate unless C > C*. If C > C*, then
authorities determine whether C - C > D, where D is an acceptable
deviation.
If C > C* and C - C > D, the actuary is penalized. 6 The penalty
is modeled here as a monetary penalty of P dollars. This can represent anything ranging from a fine to damage to one's reputation that
would reduce earning power. An excise tax may be levied upon the plan
sponsor that may have repercussions for the actuary in terms of compensation, job security, or future job prospects. The actuary may face a
lawsuit and possible loss of accreditation. 7 Furthermore, it is assumed
that the damage to the actuary's reputation also leaves the actuary with
a lower level of utility for any given wealth level in the event that the
actuary is penalized. The prudent actuary's rule is characterized by a
variable, p (the penalty), which takes the following values:
=

P

S0

l

P

if ~ ::0; ~* or if ~ > C* and C - C
if C > C* and C - C > D.

::0;

D;

Deductibility raises a perplexing problem. Solvency is one of the
primary considerations underlying the funding of a pension plan, but
the taxing authority may not explicitly allow a contingency reserve to
protect this solvency. Additionally, as modeled above, there may be
an arbitrary limit to the maximum deductible contribution to a plan.
3This would be the case, for example, if the contribution were no larger than if all
the assumptions used were the most generous allowed under IRS standards.
4This test is satisfied if the facts and circumstances surrounding the plan justify the
assumptions.
5The quantity C is known after the actual plan experience has unfolded.
6In this modeJ, we assume that the authorities always will discover the fact that
C > C* and C - C > D. The authors currently are investigating a model where the
occurrence of this event is a random variable.
7The simplifying assumption is made that the size of the monetary penalty is not
a function of the size of the contribution or the experience of the plan. It is possible
that these and other factors may have an impact on the size of the penalty, in which
case the penalty would not be a constant.
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Because of adverse experience, however, the deductible contribution
may not be sufficient to keep the plan solvent.
The second criterion, conservatism, follows from the concern about
plan solvency. The actuary (as well as the plan sponsor) prefers to keep
the probability that the plan has actuarial losses to a minimum. Therefore, the contribution is conservative if Pr[e < C] < E or, equivalently,
Pr[C> e 1 < E, where E is the tolerance level for conservatism (that is,
if the probability of actuarial losses is below E). The actuary uses only
his or her beliefs about the distribution of C to determine Pr[ C > e].
It is assumed that the actuary believes that C has a cumulative distribution function F(C). This is the actuary's subjective belief about the
distribution of C and is necessary if expected utility theory is to be
used. Therefore, the actuary concerned about conservatism prefers a
contribution, e, for which 1 - F(e) < E.
The final criterion incorporated in the model is the best estimate.
For this analysis, best estimate is interpreted to mean the estimate for
which the expected value of the absolute deviation of the actual value
from the estimate is minimized, as suggested by Anderson (1985, p.
110). Again, the plan experience is characterized in terms of C, the
contribution that would have funded the plan accurately. The actuary's
best estimate of C is p, i.e., the actuary believes that if CE is defined
as any estimate of C, then E[IC E - CI] is minimized when the estimate
CE = p.

3 The Expected Utility Model
At this point the actuary's decision process is modeled explicitly using the theory of expected utility. We assume that the actuary obtains
utility from three sources: (i) wealth, (ii) the appropriateness of his or
her assumptions, and (iii) plan solvency. The appropriateness of the assumptions may affect wealth through a potential penalty. Apart from
that, the actuary simply feels good about making an appropriate estimate and enjoys positive recognition from his or her employer. s The
two aspects of the appropriateness of the assumptions that are modeled here are accuracy and conservatism. The accuracy (or inaccuracy)
of the assumptions is measured by Ie - CI, with smaller values representing greater accuracy. The larger the value of Ie - CI, the lower
the actuary's utility, and this inaccuracy is weighted by a constant .\ in
8We assume that neither the actuary nor the employer is motivated to overfund the
plan for the specific purpose of deferring taxation.
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the utility function. But due to concerns about solvency and conservatism, the actuary's utility is reduced further when there are actuarial
losses. Therefore, whenever C < C, the actuary has additional disutility
equal to a constant y. The actuary's disutility due to actuarial losses is
characterized by a variable r that takes the following values:

r

=

0
{ Y

if C ~ C;
ifC<C.
A

The actuary's utility function U is given by U(W -p, IC -CI, n, where
W represents his or her wealth before the penalty is determined. 9 Assuming additivity,10 this utility function can be written more explicitly
as:
U(W - p,

IC - cl,n

= us(W - p) -

AIC - CI- r

(1)

where us(W - p) is the utility of wealth in state of nature 5. We assume
there are two states of nature: 5 = 0 represent the state where the
actuary is not penalized, and 5 = 1 represent the state where the actuary
is penalized. For each state 5, utility increases with wealth (so u~ > 0),
and risk aversion with respect to wealth implies that
< O. We assume
that uo(w) > U1 (w) for any given wealth level w. This implies that the
actuary suffers more than just a monetary fine when penalized by the
authorities. Once sanctioned by the authorities, the actuary is worse
off, in utility terms, at any given wealth level.
In choosing the contribution, C, the actuary maximizes his or her
expected utility where the expectation is taken over the distribution
F (C). So, the actuary solves for the C that maximizes the right hand
side of the equation:

u;

maxE[us(W - p) t

A(IC - CI) -

maxE[us(W - p)] - AE[IC t

r]

CI] -

y(1 - F(C))

(2)

where 0 ~ p ~ P.
Each of the three terms on the right hand side of equation (2) represents one of the criteria that the actuary uses in making the funding
decision. The second term represents the best estimate criterion. The
9A

more general representation of the actuary's utilit)' function is U(Y(W. p).IC -

el, n. where Y and W represent wealth after and before the penalty, respectively, and
p represents an arbitrary penalty function.

laThe authors are currently investigating a more general formulation of this utility
function. The Simplified version in the text, however, is sufficient to convey the essence
of the model.
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contribution that minimizes this term (and hence maximizes its contribution to expected utility) is the best estimate, /-'. But the best estimate
may not be the optimal contribution for the plan due to the offsetting
effects of the two other criteria. The third term, representing conservatism, is the probability of an actuarial loss weighted by the disutility
such a loss brings. This term is subtracted from expected utility. To
maximize this term's contribution to expected utility, the probability
of an actuarial loss 1 - F(C) must be minimized. This provides an incentive for the actuary to choose a contribution that is above the best
estimate, i.e., to play it safe. On the other hand, the first term is the
expected utility of wealth which is dependent upon whether a penalty
is received from the authorities for choosing a contribution that may
not be deductible.
The actuary has an incentive to choose a contribution that is higher
than the best estimate because of concerns about solvency. But government officials may choose to interpret this behavior as an attempt to
avoid current taxation. This exerts pressure on the actuary to choose
a lower contribution. This first term is maximized when the chance of
receiving a penalty and the subsequent damage to the actuary's reputation is eliminated (that is, when the contribution is below the authorities' upper bound). The relative weight with which each of the three
criteria enters expected utility determines the trade-off that must be
made. Other factors that determine this trade-off are initial wealth, W,
the size of the acceptable deviation, D, and the size of the penalty, P. A
final factor is the actuary's perception of the distribution of C, in particular, how probable it is that the deviation will be greater than zero
and/or greater than D. We now analyze this more formally.
Let us assume F is such that Pr[CL s C s Cu) = 1. There are
two possible ranges within which the chosen contribution, C, can fall,
the prudent range where C E [CL, C*] or the other range where C E
[C*, cu].11 A penalty is imposed when C E (C*, Cu] and C - C >
D. On the other hand, when C E [CL, C*] there is no possibility of
receiving a penalty. Therefore, analysis of the decision requires that
the maximization problem given by equation (2) be separated into two
steps because the expected utility function is discontinuous at the point

C = C*.
There are two expected utility functions that must be considered,
one that applies for values of C s C* and one that applies for values
of C > C*. We will graph both of these expected utility functions over
the entire range of potential contributions, C, and illustrate how the
llWe assume that [eL, C*] is not empty.
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actuary's choice is affected by the tax authorities' choice of an upper
limit on the prudent range, C*.
The expected utility function that pertains to the range of contributions C : : ; C* is:
Uo(W) - AE[IC - CI] - y(1- F(C))
uo(W) - A

[J~ (C - C)dF(C) + J:u (C -

C)dF(C) ]

- y(I - F(C)),

(3)

C > C*:

while for the range of contributions

Ul (W - P)F(C - D)

+ uo(W) (1 - F(C - D))

- AE[IC - CI] - y(1 - F(C))
udW - P)F(C - D) + uo(W)(I - F(C - D))
u
- A
(C - C)dF(C) +
(C - C)dF(C) ]

J:

[J~

- y(I - F(C)).

(4)

Comparison of equations (3) and (4) indicates that for any given
value of C greater than CL + D, the expression on the left hand side
of equation (3) is greater than that of equation (4) because uo(W) >
Ul (W - p).12 Furthermore, the gap between these two functions increases as C increases because more weight is given to Ul (W - P) as
F (C - D) increases.
Next, the contribution that provides the maximum level of expected
utility must be determined. Differentiating 13 equations (3) and (4) with
respect to Cyields equations (5) and (6), respectively. Setting equations
(5) and (6) each equal to zero gives the conditions for the maximum
values of E[ Uc,;c*] and E[ Ubc*], respectively:
~

-A(2F(C) - 1)

o

d

~

+ y-~ F(C)
dC

(5)

120nly contributions that are greater than CL + D are potential choices as the maximization problem is established. Intuitively, as long as the best estimate, /1, is greater
than CL + D (as will be assumed), contributions that are less than CL + D will not be
chosen because C - C cannot be greater than D, implying that there are no potential
penalties in this range and, therefore, no benefits to be gained from reducing the contribution below CL + D. This further implies that C- D > CL for any possible sollltion,
soF(C-D»O.
13We now assume that F(C) is differentiable in the relevant regions.
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d
~
(udW - P) - uo(W)) dCF(C - D)
A

- A(2F(C) - 1)

d

~

+ y-~F(C)
dC

(6)

O.
A useful point of comparison is the best estimate j.1, which is obtained by minimizing E[ IC - C I]; that is, by solving:

mdn [J~ (C - C)dF(C) +

M2 =

f:

u
(C - C)dF(C)] .

(7)

The first order condition for the problem of equation (7) is:
2F(C) - 1

=

O.

(8)

The value of C that solves equation (8) is the best estimate and is denoted j.1, where j.1 is the median because F(j.1) = 1/2.

4

An Example

For the purpose of example, assume that C is uniformly distributed
on the interval [CL, Cu].14 The best estimate is:
j.1=

CL + Cu

2

(9)

Furthermore, the contributions that maximize E[UC:5C*] and E[U6c*],
respectively, and the shapes of these expected utility functions can be
obtained by substituting for F(C) into equations (5) and (6).1 5 Using
equation (9), we have:
d

-~ E[UCA'<CA*]

dC

y-2-A(C-j.1)

-

(Cu -

o

Cd

(10)

o.
14This assumption is not meant to imply that this is the appropriate distribution for
C, but is used to allow a clear characterization of the solution that may be obtained
using this model.
15We assume that the contribution that maximizes E[Uc"c* J and the contribution
that maximizes E[Ut>c* J are elements of the interval [CL, Cu J.
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Both E[Uc:s c *] and E[Uc>c*] are strictly concave, as the second derivative with respect to C of each is negative.
Next, let the solution to (10) be denoted C3 and the solution to (11)
be denoted C4. 16 Then E[Uc:sc*] is maximized at:
~

C3

= J.l

Y
2i\

+-

(12)

and E[Uc>c*] is maximized at:

L _ uo(W)

C~ 4 --

J.l

+ 2i\

- udW - P)

2i\

.

(13)

When there is no concern about a penalty by the authorities, as is the
case when C :::; C*, the optimal contribution, C3, is the best estimate, J.l,
plus a contingency reserve equal to one half of the relative disutility of
insolvency (that is, disutility, y, relative to the weight given to accuracy,
i\). When there is the possibility of a penalty (because the contribution
is not in the prudent range), then the optimal contribution, C4, is C3
reduced by one half of the relative disutility of being penalized (that is,
the change in utility caused by a penalty, uo(W) - Ul (W - P), relative
to the weight given to accuracy, i\).
The two expected utility functions, E[Uc:sc*] and E[Ut>c*] now can
be graphed over the range of potential contributions to illustrate how
the value of C* impacts the actuary's funding choice. The following
characteristics of the expected utility functions have been determined
from the above analysis. E[Ucd*] is greater than E[Ut>c*] for any
given value of C, and the difference between these two functions increases as C increases. Both E[ Uc:sc*] and E[ Ut>c*] are strictly concave, and E[Uc:s c *] reaches its maximum value at a higher contribution
level than E[Ut>c*] does (because C3 > (4).
Figure 1 is based on the foregoing observations. An important point
on this graph is the lowest contribution level at which E[Uc:s c *] is exactly equal to the maximum value of E[Ut>(':'*]' This contribution level
is denoted Cs (thatis, E[Uc:sc* (Cs)] = E[Ut>c* (C4) ]),17 It is necessary
16Both of these points exist and are unique because the functions that are being
maximized have been shown to be concave.
17S olving for C5 explicitly gives:

C-C
5 -

4 -

uo(W) -Ul(W -P)

2Ap + Y

(C

4 -

DC)
-

L·

It is possible that the value C5 is less than CL, in which case it does not appear on
the graph. The following analysis will make clear that if this is the case, the optimal
contribution must be in the prudent range.
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to know the value of C* to determine which expected utility function is
relevant over which range of contributions. E[ Uc"c*] is the applicable
expected utility function for all contributions below C*, and E[Ut>c*]
is applicable for contributions above C*. If C* is greater than C3, then
C3 is the contribution that is chosen by the actuary because expected
utility is maximized at that point. If C5 < C* :s; C3, then the optimal
contribution is C*. If C* = C5, then the actuary is indifferent between
C* and C4. Finally, if C* < C5, then the optimal contribution is C4.
Figure 1
Optimum Expected Utilities

EU

- - - - - - - _. ,,---=-"-....- - -

E7U"C>C"*

A

"
C
s

C4

I

I
A

C4

C"

"
C
3

"*
C

A

C3

Further, Figure 1 indicates that when the upper bound on the prudent range is relatively high (that is, higher than the contribution that
maximizes the expected utility in the absence of a penalty), then the
constraint provided by the authorities is not binding and the actuary's
choice (C3) is a trade-off between the criteria of best estimate and conservatism. When the upper bound on the prudent range is in some
middle range (that is, C5 < C* :s; (3), then the actuary chooses the upper bound as the optimal contribution because it is preferable to avoid
the possibility of a penalty. When the upper bound on the prudent
range is relatively low (that is, below (5), then it is in the actuary's best

Posey and Shapiro: Decision Making Under Conflicting...

127

interest to choose a contribution above the prudent range that makes a
trade-off between the criteria of conservatism, prudence, and best estimate. In this case, the chosen contribution is C4. If C5 is less than CL,
then it is necessarily less than C*, implying that for any C* E [CL, Cu]
the optimal contribution, C, is in the prudent range.

5

Summary

The purpose of this paper has been to explore the use of expected
utility theory to model the process by which an actuary chooses the
appropriate contribution for a pension plan. Because this is just a first
attempt, however, only a simple expected utility model is used and
only three criteria are considered: prudence, best estimate, and conservatism. Nonetheless, we are able to conceptualize the essence of
some of the relationships.
Based on our model, the actual contribution chosen by the actuary
depends on the contribution level that triggers a red flag with respect
to tax deductibility. If this level is relatively low, the actuary chooses a
high contribution that gives weight to each criterion, incorporating the
risk of a penalty by tax authorities. If the tax deductible trigger is of an
intermediate level, the actuary chooses this level exactly and insulates
the plan from tax scrutiny; if the level is high, the utility maximizing
contribution is below that level.
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Cross-Tested Defined Contribution Plans
Ho Kuen Ng*

Abstract
Cross-tested plans are defined contribution plans that test allocations for
nondiscrimination. The test is based on a plan's actuarial equivalent annuity
benefits. Cross-tested plans have become popular among small plan sponsors
after the release of the nondiscrimination regulations. This paper investigates
the pros and cons of cross-testing.
Key words and phrases: pension plan, nondiscrimination, cross-testing, highly
compensated employees

1 Introduction
For a retirement plan in the United States to be qualified and enjoy
all accompanying tax advantages, it must satisfy the requirements in
Internal Revenue Code section 401(a). Paragraph (4) of section 401(a)
requires that a plan not discriminate in favor of highly compensated
employees, as defined in Code section 414(q), based on compensation,
ownership, and employment status.
The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) has published voluminous regulations on the application of this paragraph. These regulations have
brought renewed interest in a plan design based on the technique known
as cross-testing. Although this technique has existed for many years,
it recently has drawn much attention in the employee benefits community. Its status had been uncertain because of legislative proposals to
ban its use in defined contribution plans. The banning language was
deleted from the Retirement Protection Act, however, before it became
*Ho Kuen Ng, Ph.D., F.S.A., is a professor of mathematics and computer science at
San Jose State University.
Dr. Ng's address is: Department of Mathematics and Computer Science, San Jose
State University, San Jose, CA 95192, USA. Internet address: ng@sjsumcs.sjsu.edu
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law in December 1994. Now that the fate of cross-testing seems certain,
at least in the foreseeable future we will take a look into what it is and
why it has created such controversy.
To the Internal Revenue Service, the nondiscrimination requirement
is not simply section 401(a)(4). Instead, the IRS requirement is a package of rules consisting of sections 401(a)(4), 401(a)(26), and 410(b).
Some other sections of the Code are also part of this nondiscrimination package, but this article will not dwell on these other sections.
The purpose of sections 401(a)(26) and 410(b) is to ensure that a
qualified plan generally covers a reasonably large number of employees of the plan sponsor who are not predominantly highly compensated.
Code section 401(a)(26) requires that a minimum number of employees
benefit under a qualified plan. Specifically, it requires that a plan must
give benefits to at least 50 employees or 40 percent of the employees of
the plan sponsor. Section 410(b) requires that there be a fair number of
nonhighly compensated employees who benefit under a plan. The proportion of nonhighly compensated employees receiving benefits under
a plan generally must not be less than 70 percent of the proportion of
highly compensated employees benefiting under the same plan. If this
70 percent test is not satisfied, however, a plan can resort to an alternative test, known as the average benefit test, to satisfy section 41 O(b).l
Finally, section 401(a)(4) tests the actual amount of benefits and other
features of a plan to ensure that the nonhighly compensated employees
covered under the plan receive benefits comparable to those received
by the highly compensated employees.

2 Cross-Testing
The concept of cross-testing is actuarially simple. In a defined contribution plan the allocations to employees' accounts are determined
based on a formula contained in the plan document. The allocation
formula must be definitely determinable in the sense that once the total contribution amount is known, each employee's allocation is determined without any further discretion of the plan sponsor or the plan
administrator. Instead of testing these allocations for discrimination,
their actuarially equivalent annuity benefits are tested. In other words,
such allocations, when accumulated with interest to the employees' retirement, must be capable of buying annuity benefits that are not discriminatory. The regulations require that this actuarial equivalent con[The average benefit test will not be discussed here because of its complex technical
details.
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version, known as normalization, be done based on standard assumptions: namely, an interest rate between 7.5 percent and 8.5 percent and
one of nine given mortality tables. Instead of these actuarially equivalent accruals, their corresponding accrual rates, defined as the ratio of
such accruals to employees' compensations, may be used in the nondiscrimination testing.
How are these normalized accruals or accrual rates tested for nondiscrimination? Roughly speaking, a plan is divided into smaller plans
known as rate groups, each defined by a highly compensated employee
and each tested for coverage under section 410(b). A rate group consists of a highly compensated employee and all employees (both highly
and nonhighly compensated) with at least as high an accrual or accrual
rate as this highly compensated employee. The underlying idea is that
if the plan sponsor were to choose to establish a plan benefiting precisely the employees in this rate group, then this rate group would satisfy section 410(b) and, therefore, there are a fair number of nonhighly
compensated employees with at least as good a benefit as the highly
compensated employee who defines this hypothetical plan. The main
policy objective of these regulations is to ensure broad coverage and
nondiscrimination in qualified plans. Because each rate group satisfies
this main objective of the regulations, there is no reason that the plan
as a whole should not be allowed.

3 An Example
To illustrate the methodology, consider a sponsor with 16 employees, all of whom are covered under a defined contribution plan. Among
these employees HI and H2 are highly compensated, whereas the other
employees (Nl through N14) are nonhighly compensated. Every employee receives an allocation equal to 4.5 percent of compensation, except that HI receives 20 percent and N5 receives no allocation. How can
such an allocation be achieved and be deemed definitely determinable?
The plan sponsor could state in the plan document the precise allocation that each employee is to receive. The plan sponsor could use an
integrated excess formula with appropriate integration level and disparity and exclude N5 from receiving an allocation. The plan sponsor
also could divide the employee group into three classes, receiving allocations of 20 percent, 4.5 percent, and 0 percent of compensation,
respectively.
Because 15 of the 16 employees benefit under the plan, section
40l(a)(26) is satisfied. Because more than 70 percent of the nonhighly
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Table 1
Employee Data
Equiv
Age
Comp
Alloe
AeVal
Ee
$30,000
$129,471
$12,973.05
$150,000
Hl
46
3,600
31,058
3,111.98
80,000
H2
37
2,700
43,114
4,320.05
Nl
29
60,000
60,000
2,700
58,656
5,877.38
N2
25
2,610
9,657
48
58,000
967.64
N3
42,000
1,890
8,809
882.69
N4
45
40,000
0
0.00
N5
40
0
40,000
1,800
18,113
1,814.91
N6
35
1,710
40,121
4,020.12
24
38,000
N7
23,952
2,400.03
36,000
1,620
N8
30
1,575
36,953
3,702.75
24
35,000
N9
1,530
33,239
3,330.51
25
34,000
NI0
1,350
19,960
2,000.02
30,000
NIl
30
23,000
1,035
16,527
1,656.02
N12
29
907,45
9,056
20,000
900
N13
35
19,704
1,974.35
N14
22
16,000
720
Notes: Ee = Employee; Comp = Compensation; Alloc = Allocation;
Accumulated Value at age 65; Equiv = Equivalent Accrual; Rate =
Rate

Rate
8.65%
3.89%
7.20%
9.80%
1.67%
2.10%
0.00%
4.54%
10.58%
6.67%
10.58%
9.80%
6.67%
7.20%
4.54%
12.34%
AcVal =
Accural

compensated employees benefit, section 410(b) is satisfied. Section
40l(a)(4) cross-testing based on a testing age of 65 uses an interest rate
of 8 percent and mortality in accordance with the 1983 Individual Annuity Female Mortality Table. The annuity purchase rate based on these
assumptions is 9.98. The data and results are summarized in Table 1.
Table 2 shows the accrual rates arranged in descending order.
Table 3 shows that both rate groups satisfy the 70 percent test in
section 41 O(b).
There are other ways to perform the testing procedure, e.g., imputing Social Security benefits because part of these benefits is paid by
the employer, using a testing period other than the current plan year,
using the average benefit test instead of the 70 percent test for the rate
groups, restructuring, etc. There are also difficulties that practitioners
may face in practical situations, e.g., the required minimum allocation
to a young, non-key, highly compensated employee in a top heavy plan
may result in an unusually high actuarially equivalent annuity b-enefit.
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Table 2
Ordered Accural Rates
Employee
Accrual
Rate(%)
12.34
N14
N7
10.58
10.58
N9
9.80
N2
N10
9.80
HI
8.65
N1
7.20
N12
7.20
6.67
N8
6.67
Nll
N6
4.54
N13
4.54
H2
3.89
N4
2.10
1.67
N3
N5
0.00

Or the allocation to an old nonhighly compensated employee that is actuarially equivalent to an annuity benefit needed to pass the test may
run into maximum limitation problem under section 415(c). Instead of
dwelling on these technical details, we instead will focus on other issues faced by practitioners. Practitioners must familiarize themselves
with the technical difficulties and variations of cross-testing, however,
before they apply it to their clients' plans.

4

Benefits of Cross-Testing

Why do some plan sponsors, especially those sponsoring small plans,
favor plans based on the cross-testing technique? First, such employers
are usually small business owners who have spent a lot of time cultivating a successful business and now are ready to plan for retirement.
Owners obviously want to allocate as much as possible to their own
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Rate

Table 3
Ratios for Various Rate Groups
Highly
Nonhighly
Compensated
Compensated
Number Ratio Number Ratio
1
1/2
5
5/14
2
2/2
11
11/14

H2
Notes: NR:HR = Nonhigh Ratio to High Ratio.

NR:HR
71.43%
78.57%

accounts and, at the same time, likely will try to minimize what they
must give to their rank-and-file employees.
In a traditional nonintegrated defined contribution plan allocations
are determined as a uniform percentage of plan participants' compensations. In the case of small businesses, the owners are usually older
than their employees. Thus, based on the same accrual rates, they will
receive larger allocations, as a percentage of their compensations, than
their employees simply because they are older and have larger deferred
annuity factors. In our numerical example HI receives an allocation
that is the highest as a percentage of compensation among all employees. His/her actuarially equivalent annuity benefit as a percentage of
compensation, however, is not the highest.
Another reason is that such plans, being defined contribution plans,
are free of the long-term commitments inherent in defined benefit plans.
Furthermore, the annual administration required in a defined contribution plan is usually much less burdensome than that in a defined benefit plan. If a defined contribution plan is of the profit sharing type,
it does not have a funding requirement. As long as the plan sponsor
can demonstrate that there are substantial and recurring contributions,
there is no need to contribute any required amount in any particular
year.
Does the above example seem nondiscriminatory? It seems that
such allocations would not pass the so-called smell test, i.e., people
would intuitively think that such allocations are discriminatory. Although guidance on section 401(a)(4) existed before the publication of
these regulations, the tests described in earlier guidance were not as
clearly defined as those in these regulations. Due to this uncertainty
and the possible challenge by the Internal Revenue Service, such a plan
probably would not have been recommended by practitioners before
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the nondiscrimination regulation package. The author believes that
there are two main reasons for the change of practitioner attitudes.
First, the regulation package opts for objective criteria. The conservative practitioners who in the past would not have recommended such
plans because they did not smell right have no doubt that such plans
now are allowed simply because the tests are passed. In other words,
even if a plan is designed to discriminate, it is not discriminatory in the
eyes of the regulatory government agency.
Second, Revenue Ruling 81-202, the guide made obsolete by this
regulation package, had a safe harbor interest rate of 5 percent to 6
percent. While Internal Revenue Service officials indicated that a higher
interest rate would be allowed if the plan sponsor could demonstrate
that its plan consistently had earned a higher rate of return, most practitioners stayed in the safe harbor range. It is easy to demonstrate
mathematically that the higher the interest rate, the higher the disparity in allocations between employees of different ages. The regulations
now require that an interest rate between 7.5 percent and 8.5 percent
be used, increasing the disparity due to age differences. As pointed
out earlier, it is usually the case that highly compensated employees
are older than nonhighly compensated employees. Thus, the disparity
in favor of the highly compensated employees is now greater due to the
use of a higher interest rate in the normalization.
The objection would not be as much if these defined contribution
plans are strictly age-weighted in the sense that the allocations are actuarially equivalent to the same annuity benefit (in dollar amount or as
a percentage of compensation) for all employees. After all, this is how
the normal cost is calculated under the unit credit actuarial funding
method in defined benefit plans. A plan that applies this methodology
and that gives HI the same allocation as in our previous example is
shown in Table 4 below. When the allocations are converted to annuity benefits commencing at the testing age of 65, all employees receive
the same benefit as a percentage of compensation. For comparison
purposes the allocations in our earlier example are shown next to this
age-weighted plan.

5

Criticisms of Cross-Testing

The objection of most critics of cross-tested plans is that such plans
are not strictly age-weighted. The structure of rate group testing allows
a plan sponsor to use the demography of the plan population so that
a relatively small increase in the allocations to young nonhighly com-
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Employee
HI
H2
N1
N2
N3
N4
N5
N6
N7
N8
N9
N10
NIl
N12
N13
N14
Total

Table 4
Plan Allocations
Age-Weighted
Allocation in
Allocation Previous Example
$30,000
$30,000
8,004
3,600
3,243
2,700
2,384
2,700
13,530
2,610
7,778
1,890
5,041
0
3,431
1,800
1,398
1,710
2,102
1,620
1,288
1,575
1,351
1,530
1,751
1,350
1,243
1,035
1,716
900
720
505
55,740
84,765

pensated employees can be used to avoid larger allocations to older
nonhighly compensated employees that would be required on a strictly
age-weighted basis. Further, in a strictly age-weighted plan, every young
employee has the opportunity, as he or she ages, to grow to receive a
larger allocation. The analogous situation in defined benefit plan funding is the increasing normal cost in the unit credit method as a person
ages. But in the example above, an employee may never be able to grow
into that situation as long as there are new young nonhighly compensated employees that can help the plan pass rate group testing.
Another objection is that although the policy reason of allowing a
plan sponsor to do what it could do by utilizing separate plans is sound,
the rate groups are not plans. They are not required to satisfy the participation requirement in section 401(a)(26). If it were required, the
example above would fail. Furthermore, our example is constructed
so that each rate group passes the 70 percent coverage test of section
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41O(b). Should a rate group fail such a test, it still can demonstrate its
coverage by passing the alternative average benefit test. In this test the
70 percent threshold is lowered to somewhere between 20.375 percent
and 45 percent if another requirement on the relative benefits that employees receive is satisfied. The average benefit test for a rate group,
however, is more liberal than the corresponding test for a plan. For
example, one of the requirements for a plan to satisfy the average benefit test is that the classification of employees covered under the plan
be a reasonable one. A rate group does not need to satisfy such a requirement. Thus, a rate group may not be a plan that could pass the
nondiscrimination requirements if it were to exist alone.
What should practitioners do? They have an obligation to their
clients to design retirement plans that are legal and that are best for
their clients. Because discrimination and nondiscrimination are defined
by the government, practitioners will be remiss if they do not discuss
this plan design with their clients whose objectives may be served best
by cross-testing.
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Model Year Rating for Automobile Liability and
Injury Coverages
Leonard T. Guarini* and Edward P. Lotkowski t
Abstract*
This paper is intended to stimulate further research and discussion on the
validity and utility of model year rating for personal automobile coverages
other than physical damage. Using data from a single insurer and some elementary statistical techniques, we provide evidence supporting model year as
a classification variable for automobile liability and injury coverages.
Key words and phrases: age rating, risk classification, loss ratio, claim frequency, claim severity

1 Age Rating Versus Model Year Rating
Before the mid 1970s the standard automobile phYSical damage rating system employed age rating. Under the age rating system the premium structure for a given model yearl was such that renewal premiums decreased automatically as an automobile aged. The age rating approach recognizes that as a vehicle ages, the maximum amount payable

* Leonard T. Guarini is vice president of actuarial consulting at Prudential Property
and Casualty Insurance Company. He has over 30 years of experience in property
and casualty insurance with emphasis on pricing and research in personal lines. Mr.
Guarini graduated from Brooklyn College with il B.S. in mathematics.
Mr. Guarini's address is: Prudential Property and Casualty Insurance Company, 1111
Durham Avenue, South Plainfield NJ 07080-2398, USA.
tEdward P. Lotkowski, F.C.A.S., M.A.A.A., is an actuary with the Hanover Insurance
Company, a member of the Allmerica Financial Group. He has served in marketing,
operational, and traditional actuarial roles in the course of his career. He holds a Ph.D.
in mathematics from Rutgers University.
Dr. Lotkowski's address is: The Hanover Insurance Company, 100 Century Drive, PO
Box 15063, Worcester MA 01615-0063, USA. Internet address: epl@lotkow.ultranet.com
*The authors would like to acknowledge and thank the editor and the referees for
several valuable suggestions that improved the presentation of ideas expressed in this
paper.
1 We adopt the convention that the model year of a car is the fiscal year ending
September 30. For example, model year 1990 runs from October 1, 1990 to September
30, 1991.
139

140

Journal of Actuarial Practice, Vol. 3, No.1, 1995

(total loss) decreases as the car depreciates. It fails to recognize, however, that the overwhelming percentage of losses are partial losses that
are subject to the full impact of inflation. As a result, companies have
had to seek rate relief constantly to keep pace with the impact of inflation. The age rating system builds physical damage premium reductions into a carrier's inforce book of business. These built-in reductions
are offset by the attrition of old vehicles and the influx of new vehicles.
The net result is little or no overall change in premium level.
Model year rating was introduced in the mid-1970s by rating bureaus
and individual companies on a state by state basis. Model year rating is
the end result of an effort to find an inflation-sensitive exposure base
orrating variable for automobile physical damage coverages. Under the
model year rating system premiums for a model year remain fixed until
a general rate level change is implemented. Premium levels between
successive model years typically increase about 5 percent. In contrast to
the age rating situation, the influx of new vehicles coupled with attrition
of older vehicles typically results in an increase in revenue.
The essential difference between age rating and model year rating
is captured in the following example. Assume, for simplicity, there
is a $ 5 differential between age groups and that the premium for age
zero 2 is $100. Table 1 shows the premiums charged on 10/1 / z - 1 and
on 10/1/z under age rating, while Table 2 shows the premiums under
model year rating. A model year z automobile classified as age zero on
10/1/z - 1 carrying a premium of $100 would renew on 10/1/z as an
age one automobile with a (lower) premium of $95 under the age rating
system. On 10/1/z newly built cars would be rated at age zero with
the highest premiums. In contrast, under model year rating premiums
remain constant and the new car is charged a new (higher) premium.
The impact of the change from age rating to model year rating on
the United States automobile rating system was significant. Rate level
indications for physical damage coverages were reduced to recognize
that model year rating acts as an automatic premium escalator on these
coverages. This eliminated the roller coaster effect on rates paid by the
customers under the age rating system. That is, it was common for
a policyholder to receive a lower physical damage renewal premium
when renewing subsequent to 10/1/z, only to have the physical damage premium later revised due to a general rate increase. Arguably,
an ancillary effect was to reduce pressure on regulators, as the size of
announced rate increases diminished in recognition of the additional
revenue generated by model year rating.
2The convention used here is that the vehicle's birthday is on October 1 each year.
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Table 1
Age Rating System
Data on 10/1/2 - 1
Data on 10/1/2
MY
Weight Age Premium
Weight Age
Premium
1
2+1
wriz+ )
0
$100
Z
l
2
wri )
0
$100
wiz+ )
1
$95
1
$95
W~Z+l)
2
$90
2 - 1 wi Z)
2 - 2 W?)
2
$90
WJZ+l)
3
$85
3
$85
WF+l)
4
$80
2 - 3 WJZ)
MY = Model Year; and W?) = Percent of in force cars at age i in model year z

MY
2+1
2
2- 1
2- 2
2- 3

Table 2
Model Rating System
Data on 10/1/2 - 1
Data on 10/1/2
Weight Age Premium
Weight Age
Premium
wri Z+1 )
0
$105
Z
z
1
wri )
0
$100
wi + )
1
$100
W?)
1
$95
W~z+l)
2
$95
W?)
2
$80
wiz+l)
3
$90
wf)
3
$85
WF+l)
4
$85

I'vrY = Model Year; and

wi z )

=

Percent of in force cars at age i in model year z

Model year rating has many desirable features and is more appropriate than age rating for many reasons:
• Age rating ignores the fact that overall loss costs tend to increase
over time because age rating automatically lowers a risk's premium each year. Model year rating does not;
• Model year rating avoids the roller coaster effect on a risk's premium induced under age rating;
• Due to its effect as an automatic premium escalator on an entire
book of business, a model year rating system makes it possible to
file for smaller rate increases than would be necessary under an
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age rating system while achieving the same overall premium level;
and
• If manual rates are not reviewed or filings delayed for some rea-

son, average premiums nevertheless are increasing automatically.
These advantages do not reference a particular coverage.

2

Is Model Year Rating Valid for Other Coverages?

One would expect a connection between the model year and the cost
level for physical damage coverages, even if only due to the effects of
depreciation and the higher cost of parts for newer vehicles. A review
of auto collision data 3 indicates that severities are correlated positively
with model year, but that severity alone does not explain the entire
cost difference from model year to model year. Frequency increases by
model year are also significant; see Table 3. This suggests that one may
find frequency increases by model year for other coverages.
Before examining frequency and severity data for liability (plus injury) coverages, loss ratio data for these coverages by model year will
be reviewed. 4 Table 4 shows the basic limits loss ratio data for liability (Le., other than physical damage) coverages. The loss ratios tend
to increase with model year, suggesting that model year rating may be
a valid rating criterion. s Because liability coverages currently are not
3 All data in this paper are drawn from several states for an individual company.
The data are for the four year accident period 1/1/88 through 12/31/91, evaluated
as of 12/31/91. Model years subsequent to 1988 are not examined for two reasons.
First, only the more recent of the four accident years would apply to model years 1989
and subsequent, whereas all four accident years' experience would apply to the earlier
model years. Second, the experience for more recent accident and model years is biased
downward for liability coverages because these coverages develop upward over time
and because new model years are introduced in the latter half of the year.
4The use of loss ratio data controls for distributional effects. For example, if more
recent model years had a disproportionate share of youthful operators who generate
high loss costs, the frequency and severity data should reflect this effect, thus giving
the more recent model years the appearance of higher loss costs. Youthful operators
also generate a higher premium, however. In a loss ratio analysis this offsets their
higher loss costs, to the extent that they are rated properly. Loss ratios at basic limits
also have been utilized to mitigate the potential impact of large losses on anyone
model year's data.
5 Another rating criterion that may be important is the automobile's symbol. Symbols
are physical damage rating variables that are assigned to each automobile and reflect
its relative loss potential. With the exce,ption of an automobile's symbol, we know of
no other variable not reflected in the liability rating system that would be correlated
strongly enough with model year to explain this observed loss ratio behavior. We

Guarini and Lotkowski: Model Year Rating

MY
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
Total
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Table 3
Private Passenger Automobile Collision
Insurance Frequency and Severity Data
Frequency
Severity
Observed Relativity Observed Relativity
$1,151
0.697
0.0303
0.497
$1,005
0.0308
0.505
0.608
$1,005
0.0327
0.535
0.609
$ 948
0.0333
0.545
0.574
$ 962
0.0379
0.621
0.582
$1,072
0.0375
0.615
0.649
$1,083
0.0445
0.729
0.656
$1,148
0.0481
0.788
0.695
$1,264
0.0484
0.793
0.765
$1,404
0.850
0.0536
0.878
$1,501
0.0579
0.949
0.909
$1,647
1.036
0.997
0.0632
$1,741
0.0673
1.103
1.054
$1,846
0.0706
1.158
1.118
$1,942
0.0724
1.187
1.176
$1,651
0.0610
1.000
1.000

Notes: MY = Model Year; Relativity = Ratio of Observed to Total.

rated by model year, an increasing trend in loss ratios (by model year)
suggests that a differential between successive model years should exist in the rating system. By fitting an exponential regression to the data
in Table 4, we see an average increase between successive model years
of 3.3 percent. Figure 1 depicts these liability loss ratio relativities.
To better understand the behavior of the loss ratios in Table 4, let
us split the pure premium into its frequency and severity components.
As the data in Table 5 show, claim frequency by model year increases at
a faster rate than does severity. The estimated annual rate of increase
produced by fitting an exponential to the data in Table 5 is 3.3 percent
for frequency and 1.0 percent for severity.6 Figures 2 and 3 respectively
reviewed liability loss ratios split to model year and symbol and found no evidence of
a relationship between loss ratio and symbol.
6The larger year-to-year frequency change obtained for collision possibly is due to
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Table 4
Private Passenger Automobile
Liability Insurance Loss Ratios
Relativity
Model Year Amount
40.5%
1974
0.644
50.9%
0.810
1975
1976
47.6%
0.758
1977
49.2%
0.783
53.5%
1978
0.852
55.3%
0.881
1979
56.3%
0.896
1980
1981
58.3%
0.929
1982
60.0%
0.955
1983
62.0%
0.986
63.8%
1984
1.016
66.7%
1985
1.062
64.7%
1986
1.030
69.8%
1.1l0
1987
69.0%
1988
1.099
62.8%
1.000
Total
Notes: Relativity = Ratio of Observed to Total.

display the actual and fitted frequency and the actual and fitted severity
rela tivities.

3

What Drives the Results?

Although causality applied in the context of insurance pricing can be
difficult to establish, regulators and insurance company management
nevertheless often ask why a rating variable works. The relatively mild
annual rate of increase in severity over the model years is not surprising. One would not expect the distribution of automobiles (and their
operators) to which any vehicle is exposed to depend strongly upon the
an interaction with deductibles. Because the focus of this paper is liability and injury
coverages, this is not investigated. We speculate that higher first dollar severities for
newer models mean that proportionately more claims pierce the deductible.
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model year of that vehicle. So what explains the frequency result? It
seems unlikely that frequency variation by model year can be explained
by territory or operator characteristics. Moreover, these variables are
controlled for in the loss ratio analysis above.
In the case at hand, it is plausible that model year acts as a partial
surrogate for annual miles driven. In the United States some insurers
incorporate miles driven into their rating plans. Due to the cost and difficulty of obtaining accurate odometer readings, however, miles driven
is incorporated on an incomplete basis. Companies often will use just
a single breakpoint (such as 7,500 miles annually) to segregate vehicles
by miles driven.
Why is there a link between model year and miles driven? It is reasonable to surmise that a newer car is likely to be used more than an
older one. It also is likely that older vehicles are more prone to be under
repair and thus are removed from exposure more days of the year than
are newer vehicles. Moreover, we surmise that both factors are likely
to operate more strongly in multiple car households than in single car
households. For example, in the specific case of a two car household
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MY
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
Total

Table 5
Private Passenger Automobile Liability
Insurance Frequency and Severity Data
Frequency
Severity
Observed Relativity Observed Relativity
$2,848
0.0465
0.690
0.862
$3,244
0.775
0.982
0.0521
$3,017
0.0519
0.771
0.914
$3,062
0.0531
0.789
0.928
0.849
$3,086
0.0572
0.935
$3,230
0.855
0.978
0.0576
0.922
$3,130
0.948
0.0621
0.952
$3,125
0.0641
0.946
$3,278
0.943
0.993
0.0635
0.982
$3,279
0.0661
0.993
1.020
$3,269
0.990
0.0686
1.046
$3,364
0.0704
1.019
1.061
$3,260
0.0714
0.987
1.102
$3,468
1.050
0.0742
1.115
$3,455
1.046
0.0750
0.0673
1.000
$3,300
1.000

Notes: MY = Model Year; Relativity = Ratio of Observed to Total.

with two operators, the newer car is apt to be used when both operators are traveling together or when either operator has a choice between
vehicles. Table 6 contains the data on single car households and multiple car households. The data show a modest but definitely greater
indicated model year factor in the multiple car case. There is a lower
annual rate of increase between successive model years for single cars
than for multiple cars (2.3 percent for single cars and 3.8 percent for
cars on multiple car policies). This result is consistent with our hypothesis and hence does provide evidence that frequency differences
by model year reflect annual miles driven.
The issue of more accurately reflecting a vehicle's annual mileage
in the automobile insurance pricing structure has been raised before.
Butler (1993) argues for car-mile as an exposure basis to be preferred
over the currently employed car-year exposure basis. One may view
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Figure 2
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the extension of model year rating to all major automobile coverages
as an idea that lies between these two extremes. It retains car-year as
the exposure base but recognizes miles driven through a classification
rating variable. Although it does not capture the mileage of individual vehicles, it does reflect mileage on an average basis. It also has
the advantage of injecting no additional administrative costs into the
insurance system.

4 Concluding Remarks
The evidence presented in this paper suggests that model year rating is a valid rating criterion for personal automobile liability and injury
coverages. The data and analysis are far from complete, however. The
authors hope that this discussion will encourage further research utilizing more extensive data sets that lend themselves to more sophisticated
analysis. We expect the results of this paper will be corroborated. The
'xtension of model year rating to automobile liability and injury cov-
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Figure 3
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erages also may be viewed as a means of reflecting miles driven in the
automobile rating system at no additional administrative cost.
In clOSing, we note that the insurance industry's annual personal
automobile liability plus injury premium stands in excess of $50 billion.
Should a model year rating differential of just 1 percent prove to be
valid and be adopted, the annual industry wide premium impact would
exceed $0.5 billion due to model year rating's action as an automatic
premium escalator.
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Table 6
Private Passenger Automobile Liability Insurance
Loss Ratios: Single Car Versus Multiple Cars
Single Car
Multiple Cars
Observed Relativity Observed Relativity
MY
57.5%
0.935
35.6%
1974
0.562
51.4%
49.3%
0.803
0.811
1975
48.0%
46.5%
0.756
1976
0.758
45.8%
0.744
50.3%
1977
0.794
53.4%
53.8%
0.875
0.843
1978
0.844
56.4%
1979
51.9%
0.891
59.7%
0.971
55.2%
1980
0.871
59.3%
0.936
1981
55.4%
0.901
1.002
59.5%
1982
61.6%
0.939
62.6%
1983
60.1%
0.979
0.988
64.3%
1984
62.6%
1.019
1.015
68.1%
1985
63.2%
1.028
1.076
64.1%
1.043
64.9%
1.025
1986
70.6%
1987
68.0%
1.106
1.114
71.7%
63.1%
1.027
1.132
1988
Total
61.4%
1.000
63.3%
1.000
Notes: MY = Model Year; Relativity = Ratio of Observed to Total.
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Lotkowski's "Model Year Rating for Automobile
Liability and Injury Coverages"
Cheng-Sheng Peter Wu*

1 Introduction
The paper by Messrs. Leonard T. Guarini and Edward P. Lotkowski
presents data supporting their view that private automobile loss costs
correlate with the model years of vehicles: the newer the vehicles, the
higher the loss costs. Not only physical damage coverages, but also
liability and injury coverages exhibit such model year cost differences.
The paper explores the idea of applying model year rating to liability
and injury coverages.
The loss cost inflation associated with private automobile insurance
is volatile because the underlying frequency and severity trends are
affected uniquely by external economic conditions. During recession
the vehicle repair cost is low. Also, a higher unemployment rate reduces
the frequency of accidents because fewer persons drive to work. When
the economy is recovering, both frequency and severity tend to rise.
Although the data reviewed in the paper indicate that "severity alone
does not explain entire cost difference indicated from model year to
model year," the model year rating currently used for physical damage coverages is designed to hedge against the severity trend. Due to
the higher cost in repairing newer vehicles, the insurance industry convinced regulators that using model year ratings for physical damage
coverages would "reduce the roller coaster effect on the rates ... and
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pressure on regulators as the size of announced rate increases diminished in recognition of the additional revenue by model year rating," as
pointed out in the paper. The commonly used model year factor has
been indexed to a long-term inflation trend, 5 percent per model year,
for example.

2

Examples

Before continuing my comments, I would like to introduce two examples. These two examples illustrate how a model year rating system
hedges against automobile loss cost inflation. The key assumptions for
the examples are:
• No vehicles with age more than three years;
• Model year factor and model year cost difference is 5 percent per
year;
• An annual trend of 5 percent for severity; and
• No expense is included.

2.1

Example 1: No Model Year Cost Difference for Frequency

The commonly used model year rating has been indexed to the longterm severity trend. Therefore, in this first example it is assumed that
there is no model year cost difference for frequency. That is, the overall
model year loss cost difference is due entirely to severity:
Table 1
Data on 10/1/z
MY
SEV FREQ PURE BRATE
$40.0
$441
10%
$44.0
z
z-1 $420 10% $42.0 $40.0
z-2 $400 10% $40.0 $40.0
Notes: MY = Model Year; SEV = Claim Severity;

MYF
1.10
1.05
1.00
FREQ = Claim

Frequency; PURE = Pure Premium; BRATE = Base Rate; and MYF
Model Year Factor.

=

In Table 1, model year z - 2 is used as the base year for the model
year factor. One year later at z + 1, the z - 2 vehicles drop out and the
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2 + 1 vehicles are introduced. If we assume that the frequency remains
unchanged, then the following loss costs are expected at year 2 + 1:
Table 2 shows that the severity for the 2 and 2 - 1 vehicles at year 2 + 1

Table 2
Expected Loss Costs on 10/1/2 + 1
MY
SEV FREQ
PURE
2 + 1 $463
10%
$46.3
2

2-1

$441
$420

Notes: MY
ity; FREQ
Premium.

=

10%
10%

$44.1
$42.0

Model Year; SEV = Claim SeverClaim Frequency; and PURE = Pure

=

remains the same as the severity at year 2. This is because the annual
depreciation as assumed in the model year cost difference offsets the
external severity upward trend, both being 5 percent.
On the other hand, the premium at year 2 + 1 automatically will
escalate by the model year rating:
Table 3
Premium Escalation on 10/1/2 + 1
MY
BRATE MYF
PREM
2 + 1 $40.0
1.16
$46.3

z
2- 1

$40.0
$40.0

1.10
1.05

$44.0
$42.0

Notes: MY

= Model Year; BRATE = Base Rate;
MYF = Model Year Factor; and PREM = Charged
Premium.

Because the model year rating increases the premium at a rate that
is the same as the rate of inflation, there is no need to adjust the base
rate. This is an ideal example because the external severity trend and
the model year cost difference exactly offset each other.
If the frequency has changed from year 2 to year 2 + 1, however,
then the model year rating will not be in balance. Table 4 lists the new
loss costs when the frequency has dropped from 10 percent at year 2
to 8 percent at year 2 + 1:
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Table 4
Frequency Change on 10/1/2 + 1
MY
SEV FREQ
PURE
2 + 1 $463
8%
$37.0
8%
$35.3
2
$441
2 - 1 $420
8%
$33.6
Notes: MY = Model Year; SEV = Claim Severity; FREQ = Claim Frequency; and PURE = Pure
Premium.

With this new frequency assumption, the premium charged by the
model year rating will overstate the loss costs. The opposite is true
when the frequency has increased instead of decreased.

2.2

Example 2: Model Year Cost Difference for Frequency

As the data presented by Guarini and Lotkowski suggest, the frequency cost difference by model year is significant as well. Therefore,
in this second example we assume in addition to all the assumptions
made in the first example that the frequency cost difference is also
5 percent per model year. The overall model year factor becomes 10
percent per model year-5 percent from frequency and 5 percent from
severity. Because of the increased model year cost difference, both the
model year factor and the base rate need to be modified as follows:

MY
2
2- 1
2-2

SEV
$441
$420
$400

Table 5
Data on 10/1/2
FREQ PURE BRATE
$36.2
10% $44.1
9.5% $40.0 $36.2
9.1% $36.2
$36.2

MYF
1.22
1.10
1.00

Notes: MY = Model Year; SEV = Claim Severity; FREQ = Claim
Frequency; PURE = Pure Premium; BRATE = Base Rate; and MYF
= Model Year Factor.

Next, if we assume that the frequency trend is also 5 percent per
year, then the loss costs at year 2 + 1 are:
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Table 6
Expected Loss Costs on 10/1/2 + 1
MY
SEV
FREQ
PURE
2 + 1 $463 10.5%
$48.5
Z
$441
10%
$44.1
$40.0
z-1
$420 9.5%
Notes: MY = Model Year; SEV = Claim Severity; FREQ = Claim Frequency; and PURE = Pure
Premium.

With all the assumptions the model year rating will increase the
charged premium at the same rate as the overall inflation, as illustrated
below:
Table 7
Premium Escalation on 10/1/2 + 1
MY
BRATE MYF
PREM
2 + 1 $36.2
1.34
$48.5
$44.1
2
$36.2
1.22
2 - 1 $36.2
1.10
$40.0
Notes: MY = Model Year; BRATE = Base Rate;
MYF = Model Year Factor; and PREM
Premium.

=

Charged

But if the external frequency trend exhibits a different rate from
the frequency model year cost difference, the model year rating will
overestimate or underestimate the loss cost inflation. Table 8 shows
the loss costs if there is no change in frequency from year 2 to year
2+1.
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Table 8
Frequency Change on 10/1/ z + 1
MY
SEV FREQ
PURE
z + 1 $463 10%
$46.3
$42.0
z
$441 9.5%
z - 1 $420 9.1%
$38.1
Notes: MY = Model Year; SEV = Claim Severity; FREQ = Claim Frequency; and PURE = Pure
Premium.

3

Some Comments
From these two examples, we can arrive at the following conclusions:
• Model year factors ideally should include the model year cost differences for both frequency and severity;
• The performance of a model year rating system depends largely
on the degree that the overall model year cost difference offsets
the external loss cost inflation.
.

Because the model year factors currently used by insurance companies for physical damage coverages have been indexed to the long-term
severity trend, they reflect neither the frequency trend nor the model
year cost difference for frequency.

4

The Real World

Now, let us evaluate real world data. Table 9 replicates the collision
data by model year. The data further are plotted in Figure 1. Using
an exponential regression technique and the data we can estimate the
model year factor. Listed at the bottom of Table 9 are the fitted results
using different numbers of data points. The fitted results given in Table
9 suggest that the model year factor for collision is about 12 percent.
This seems to be higher than the model year factor used in the industry.
Table 10 and Figure 2 show industry collision loss cost data from
the first quarter of 1990 to the first quarter of 1994. The data are
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Insurance Services Office (ISO) fast track data from ISO Circular ASPA-94-20.1 The data cover the period of the 1991-1993 recession. The
frequency trend during the recession dropped so low that the overall
loss cost trend experienced a certain degree of deflation. As illustrated
earlier, we expect the model year rating for physical damage coverages
to significantly overstate the loss costs for that period of time. In the
past two years some insurers did lower their physical damage rates.
Table 11 and Figure 3 replicate the liability data. The exponential fits
given in Table 11 suggest a liability model year factor of approximately 4
percent. We find a major difference when comparing the liability model
year data and the physical damage model year data: the liability model
year cost difference is driven mainly by frequency, while the physical
damage cost difference is driven by both frequency and severity.
Table 12 and Figure 4 show the liability inflation data from the ISO
Circular AS-PA-94-20. The liability data in these two tables and figure
indicate that the liability frequency trend has been flat and that the liability severity trend has been leveling from 1991 to 1994. This differs
greatly from the liability model year cost difference. Table 11 and Figure 3 show that the frequency cost difference is significant for liability,
while the severity loss cost difference is not.
After presenting all the examples and data, I tend to disagree that
model year rating should be applied to liability and injury coverages.
First, the model year rating for liability and injury coverages will not
be understood easily by public or regulators because frequency, not
severity, is the main driving force for the liability cost difference. Second, the real world data suggest that liability model year rating may not
perform well. It may be more appropriate to let market forces, underwriting measures, or age rating correct the model year cost differences
for liability and injury coverages.
Finally, I want to applaud the authors for their effort in proposing an
interesting idea. I agree with them that there needs to be more in-depth
research and more comprehensive data on this topic in the future.

ITo obtain copies of this data set write to: Insurance Services Office, 7 World Trade
Center, New York NY 10048

Model
Year
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988

Frequency
3.03%
3.08%
3.27%
3.33%
3.79%
3.75%
4.45%
4.81%
4.84%
5.36%
5.79%
6.32%
6.73%
7.06%
7.24%

Table 9
Model Year Loss Cost Difference-Collision
Pure
Normalized
Normalized
Severity
Premium
Frequency***
Severity***
1,151
34.9
1.00
1.00
1,005
31.0
1.02
0.87
1,005
32.9
1.08
0.87
948
31.6
1.10
0.82
962
36.5
1.25
0.84
1,072
40.2
1.24
0.93
1,083
48.2
1.47
0.94
1,148
55.2
1.59
1.00
1,264
61.2
1.60
1.10
1,404
75.3
1.77
1.22
1,501
86.9
1.91
1.30
1,647
104.1
2.09
1.43
1,741
117.2
2.22
1.51
1,846
130.3
2.33
1.60
1,942
140.6
2.39
1.69

Normalized Pure
Premium***
1.00
0.89
0.94
0.91
1.05
1.15
1.38
1.58
1.75
2.16
2.49
2.98
3.36
3.74
4.03
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* The data in this table are based on Table 3;
** An exponential fitting technique is used;

Year
1990, 1Q
1990,2Q
1990,3Q
1990,4Q
1991, 1Q
1991,2Q
1991,3Q
1991,4Q
1992, 1Q
1992,2Q
1992,3Q
1992,4Q
1993, 1Q
1993,2Q
1993,3Q
1993,4Q
1994, lQ

Table 10
Industry Loss Cost Trend-Collision*
Pure
Normalized
Severity
Premium
Frequency***
1,487
119.7
1.00
1,497
120.5
1.00
1,505
120.4
0.99
1,504
118.5
0.98
1,498
114.0
0.95
1,496
110.7
0.92
1,499
109.1
0.90
1,506
0.90
108.7
1,514
106.6
0.87
1,527
106.0
0.86
1,537
105.0
0.85
1,560
105.6
0.84
1,586
108.0
0.85
1,604
109.7
0.85
1,630
111.8
0.85
1,661
113.6
0.85
1,687
118.1
0.87

Frequency
8.05%
8.05%
8.00%
7.88%
7.61%
7.40%
7.28%
7.22%
7.04%
6.94%
6.83%
6.77%
6.81%
6.84%
6.86%
6.84%
7.00%

......
c

Normalized
Severity***
1.00
1.01
1.01
1.01
l.01
1.01
l.01
l.01
1.02
l.03
l.03
1.05
l.07
1.08
1.10
1.12
1.13

Normalized Pure
Premium***
1.00
1.01
1.01
0.99
0.95
0.92
0.91
0.91
0.89
0.89
0.88
0.88
0.90
0.92
0.93
0.95
0.99

0
Vi
t"'I
c

III
III
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Annual Trend
Frequency
2.12%
-2.40%
-4.57%
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6.44%
4.60%
2.94%
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2.09%
-1.76%
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Model
Year
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988

Freguency
4.65%
5.21%
5.19%
5.31%
5.72%
5.76%
6.21%
6.41%
6.35%
6.61%
6.86%
7.04%
7.14%
7.42%
7.50%

Loss Cost Difference Per Year
Frequency
2.49%
3 Year Fit**
2.34%
5 Year Fit**
2.77%
10 Year Fit**
All Year Fit**
3.28%

Table 11
Model Year Loss Cost Difference-Liability*
Pure
Nonnalized
Nonnalized
Severity
Premium
Freguency***
Severity***
2,848
132.4
1.00
1.00
3,244
169.0
1.14
1.12
3,017
156.6
1.12
1.06
3,062
162.6
1.14
1.08
3,086
176.5
1.23
1.08
3,230
186.0
1.24
1.13
3,130
194.4
1.34
1.10
3,125
200.3
1.10
1.38
3,278
1.15
208.2
1.37
3,279
216.7
1.42
1.15
3,269
224.3
1.48
1.15
1.18
3,364
236.8
1.51
1.14
3,260
232.8
1.54
3,468
1.22
257.3
1.60
1.21
3,455
259.1
1.61

,.....
O"l

0

Nonnalized Pure
Premium***
1.00
1.28
1.18
1.23
1.33
1.40
1.47
1.51
1.57
1.64
1.69
1.79
1.76
1.94
1.96

'--

0

s:::
....

~

PJ

-

0
-.

»
,....
("l

s:::

PJ
:::!.
PJ
'"0
....
PJ
("l
,....
("l

SO

<
0
Severity
2.95%
1.42%
0.98%
0.99%

Pure Premium
5.51%
3.79%
3.78%
4.30%

w

z

~

<..0
<..0
U1

* The data in this table are based on Table 5;

Year
1990, lQ
1990,2Q
1990,3Q
1990,4Q
1991, lQ
1991,2Q
1991,3Q
1991,4Q
1992,IQ
1992,2Q
1992,3Q
1992,4Q
1993,IQ
1993,2Q
1993,3Q
1993,4Q
1994, lQ

Frequency
1.33%
1.35%
1.37%
1.39%
1.40%
1.40%
1.40%
1.39%
1.39%
1.38%
1.37%
1.37%
1.37%
1.38%
1.38%
1.39%
1.39%

Table 12
Industry Loss Cost Trend-Liability*
Pure
Normalized
Severity
Premium
Frequency***
7,538
100.3
1.00
7,645
1.02
103.2
7,777
1.03
106.5
7,881
1.05
109.5
8,017
112.2
1.05
8,152
114.1
1.05
8,268
115.8
1.05
8,373
116.4
1.05
8,485
117.9
1.05
1.04
8,537
117.8
117.8
1.03
8,601
8,702
119.2
1.03
8,711
119.3
1.03
8,740
1.04
120.6
8,758
120.9
1.04
8,730
121.3
1.05
8,739
121.5
1.05

~

Normalized
Severity***
1.00
1.01
1.03
1.05
1.06
1.08
1.10
l.l1
1.13
1.13
1.14
1.15
1.16
1.16
1.16
1.16
1.16

Normalized Pure
Premium***
1.00
1.03
1.06
1.09
1.12
l.l4
1.15
1.16
1.18
l.l8
l.l8
1.19
1.19
1.20
1.21
1.21
1.21

s:::
0
Vl

n

s:::

Vl
Vl

o·

:::l

Annual Trend
6 Quarter Fit**
12 Quarter Fit**
All Quarter Fit**

Frequency
1.33%
-0.35%
0.36%

Severity
0.34%
2.53%
3.97%

Pure Premium
1.68%
2.17%
4.34%

* The data in this table are from ISO Circular AS-PA-94-20;
** An pvnl"'\npntl'.:ll flttlncr t,::llr-hnlr1l1~ lC
llC'Orl·

.....
OJ
.....
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Figure 1
Model Year Cost Differences: Collision
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Figure 2
Industry Collision Trend
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Figure 3
Model Year Cost Differences: Liability
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Discussion of Leonard T. Guarini and Edward P.
Lotkowski's "Model Year Rating for Automobile
Liability and Injury Coverages"
Mohammed Q. Ashab*

Introduction
I congratulate Messrs. Leonard T. Guarini and Edward P. Lotkowski
on their interesting and innovative paper. I know of no other paper that
purports to use a rating variable that traditionally is reserved only for
physical damage coverages (Le., model year) also to price auto liability
(and injury) coverages.
My comments will be restricted to a practical observation and a minor note on the paper. From a practical perspective, I don't believe
companies would use model year to price auto liability (and injury) coverages. Even if the authors' proposed use of model year were accepted
and endorsed by regulators, companies would be reluctant to implement it in the marketplace due to competitive reasons and strategies.
To see this, assume that the market is competitive. All other things
equal, a company that tries to use model year to price its auto liability
(and injury) coverages would be driven out of the market for more recent model years and would undercut the competition on older model
years. The more recent model year cars would be rated with model
year factors greater than unity, while the older model year cars would
be rated with factors less than unity. I don't believe companies would
choose to be competitive only for older cars and leave newer cars to
their competitors. This would be a poor competitive strategy even if
*Mohammed Q. Ashab A.S.A., M.AAA., is a manager of the property and casualty
reserving unit at Metropolitan Property and Casualty Insurance Company. He received
his B.Sc. degree in pure and applied mathematics and computer science from the University of Massachusetts_
Mr. Ashab's address is: Metropolitan Property and Casualty Insurance Co., 700
Quaker Lane, Warwick RI 02886, USA.
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older cars produce better loss ratios than newer cars. Therefore, using the model year for other than physical damage coverages would be
prohibitive.
Messrs. Guarini and Lotkowski also give some reasons on the desirability and appropriateness of model year rating when compared with
age rating. While the reasons are well-known to all practicing actuaries,
an additional advantage of model year not stated in the paper is that
model year allows companies to achieve greater differentiation in their
rating structure than under age rating because ten or more model years
are substituted for three to five age groups.

Authors' Reply to Discussion
Leonard T. Guarini and Edward P. Lotkowski

As both Messrs. Cheng-Sheng Peter Wu and Mohammed Q. Ashab
point out in their discussions of our paper, model year rating for liability and injury coverages is an idea that must be tested not only from
an actuarial perspective, but also from a general business (real world)
point of view. We hope their discussions represent the beginning of a
healthy debate on this subject.
Mr. Wu has provided some examples that shed some light on the
workings of a model year rating system. His examples and conclusions
are not coverage specific. They work equally well if one is modeling
physical damage coverages or liability coverages. We have expanded
Mr. Wu's set of tables to depict a scenario more likely to be found for
liability than for physical damage coverages.
Assume that severities do not vary by model year, but that overall
severity levels are increasing at a 5 percent annual rate. Assume further that frequency levels vary 3 percent between model years, but that
overall frequency levels are not changing over time. Thus, a 3 percent
model year premium increment is indicated. Using Mr. Wu's notation,
we have developed Tables 1, 2, and 3.
On 10/1/z the system is in balance (see Table 1): the average premium equals the average pure premium. On 10/1/z + 1, however, the
average premium (Table 3) is 2 percent less than the average pure premium (Table 2), reflecting the difference between the model year increment and the annual increase in severities. Thus, a base rate increase
of 2 percent is necessary to keep the system in balance.
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MY

z
z-l
z-2

SEV
$400
$400
$400

Table 1
Data on 10/1/z
FREQ PURE BRATE
$40.0
$37.6
10%
$37.6
9.7% $38.8
$37.6
9.4% $37.6

MYF
1.06
1.03
1.00

PREM
$40.0
$38.8
$37.6

Notes: MY = Model Year; SEV = Claim Severity; FREQ = Claim
Frequency; PURE = Pure Premium; BRATE = Base Rate; MYF =
Model Year Factor; PREM = Charged Premium.

Table 2
Expected Loss Costs on 10/1/ z + 1
MY
SEV FREQ
PURE
z + 1 $420 10%
$42.0
z
$420 9.7%
$40.7
z - 1 $420 9.4%
$39.5
Notes: MY = Model Year; SEV = Claim Severity; FREQ = Claim Frequency.

In general the model year increment is not tied directly to the annual
increase in overall loss costs. The increment reflects the difference in
relative cost levels among model years. This difference may bear no
direct relationship to the annual rate at which loss costs are increasing.
In this example and in our paper one sees a frequency-based cost allocator implemented as a premium escalator to partially offset severitybased aggregate loss cost increases. Mr. Wu is likely correct in supposing that some regulators may have difficulty making this transition.
Undeniably, the necessary connections are made more easily for physical damage coverages. Other regulators may weigh the advantages of
such an approach and decide in its favor. Our view is that if liability and
injury pure premiums can reasonably be expected to increase over the
long term (driven either by frequency or severity) then it is reasonable
to consider introducing a premium allocator as an escalator. This is
especially true if the premium allocator's impact on increaSing average
premiums is as modest as our data suggest.
Should pure premium trends drop to low levels and be expected to
remain at low levels, it would be appropriate to question the use of a
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Table 3
Premium Escalation on 10/1/ z + 1
MY
BRATE MYF
PREM
$41.0
z+1 $37.6 1.09
$37.6
1.06
$40.0
z
$38.8
z-1 $37.6 1.03
Notes: MY = Model Year; BRATE = Base Rate;
MYF = Model Year Factor; PREM = Charged
Premium.

premium escalator. Of course, the ongoing manual rate review process
corrects rates if they are out of balance, as the example above shows.
This comment applies to physical damage as well as liability coverages.
It is hard to imagine insurers discarding model year rating on physical
damage coverages even if inflation were to stay in check.
Mr. Ashab wonders if insurance company management would accept model year/age rating on liability, given its impact on older versus
newer cars. This is a reasonable question. The answer likely will depend
on circumstances. For example, a company with a structural expense
advantage that translates into a lower average premium would be in a
better position to implement model year rating and still remain competitive for newer cars. Also, an organization that employs multiple
companies at different rate levels may have less concern with the effect of model year/age rating on poorly maintained older cars operated
by drivers with marginal driving records if it can properly assign risks
to rating tiers. Finally, in a jurisdiction with administrated rates these
issues may be viewed as minor, as all companies would utilize the same
rating structure.
The discussants have identified several potential points of discussion. We would like to add the following points:
• Companies occasionally do not implement manual rate revisions
on their planned effective dates. This usually results in reduced
total premium levels. In a model year rating environment, average premiums are increasing automatically, thus mitigating the
effects of delayed revisions;
• In the same vein, companies would not need to review manual
rate levels as frequently in a model year rating environment. This
could be important to a management reluctant to devote resources
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to states with low premium volume;
• Model year/age rating reacts to the business cycle. That is, during
economic downturns fewer new automobiles enter, and fewer old
automobiles leave, the vehicle population. This retards premium
growth under model year/age rating at the same time that the
pure premium's increase is slowing, as happens during economic
downturns. The opposite effect occurs as the economy recovers.
These effects partially offset one another, resulting in more even
operating results over a business cycle;
• Model year/age rating meets the average consumer's expectation
that insurance costs more for newer cars; and
• Model year/age rating achieves the social objective of shifting insurance premiums onto those more able to afford higher premiums, as owners of newer automobiles are likely to be more affluent.
The authors appreciate the discussants' thoughtful comments and the
generosity of their remarks. As we have stated, we hope to see our
results tested on other data sets. If the actuarial analysis is validated,
we believe that .some interesting discussion may ensue.
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Recent Canadian Human Rights Decisions Having an
Impact on Gender-Based Risk Classification Systems
Robert L. Brown*

Abstract
With the passage of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms on April
17, 1982, all previous court precedents using gender in risk classification systems became obsolete. Three cases involving issues of discrimination in the
use of age and gender now clarify the position of the Canadian judiciary. Based
on the decisions in these three cases, this paper presents arguments that can
be used in any jurisdiction to defend successfully the use of gender in a property/casualty risk classification system.
Key words and phrases: Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, human
rights, gender discrimination, risk selection, automobile insurance, mandatory
retirement

1

Introduction

The existence of the new Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms
(April 17, 1982) brings challenges to many of the present risk classification parameters used by the Canadian automobile insurance industry,l
Individual insurance contracts are generally subject to the sections of
*Robert L. Brown, F.C.r.A., F.S.A., A.C.A.S., is professor of statistics and actuarial science and director of the Institute of Insurance and Pension Research at the University
of Waterloo. He is a past president of the Canadian Institute of Actuaries and is currently on the SOCiety of Actuaries' Board of Governors and Executive Committee. He
was an elected Councillor in the City of Waterloo from 1988 to 1994. Professor Brown
has authored several articles and books.
Professor Brown's address is: Department of Statistics and Actuarial Science, University of Waterloo, Waterloo ON N2l 3G1, Canada. Internet address:

rlbrown@jeeves.uwaterloo.ca
I See Brown (1988) for a discussion of some of the actuarial implications of the
Charter.
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provincial human rights codes prohibiting certain types of discrimination. These codes often provide special provisions for insurance. For
example, the Ontario Human Rights code provides for limited exemptions for insurance "on reasonable and bona fide grounds because of
age, sex, marital status, family status, or handicap," What is reasonable
and bona fide has become the issue.
This paper reviews three recent court cases in Canada that have
made the application of these human rights provisions much clearer
for insurance risk classification systems. While the cases are Canadian,
the reasoning and logic used by the courts are universal. 2

2

Dickason v. University of Alberta

At issue in this case is the fact that the University of Alberta has
an age 65 mandatory retirement clause that had forced Professor Olive
Dickason to retire. The Individual's Rights Protection Act of Alberta
(Revised Statute of Alberta (RSA) 1980) prohibits discrimination on the
basis of age but includes the phrase: "except where reasonable and
justifiable in the circumstances".
A board of inquiry appointed to hear the appellant's complaint decided in her favor and ordered that she be reinstated. The Court of
Queen's Bench (Alberta), upon appeal from the university, upheld the
decision of the board of inquiry. Upon further appeal, however, the
Alberta Court of Appeal overturned the lower court decision. Finally,
the case was appealed to the Supreme Court of Canada.
The Supreme Court of Canada (September 24, 1992), on a 4-3 vote,
supported the Court of Appeal of Alberta and found in favor of the
University of Alberta. In writing the majority opinion, Justice]. Cory
stated:
The University has shown that the impugned practice of mandatory retirement is reasonable and justifiable within the
meaning of section 11.1 of the Individual's Rights Protection
Act.
In the construction of human rights legislation, the rights
enunciated must be given their full recognition and effect,
while defenses to the exercises of those rights should be
interpreted narrowly.
2Copies of all of the cases and court opinions discussed in this paper are available
from the Insurance Bureau of Canada (IBC), 181 University Avenue, Toronto ON M5H
3M?, Canada.
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The nurturing of academic freedom and the ensuring of faculty renewal are most delicate matters that do not lend themselves to a single clear-cut answer as to the proportionality
between the burden of the discrimination complained of and
the objectives sought .
. . . the terms of the collective agreement relating to compulsory retirement will apply to every member of the faculty
association. Moreover, the union did not negotiate the term
in a vacuum, but rather in the context of a system of tenure
which protects all members of faculty from dismissal without just cause, and provides a pension scheme assuring the
financial security of all retiring members of faculty.
The objectives of mandatory retirement were stated to be the
preservation of tenure, the promotion of academic renewal,
the facilitation of planning and resource management, and
the protection of "retirement with dignity" for faculty members.
(These objectives) are of sufficient significance to justify the
limitation of a constitutional right to equality. The impugned
retirement practice is rationally connected to the objectives
cited. The retirement of faculty members at the age of 65
ensures that the university may readily predict the rate at
which employees will leave the institution and that positions
are opened for new faculty. Mandatory retirement also allows the university to renew its faculty by means of remedying the twofold problem of limited funding and a "bulge" in
the age distribution of professors. As well, the policy supports the existence of a tenure system which creates barriers
to the dismissal of faculty members thereby enhancing academic independence. In the university setting, mandatory
retirement also withstands the minimal impairment test. No
obvious alternative policy exists which would achieve the
same results without restricting the individual rights of faculty members. Finally, the effects of the prima facie discrimination are proportional to the legitimate objectives served.
While the Dickason case does not deal with property/casualty insurance matters, it is the first of a series of important human rights
cases. Hence, an understanding of the two other cases, which impact
auto insurance risk classification systems directly, is enhanced by this
summary of the Dickason decision.
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Zurich Insurance Company v.
Rights Commission) and Bates

Ontario (Human

A young male driver, Michael Bates, complained to the Ontario Human Rights Commission in 1983 that he was paying higher rates for his
auto insurance because of his gender. The Human Rights Commission
appointed a board of inquiry that concluded that the driver classification for unmarried male drivers contravened the Human Rights Code.
Zurich Insurance appealed this decision, and the Divisional Court allowed the appeal (Le., found in favor of Zurich). This judgment was
appealed by the Human Rights Commission and Bates to the Ontario
Court of Appeal, which dismissed the appeal. The case finally went
to the Supreme Court of Canada which found in favor of the Zurich
Insurance Company (5-2).
Justice John Sopinka, writing for the majority on the Supreme Court,
stated that the issue to be determined in the appeal is whether the
method by which Zurich set its rates, which admittedly discriminates
on the basis of age, sex, and marital status, nonetheless satisfies the
reasonable and bona fide grounds exemption provided by section 21
of the Ontario Code. Noting that the board of inquiry had determined
that the section 21 exemption has the same meaning as the bona fide
occupational qualification or requirement when applied in employment
cases, the court decided that while individual testing is often feasible
in the case of an employee, individualized assessment is not possible
in the case of insurance. That is, the court agreed that some form of
grouping is an essential element of the insuring process.
The court also noted that single males under the age of 25 have
the highest claim frequency, the highest loss per car insured, and the
highest average claim cost of any of the categories for which statistics
are kept. The insurer's rate classification system (as even the board of
inquiry had conceded) is based on credible actuarial statistics, is sound
and accepted business practice, and therefore is reasonable. The court,
however, stated that the statistical application would not be considered
reasonable if there were an alternative which in all the circumstances
was practicable. The board of inquiry had decided that Zurich had not
proved that the very essence of its business would be undermined if
it no longer could use its rate classification system using age, sex, and
marital status. The Supreme Court believed that this decision sets a
standard higher than that required by section 21 of the Human Rights
Code and that the board of inquiry had given insufficient weight to the
difficulties inherent in attempting to adopt new criteria in the absence
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of an adequate statistical base.
Although it could be that an alternative statistical base might exist
in 1992 (the time of the Supreme Court decision), the Supreme Court
had to judge the situation as it existed in 1983. The Supreme Court
said that the insurance industry must be allowed time to determine
whether it could restructure its classification system in a manner that
would eliminate discrimination based on enumerated group characteristics and still reflect the disparate risks of different classes of drivers
and concluded that it would be inappropriate for the court to find a
particular practice to be unreasonable when no reasonable alternative
existed.

4

Watters (Alberta Human Rights Commission) v.
Co-operators General Insurance Company

This case again involves a young male driver who claimed discrimination based on the grounds that auto insurance rates used gender as
a rating factor for persons under age 25. As this case was in Alberta,
the act that defines prohibited discrimination is again the Individual's
Rights Protection Act (RSA 1980) previously seen in the Dickason case.
Using the wording of section 11.1 of the act, the Co-operators General Insurance Company stated that the practice of using gender as a
risk classification parameter is reasonable and justifiable in the circumstances.
In a decision dated February 22,1990, the Alberta board of inquiry
found:
... that the complaint of the complainant under section 3(b)
of the Individual's Rights Protection Act is justified and that
the respondent has failed to establish under section 11.1 of
the act that the contravention is reasonable and justifiable
in the circumstances.
The board ordered Co-operators to cease the contravention complained of and to refrain in the future from committing the same or similar contraventions. The board's decision was appealed by Co-operators
to the Court of Queen's Bench which dismissed the appeal (Le., Cooperators lost again).
Co-operators appealed to the Court of Appeal of Alberta. The findings of the Court of Appeal of Alberta, dated November 9, 1993, were
in favor of Co-operators. Watters (and the Alberta Human Rights Commission) appealed to the Supreme Court of Canada. On June 2, 1994,
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the Supreme Court of Canada stated that it would not hear this case,
which means that the decision of the Court of Appeal of Alberta (in
favor of Co-operators) stands. This normally implies that the Supreme
Court could not find fault with the lower court decision, but that is not
stated explicitly. It is worthwhile analyzing the decision of the Court of
Appeal of Alberta.
In summary, the Court of Appeal found that the gender-based classification system used by Co-operators in setting rates constituted discrimination, but that the practice is excused as being reasonable and
justifiable in the circumstances (section 11.1). In deciding that the
gender-based classification system was discriminatory, the court stated
that:
... if a discrimination prohibited by law exists it is no less
prohibited discrimination because it is supported by statistics.
Thus, the existence of actuarial data to support distinguishing two risk
classes, using demographic parameters, does not, by itself, counter the
charge of discrimination.
The court, having decided that the action of Co-operators was discriminatory, as laid out in section 3(b) of the act, then proceeded to
section 11.1 to determine if the practice was excused by being reasonable and justifiable in the circumstances.
The Court of Appeal referred to the precedents set by the Supreme
Court of Canada in both the Dickason and the Bates cases for what is
reasonable and justified. The judgment refers to guidelines established
in the Dickason case:
That familiar test directs the party raising a s. 13 defense to
demonstrate; (i) that the restriction of a right is undertaken
in the pursuit of a pressing and substantial objective and (ii)
that the impugned restrictive measure is proportional to the
enacted measure as evidenced by the fact that it is (a) rationally connected, (b) constitutes a minimal impairment to the
right and (c) is proportional in its effects. In its application,
the Court has adopted a flexible standard of proof which responds to the varying contexts in which the state seeks to
invoke s. 1 justification for the impugned legislation.
3Author's note: The "s. 1" referred to here is section 1 of the Canadian Charter
of Rights and Freedoms, which is the guideline used to determine if any government
legislation is discriminatory.
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The Alberta Court of Appeal agreed with certain statements of the
Supreme Court in the Bates, in particular:
... in the insurance industry it is impractical in the extreme
to individually assess the risk that each person brings to the
system and that therefore grouping into risk classifications
is necessary. It follows that this factor distinguishes it from
most other human rights cases which call for an individual
to be dealt with on his or her own merits.
The Court of Appeal also felt bound to take into account the Supreme
Court's concept of reasonableness, defined in the Bates case:
In my opinion, a discriminatory practice is reasonable within
the meaning of s. 21 of the Code if (a) it is based on a sound
and accepted insurance practice; and (b) there is no practical alternative. Under (a), a practice is sound if it is one
which it is desirable to adopt for the purpose of achieving
the legitimate business objective of charging premiums that
are commensurate with risk. Under (b), the availability of a
practical alternative is a question of fact to be determined
having regard to all of the facts of the case.
Watters (and the Human Rights Commission of Alberta) did not object to risk classification per se. They also accepted that gender is a
sound actuarial rating variable correlated with loss. They did argue,
however, that gender-based auto insurance rating was not minimally intrusive because reasonable, nondiscriminatory alternatives to the practice existed. In that matter the court directed that any practical alternative must meet three objectives: it must lead to a financially viable
insurance industry; it must result in wide availability of insurance; and
it must be fair, but it need not replicate the results of the impugned
practice.
The court decided that a financially viable insurance industry and
wide availability of insurance would exist even if gender were prohibited
as a rating factor. The annual mileage driven is a rating variable that
could offset, to some extent, the loss of gender as a rating variable. The
court also noted that genderless systems exist in Michigan, Montana,
and Pennsylvania where insurance is still widely available.
The Court of Appeal decided that fairness must take into account
the interests of all significantly affected parties, not just young males.
In that regard, the court noted the following statistics:
• In Alberta if gender were removed as a rating variable, rates for
young female drivers were expected to rise between 24 percent
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and 29 percent and rates for young male drivers were expected to
fall between 15 percent and 17 percent.
• A British Columbia study revealed that 40 percent to 50 percent
of crashes resulting in death that were not due to alcohol (about
1/2 of all crashes overall) involved young male drivers.
• Young men also account for approximately 40 percent of all road
accidents resulting in death or injury.
• Young men are seriously overrepresented in traffic crashes of any
severity compared to females.
• Studies have established that young male drivers pose a greater
risk of loss and are the most at risk in the system, more so than
more experienced drivers (be they male or female).
Further, the court stated that:
It is clear from the evidence that alternatives to the cur-

rent gender-based classification system would result in significant unfairness to young females in that they would be
asked to pay rates disproportionate to their driving record.
Specifically, the evidence demonstrates that the insurance
premiums of young female drivers would rise by between
24 percent and 29 percent if the gender rating classification
were eliminated. This is a significant increase which would
impose an unwarranted financial impact on that group. It
cquld even prevent members of that group from enjoying
the privilege of driving. The fact that young females would
pay the same rate as young males, despite their far superior
driving record, (both as to number and seriousness of accidents) would not in my view, fairly reflect the disparate risks
of different classes of drivers.
The next significant group one must consider is young males.
I conclude that the gender-based rating classification is not
unfair to that group as the rates charged to them would be
an attempt to fairly reflect the number and severity of accidents involving young males.
The decision also notes the impact on drivers over the age of 25 and
concludes that it is not unfair to older male and female drivers to pay
rates based on factors other than gender because gender is relatively
less important after the age of 25.
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The court concludes:
Looked at from the perspective of equity, it is inequitable to
give a significantly higher risk group-young males-an undeserved break by, in effect, transferring the burden of their
driving record to other lower risk groups.
The Court of Appeal therefore found that Co-operators had demonstrated that the discriminatory practice was reasonable and justified in
the circumstances and ruled in their favor.

5

Conclusion

Canadian actuaries now have a clear indication of how a genderbased risk classification system will be adjudicated by the courts in a
post-Charter environment. While these cases are based on Canadian
case law, the arguments should be universally applicable.
In this regard, and given the author's personal experience in the
Watters case, I now offer what I believe is a sound defense of a genderbased risk classification system for automobile insurance.
First, insurance companies do not manufacture insurance policies
and then price them for retail sale. The insurance industry is not a part
of the manufacturing sector. Rather, it is part of the service sector.
The service that an insurance company offers is one of facilitation of
a age-old process called risk sharing or risk pooling. For a set premium,
the insurance company allows a policyholder to share his or her economic risk (Le., variance from a expected value) with a large number of
other independent policyholders. This risk-pooling concept was available before insurance companies through community risk sharing and
through fraternals and other non-insurance associations. The premium
that a policyholder pays the insurance company is commensurate with
the expected value of the cost that the policyholder brings to the risk
pool.
Thus, the insurance process, once clearly understood, is not discriminatory. Service is provided equally regardless of the policyholder's age,
gender, religion, and race. The cost of insurance is the expected cost the
policyholder brings to the risk pool-nothing more and nothing less.
A useful analogy would be a restaurant that allows any customer to
eat in the establishment regardless of age, gender, etc., but that charges
a different price for Souvlaki than it does for Tandoori chicken, and a
lower price for children's meals. This is not a discriminatory practice
as defined in the human rights legislation.
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Using the arguments outlined so succinctly in the Watters case, one
can argue successfully that the manner in which rates are set (Le., using
gender-based risk classifications) is reasonable and justifiable in the
circumstances. No superior alternative exists, either in fact or in theory.
I hope that the summary review of these three important cases will
assist in future cases where gender-based risk classification systems
are brought into question.
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Introduction
Robert L. Brown is to be commended for opening a timely discussion
of three recent court decisions that involve challenges by one woman
and two men to age and sex classifications. In a retirement case the
court's opinion acknowledged the power balance in age-group politics
by upholding the age classification. In the two auto insurance cases
the courts ignored the power imbalance between groups in allowing
insurance companies to win exemption from law prohibiting unequal
treatment of individuals by age and sex.
There are bona fide physical and psychological reasons for age classifications, as in managing motor vehicle risk. In contrast, so-called sex
differences in data on driving risk are simply artifacts of group-average
differences in vehicles and conditions of use. The large differences in
accident involvement auto insurers use to defend selective sex classifications are products of misleading time-unit statistics and the fact that
on an annual basis in each age group women drivers average markedly
fewer miles of exposure than men drivers average.
Professor Brown's analysis approving the auto insurance case outcomes seems to assume that statistical information provided to support these class decisions is pure, i.e., complete, consistent, not misleading, and apolitical. His analysis thus can bypass the essential fact
that decision-making by insurance company executives, regulators, and
courts concerning which risk classes are necessary and what measures
of exposure are well-founded is de facto dominated by and responsive
to the needs of members of certain age and sex groups. In particular,
the claim by representatives of these dominant groups that sex classification favors women contradicts an axiom of political science and the
basis for representative government. Buoyed by its emotional appeal (to
men), the false idea that men are disadvantaging themselves to women's
benefit in auto insurance pricing is perpetuated largely through professional selection and interpretation of statistical information. The
following commentary augments Professor Brown's analysis from the
perspective of intergroup politics.

2

First Case: Dickason

In the non-insurance case Olive Dickason, a university full professor,
challenged her mandatory retirement at age 65 as a violation of Canadian law against unequal treatment by age. This case pits a presumably
small class of senior faculty against a large class of junior faculty that
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would benefit from the expanded opportunity for promotion created
by mandatory retirement. Although age is a demographic factor that
can be misused to excuse invidious and stereotypical treatment, age differs conclusively from the immutable factors of sex and race because
it is a sequence through which everyone potentially passes. Therefore,
a decision to treat individuals differently by age is not necessarily an
instance of one group gaining an advantage over another group. Junior
faculty are aware that any age rule they create is likely to govern their
own retirement.
This reality is stated in the court's opinion quoted by Professor
Brown:
the terms of the collective agreement relating to compulsory
retirement will [eventually] apply to every member of the
faculty association. (Added word and emphasis are mine.)
Professor Brown uses the disposition of this case to bolster the argument that if bona fide reasons can be found to justify exceptions to law
prohibiting age classification, then insurance reasons (more respectable
than simply one group gaining an advantage at the expense of another)
can be found to justify classification by sex.
The political difference between age and sex classification is demonstrated by retirement arrangements such as that in the Dickason case
prior to enactment of laws against unequal treatment by sex. Mandatory retirement age commonly was set at 62 for women and at 65 for
men. In this instance, the immutability of sex allowed academic and
non-academic men to gain an advantage at the expense of women in
applying an age classification.

3

First Auto Case: Bates

The first auto insurance case Professor Brown discusses provides a
good example of the strong influence of age-group politics on classification decisions. The case brought by 20 year old Michael Bates involves
an unsuccessful challenge to price classes defined by driver age, sex,
and marital status. Professor Brown hints that these classifiers may not
be applied uniformly. The court, he says,
noted that single males under the age of 25 had the highest
claim frequency, the highest loss per car insured, and the
highest average claim cost of any of the categories for which
statistics were kept. (Emphasis added.)
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The truth behind the emphasized clause is that the claim frequency,
loss per car insured, and average claim cost are not available by driver
sex for cars whose drivers are over age 25. Through classification by
driver age, auto insurers have exempted the adult owners of four of five
cars from paying costs according to the sex of a principal or occasional
driver. Men benefit from this unisex merging of men's and women's
annual insurance statistics for the large majority of cars. This fact became apparent, but was not acknowledged, by the court's opinion in
the Watters case.

4

Second Auto Case: Watters

In the second auto insurance case 19 year old Adrian Watters unsuccessfully challenged sex classification as applied to cars with drivers
under age 25. Professor Brown quotes the five insurance and public
accident statistical comparisons by the sex of young drivers that the
court cited to justify its decision. (The fifth comparison is from his
own expert testimony.) It is necessary, however, to turn to the complete
published Watters opinion for important adult-driver comparisons by
sex. In this regard, the court wrote that
The final interested group is male and female drivers over
25 years of age. Although the accident ratio of male to female drivers remains constant at 2:1 across all age groups, as
was pointed out by Mr. Brown under cross-examination, the
severity of the accidents involving young males significantly
exceeds the severity of accidents involving young females
and older male and female drivers. (Dominion Law Reports,
Volume 107, page 320. Emphasis added.)
Professor Brown's testimony on the constancy of this ratio across
all driver ages is validated by a review of published age and sex data on
reported accidents during 1984 from 7 million drivers in Pennsylvania.
In this driver population the ratio had a low of 1.8:1 at age 17, at ages 60
to 64 and for several age groups between, and had highs of 2.2:1 at age
25, and 2.1:1 for the 30-35 age group. The absolute involvement values
per 100 licensed drivers decreased for women from 5 at age 17 to 1
at age 65. Men's values followed the same pattern at about double the
value, from 9 to 1.8 involvements per 100 drivers. At all ages the ratio
of men's to women's involvements in severe accidents as measured by
fatal accidents was about 3:1 (Butler, Butler, and Williams, 1988, pp.
253, 269, 271). There is no discontinuity or marked change in relative

Butler: Discussion

185

differences by driver sex in total or severe accidents below and above
age 25.
Because men and women apparently average about the same risk
rates per mile (accident involvements per mile times average severity)
when driver age and vehicle differences are controlled, the annual accident ratio is an expression of the ratio of men's to women's annual
miles of exposure. Although average annual mileages vary strongly with
driver age, the ratio of men's to women's average mileages is remarkably constant at approximately the annual accident involvement ratio.
In 1990 men's to women's overall average mileage ratio was 1.74:1 (U.S.
Department of Transportation, 1990 Nationwide Personal Transportation Survey.)

5 Classification Alternative: Mileage
Although the car is the unit of insurance, insurers make no bona fide
attempt to measure the individual mileages cars are driven. What provision, therefore, is made for measuring the costs indicated by the large
difference in group averages for annual accidents and annual mileages?
The question of practical or superior alternatives to sex as a rating variable plays a prominent part in Professor Brown's analysis. He notes
from the Watters opinion that the "criteria of annual mileage driven
was used as an example of a rating variable which could somewhat offset the loss of gender as a rating variable." Because simple classification
of cars at one or several annual mileage break points already is used
by some insurers (and has been discontinued by others) for providing
nominal discounts, it is possible to consider the reasons for the opinion that annual mileage classification is not practical for measuring the
costs underlying the approximately 2:1 ratios of men's to women's annual accidents and mileages.
Professor Brown's reference to annual mileage driven as a rating
class criterion is misleading because the class definition does not refer
to the mileage the car was driven last year. Instead, annual mileage is
defined in company rate and rule manuals as the mileage to be driven
in the ensuing year or as future mileage as stated by the insured (or
filled in by the agent) before the beginning of the policy rating period.
Future mileage is inherently unmeasurable, and no premium adjustment is made to a low mileage discount at the end of the rating period
regardless of actual miles driven. Predictably, the resulting cost distinction between future mileage classes generally conforms to the nominal
discount size.
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When the subject of the car mile exposure unit is raised, some professionals wrongly equate it with future mileage rating. Although Professor Brown's reference is not specific, it is probably not the car mile
exposure unit but this future mileage rating factor that he justifiably
rejects as impractical for accurately delineating the difference between
young men's and women's average costs. Therefore, classifying all cars
by the sex of a driver needs to be considered as another alternative to
unisex pricing that charges women on average about twice as much per
mile as men at all ages for the same insurance protection for their cars.

6

Classification Alternative: All Cars by Driver Sex

A change to unisex pricing on the present car year unit basis represents a group overcharge to young women. The price changes for
young men and women predicted at the top of the list of five statistics
Professor Brown quotes from the Watters opinion are considerably less
than what has happened to some car owners in the states where pricing
by driver sex has been outlawed, despite efforts by regulators to cap
the increases to young women. l On the same basis, however, women
over 25 are being overcharged as a group. If current application of sex
pricing to a relatively small minority of cars is necessary and justified,
then the only question is why the accident involvement statistics do not
require application of sex-divided pricing to all cars.
One reason is that there is no consumer demand for more and better sex discrimination. Both the disparity by sex in adult costs and its
cause-men's greater average annual mileage-continue to be hidden.2
Women have good reason in principle and experience to distrust classification by sex as an unsolicited gift for which unlimited compensation
will be demanded. Having to pay higher surcharges for a few years as
I The price increases predicted to occur in Alberta as a result of unisex pricing did
affect 600,000 young women in Pennsylvania in 1989. But the adult 3 million women
drivers in that state already were paying unisex prices. As in other states where courts
have outlawed pricing by driver sex in auto insurance, this change to unisex youth
prices was understood to benefit men at women's expense, but it has not been followed
by elimination of sex-divided pricing in health insurance and annuities where insurers
overtly charge women more than men.
2 Although the information is available to the courts, its absence from public discussion of insurance costs apparently allows it to be discounted in court rulings. One
of the Supreme Court justices on the dissenting side in the Bates case quoted a law
review summary of state insurance department studies: "Male accident rates remain
higher than those of female drivers because men, as a group, drive twice as many
miles as women. When accident figures are calculated on a per-mile basis, the rates
are comparable." (Dominion Law Reports, Vol. 93, page 366.)
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young drivers currently supplies many men with a motive to find ways
of getting even not only personally but also in supporting other public
and business arrangements that treat women unequally. Sex-priced insurance is a powerful promoter of invidious attitudes. Auto insurance
is used widely to back the threat that women will be hurt by unisex
equality (as the dominant group defines it).
The compelling reason for not sex pricing insurance on all cars-a
reason consistent with established group political and economic poweris that adult men would lose the benefit of shifting the cost of their
greater average annual miles of exposure to adult women and insurers would lose the flexibility in price competition for men's business
that merged costs provide. For the minority of cars where insurance is
sex-priced, men and women as groups (not individuals) are paying the
differential costs of their different mileage averages.
But individual cars are not driven the class average annual mileage.
Despite the 2:1 ratio of averages, a sizable minority of men drive fewer
miles and have fewer accidents than women's averages, and a smaller
minority of women drive more miles and have more accidents than
men's averages (Butler, Butler, and Williams, pp. 396, 402). Annual
income distributions for men and women show a similar relationship
between averages, with a 2.04:1 ratio in 1989, and in the overlaps of
the averages by proportions of the other sex (1989 U.S. Census Statistical Abstracts, Table 728). Many upper income homemaker, business,
professional, and managerial women do well under the current car year
exposure unit system-the cost of their excess mileage is shifted to the
owners of below average mileage cars in their risk class. Therefore, the
alternative of pricing all cars by driver sex makes a poor match to the
accident risk costs of individual driving. The same severe disability,
however, applies to priCing insurance by driver sex on any subgroup of
cars.

7 Alternative Statistical Unit
Having examined two unsatisfactory alternatives-classifications by
future mileage or by driver sex for all cars-to current risk evaluation
practices, we turn to a third. Although Professor Brown does not discuss my work on the car mile exposure unit (Butler, 1993), he seems
to be referring to the car mile as an alternative to the car year unit in
allowing "that an alternative statistical base might exist in 1992," but
not in 1983 when Bates initiated his case. Nonetheless, the property
and casualty actuarial literature (Butler, 1993) contains discussions of
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the car mile unit (exposure medium or base) at least as early as 1929
when it was judged to be superior to the car year medium. The only
question raised in 1929 and subsequently has been the practicality of
odometer auditing.
As Professor Brown indicates by quoting from the Watters opinion,
the courts are currently told by experts that "it is impractical in the extreme to individually assess the risk that each person brings to the system". But courts are not told that the individual car-not its drivers-is
the insured unit and that a car brings risk to the system only when it
is driven. The courts also are not told that measurement of the mile
by mile transfer of risk to an insurance class pool by individual car use
simply requires sealing of the car's odometer and annual verification of
seals and readings. If it is a gross overstatement that the cost of odometer auditing is impractical in the extreme, it is a gross understatement
of the inherent impossibility, regardless of cost, of measuring empirical
probabilities for individuals. 3 A statistically credible measurement of
a class risk rate per exposure unit-in cents per car mile (or dollars per
car year)-can be determined only from an insurer's experienced cost
of covering a large number of insured car miles (or car years) of exposure for cars in an insurance class (defined, for example, by car use,
territory, driver age, etc.). Because the car year unit does not measure
physical exposure to risk, however, risk rates per car year are without
probability meaning for individuals. That is, an insurance price per car
year provides no cost-of-risk incentive at the margins where decisions
are made about making a given trip (Vickrey, 1968).
In 1992 I studied, for Pennsylvania legislators, the practical aspects
of an audited car mile exposure unit system for private passenger automobile insurance. The report was summarized in this journal (Butler,
1993) and reprinted in full in The Casualty Actuarial Society Forum
(Summer 1993, pp. 307-338). Noting that the actuarial literature views
practicality and not theoretical soundness as the barrier to conversion
to the car mile exposure unit, the reprint introduction suggests that the
report serve as a framework for renewed, informed consideration of
the practicality question. (Readers of this discussion can obtain copies
from me on request.)
3This is what the public is misled to believe that pricing by driver record can do. The
so-called actuarial risk class justification is simply an artifact of the car year exposure
unit: cars driven by higher mileage drivers selectively are concentrated by the random
processes of accident involvement and traffic citation into the driver-record subclasses.
With a raised average annual miles of exposure, the subclass claim frequency per car
year thereby also is raised relative to the class as a whole. Actuarial modeling in 1960
of this risk concentration process was reviewed by Butler (1993).
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Conclusion

In his conclusion Professor Brown asserts that "no superior alternative exists, either in fact or in theory" to the present use of sex categories in the risk classification system. Confining attention to driver
classifications based on stereotypes and applied to a minority of cars
creates an illusion of actuarial precision that obscures the lump-sum
character of a car year exposure basis. Although the higher income,
higher mileage beneficiaries of this cover-up are found in all demographic groups, mileage and accident statistics reveal that the predominant winners are adult men.
The power of political and economic influence to cause the disappearance of criticism of auto insurance lump-sum pricing is remarkable. For example, two eminent economists made this criticism nearly
30 years q.go. The first paper, published in 1967 with Professor Oliver E.
Williamson as first author, lists definitions of automobile classification
categories (class-plan classes were more numerous then than now), but
concludes (pp. 247-248):
Despite this multitude of rate classifications, however, no
effort is made to adjust rates within categories according
to the volume of activity. Thus our judgment holds that
the insurance premium has mainly lump-sum characteristics
.... That the premium has a lump-sum rather than marginal
character thus leads to the result that the individual operates
either at the origin [zero activity] or at [an excessive level],
but has no incentive to take up [the socially optimal level].
The following year, Professor William Vickrey (1968, p. 470) published the same conclusion about the lump-sum character of premiums
and its negative effect on incentives:
[T]he frequently overlooked fact [is] that the manner in which
premiums are computed and paid fails miserably to bring
home to the automobile user the costs he imposes in a manner that will appropriately influence his decisions .... [T]hey
provide incentives that are largely inappropriate at the margins where decisions are actually made as to whether to
maintain a car and whether to make a given trip by car.
Although these two papers continue to be cited as authority for the economic efficiency rationale for making auto liability insurance compulsory and unlimited, there has been little mention of the fact emphasized
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by both papers that auto insurance premiums are calculated virtually
without regard to the number of miles individual cars are driven.
Actuaries, especially those in academia, may choose to engage in uncritical defense of the status quo and to keep the code of silence about
who benefits from the present system. Or they can eschew group politics and constructively engage with published well-founded criticism of
the car year exposure unit. Car mile exposure unit analysis has the potential for explaining failures in the current system, such as risk class
dysfunction in pricing the effects of car weight and safety devices on
risk rates.
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Authors' Reply to Discussion
Robert L. Brown
I apologize to my audience as I write this response because, if
you were to check my references, you would find them sadly outdated.
I thought that the idea of using a classification system based on mileage
had died a natural death. But it has not. I also apologize to Patrick
Butler because he will find nothing new in my response. Dr. Butler
and other proponents long have argued the legitimacy of mileage as a
rating variable. Their ideas have been placed into the public forum at
rate hearings, tribunals, court cases, state legislative hearings etc., etc.
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But to no avail. Why? Perhaps it is a male conspiracy. Perhaps it is the
logic of the opposing argument. I will let the reader decide.
What we all agree on is that insureds who bring higher loss costs
to the risk pool should pay higher prices; those with lower loss costs
should pay lower prices. Prices based on loss costs are socially neutral.
Loss costs do not involve social judgments or sexual stereotypes.
Do insurers charge women lower rates? Yes. Under age 25, gender is
a recognized risk variable. Over age 25, if the only operator is a woman,
there is a discount. But should we use mileage instead of gender?
To say that insurers do not recognize mileage in their rates is wrong.
Insurers admit that mileage is a useful and valid indicator of exposure
to auto rates. It is used by insurers, to the extent practical, in defining
driver classes. For example, there are different rating categories for
pleasure versus business use that are proxies for mileage. Most companies having different rates for a long commute to work versus a short
commute. For youthful drivers a distinction is made between principal
operators and occasional operators, another proxy for mileage.
Mileage cannot substitute, however, for gender as a rating variable
in determining fair insurance prices. Why?
Even after adjusting completely for mileage, there is still an important gender component both in frequency and severity of accidents; see,
for example, u.s. Department of Transportation (1973), National Association of Independent Insurers (1983), The California Driver Fact Book
(several), and the Traffic Injury Research Foundation (1990). There can
be as much as a 60 percent difference in loss costs, even after adjusting
for mileage driven.
Second, premium rates must be determined at the beginning of the
exposure period, before the loss experience has unfolded. When asked
expectations of future mileage, there is overwhelming evidence that
consumers of auto insurance (often aided by their agents) antiselect
against the insurer. Ask any company that has a single-break rating
system based on mileage what percentage of their insureds expect to
drive just a few miles less than the breakpoint in the next year. As the
Government Accounting Office has testified: "it may be difficult to get
reliable information from insureds on the mileage they drive once they
realize that their insurance premiums depend on what they report".
Mileage without gender makes no provision for determining insurance premiums for more than one driver of an insured car.
Young male drivers drive fewer miles than most adult risk classes,
yet are disproportionately represented in claim statistics. Among young
drivers, the actual and reported mileage differences between men and
women are minimal, yet the accident records are measurably different.
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Actuarial Conservatism: Not in Public Sector
Defined Benefit Pension Plans
Brian A. Jones*

Abstract
Most actuaries tend to be conservative, and most, including this writer,
probably would be happy to be so categorized. But actuarial conservatism
may not be the best rule in defined benefit public sector pension plans. This
paper argues that it is not appropriate for actuaries to employ conservatism
assumptions in such public sector plans.
Key words and phrases: assumptions, risk, funding, generational equity

1

Introduction

Actuarial conservatism in the valuation of pension plans 1 manifests
itself in two basic and related areas: (i) selection of actuarial assumptions; and (ii) recommendations of contributions where the particular

* Brian A. Jones has an MA in mathematics from Oxford University, England, and
a law degree. He is an enrolled actuary and a member of a number of actuarial organizations and of the New York and D.C. Bars. He recently received an LL.M. (with
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Mr. Jones's address is: 10 Clinton Street, Brooklyn NY 11201, USA.
IThroughout this paper, pension plan will mean a defined benefit plan and public
sector plan will mean a governmental plan as defined in § 3 (22) of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), as amended. Although the paper focuses
on the U.S., the arguments apply equally to foreign governmental plans (although legislation in other countries may foreclose some issues raised here).
The Code refers to the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as amended. Interest covers
all investment earnings including dividends and capital gains that are reflected in the
actuarial value of assets.
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funding method 2 produces a range of possible contributions. Actuarial conservatism generally is understood to mean a weighting of one or
more assumptions intended to provide a safety margin, i.e., to deliberately overstate recommended deposits to some extent. 3 Conservatism
can be introduced via an explicit margin added to recommended deposits, but implicit conservatism is much more common. The typical
actuary knows that when he or she builds a model of expected future
experience, he or she is entering the realm of speculation. The actuary's crystal ball is no better than anyone else's, although the actuary's
experience may give a greater appreciation than most of the effect of
various alternative bases for speculation.
When recommending contributions-when the actuary recommends
accelerated funding, again increasing costs-the actuary often is looking to ensure that the fund becomes as solvent as possible as quickly
as possible. This emphasis on solvency must be tempered, however,
because any additional dollar put into the pension plan may mean a
reduction in the employer's investment opportunities. Reduced investment opportunities may lead to a reduction in expansion of job opportunities.
Why do actuaries lean toward conservatism? To answer this question, we will focus primarily on the economic assumptions (interest
rate and salary progression, both heavily dependent on future inflation) rather than on demographic assumptions (mortality, Withdrawal,
etc.). This Simplifies the discussion, although much of the argument
applies equally, mutatis mutandis, to demographic assumptions.

2 Conservatism
In my opinion, actuarial conservatism reflects the fact that while the
actuary may not be expert in the economic disciplines required to accurately forecast interest and inflation rates, the actuary's expertise is in
risk analysis. The actuary understands that there are two separate fi2 At the risk of some loss of generality, the various actuarial cost methods-entry
age normal, unit credit, etc.-will not be discussed in this paper. This is primarily to
simplify the presentation, but it also reflects a conviction that detailed discussion of
the mechanics of applying these methods to the broad issue discussed in this paper
would result only in obscuring the main points. It also reflects the fact that many states
mandate the funding method.
3Not every margin or adjustment to an assumption evidences conservatism under
this definition; for example, a projection of decreased mortality rates in future years
(based on an expectation that mortality will continue to improve) or an interest rate
below current earnings reflecting an expected reduction in market rates.
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nancial risks to consider when building a model to represent a pension
plan: 4 (i) future inflation and the resulting investment yields will be
underestimated so that when participants reach retirement the amount
required to provide their benefits will be less than the amount assumed
in the funding calculations and a surplus will develop; (ii) the complementary risk that future inflation and yields will be overestimated so
that the actual cost of benefits at retirement will be greater than assumed, i.e., there will be inadequate funding at retirement. These two
alternatives are based on the fact that for the typical salary-related plan,
comparable changes in the salary progression and interest assumption
broadly cancel before retirement, but after retirement only interest is a
factor, absent full cost-of-living adjustments (COLAs). 5
The first of these risks is, from the plan participant's point of view,
much less serious than the second. Potential underfunding is a serious
threat, especially when one remembers that no private sector enterprise has any guarantee of perpetual life; underfunding often becomes
a problem at precisely the time that the plan sponsor is unable or unwilling to make additional contributions. On the other hand, potential
overfunding (especially in a high inflation environment where there is
likely to be pressure to grant ad hoc COLAs and thus spend the surplus) is a less serious problem. 6 Also, the point where the interest
rate standing alone becomes dominant after retirement is well in the
future-when forecasting is hardest. For these reasons, most actuaries
are comfortable with a conservative posture.
Despite the clear thrust of the minimum funding standards of ERISA
and the Code? against underfunding, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS)
has adopted maximizing government revenue as its main objective and
seems hostile to the above approach. The IRS promotes high interest
rates that have an inherent bias toward underfunding, especially in light
of the statutory provision 8 limiting (and for the highest paid and most
expensive employees prohibiting) projection of salary increases in the
4Jt is assumed that this model will avoid the obvious traps of inconsistent projections
of future interest rates and salary increases; that is, that the wage and cost-of-Iiving
inflation underlying these two key assumptions will be reasonably related. More importantly, all of the above items reflect a fundamental assumption that inflation and
yields are positively correlated over the long term.
SMany, if not most, state pension plans have at least partial COLAs, sometimes on a
discretionary or ad hoc basis, more often as part of the formula.
GThe above analysis also supports a conservative approach to the demographic assumptions; again, spending a surplus is far less of a problem than attempting to explain
and deal with a deficiency.
7ERISA §302 and Code §412, especially the recently enacted §302(d) and 412(1).
BCode §404(1).
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funding calculations. It bases this position on the language of ERISA9
and the COdelO requiring the use of the actuary's best estimate in funding calculations, and (according to numerous IRS speakers at actuarial
meetings) the IRS interprets that language to require a straight-downthe-line interest projection with no bias toward conservatism. The case
Vinson & Elkins v. Commissioner (1993)11 recently rejected this IRS position and strongly endorsed the use of conservative assumptions. The
opinion notes that ERISA requires the actuary be retained "on behalf
of the plan participants."12 Most actuaries regard this as a charge to
act conservatively and to treat the second of the two risks as the larger
threat to the interests of his or her statutory clients: the plan participants.
I strongly endorse the actuarial attitude described above, i.e., a pension actuary should lean toward conservatism and should minimize
the risk of a plan being unable to deliver promised benefits in the long
run. 13 This view, like all such broad statements, is subject to some qualification; it would be indefensible to be so conservative in an actuarial
valuation that either benefits were held below an affordable level (and
unreasonable surpluses were built up) or that contributions exceeded
any reasonable level required to finance benefits. While most actuaries
would accept the above proposition, there is a broad spectrum of opinion about the appropriate definition of conservatism and the point at
which it may become excessive.
gCode §302(c)(3)(B).
lOCode §412(c)(3)(B); the language also appears in Form 5500 Schedule B which the
actuary must sign.
II This case upheld the actuary's 5 percent interest assumption against an IRS attempt
to impose a minimum of 8 percent. It explicitly recognized as a "particularly important"
factor "the conservative nature of the actuarial assumption selection process;" also, it
noted that:
(i)f a financial analyst's predicted rate of return is higher than the actual
rate earned, the investor simply earns less than he supposed he would
earn (, but) (i)f an actuary makes the same mistake, there is a significant
risk that the plan will become underfunded and the pensioners' full benefits will be unpaid.
The case dealt with small, one participant plans and, therefore, should be treated with
some caution when applied to larger plans.
12ERISA § 104(a)(5)(B).
13This is to be distinguished from the situation in the early years of a plan when
assets are being built and underfunding is part of the natural order of things and not
to be condemned. Jones (1994) gives a lengthier discussion of this point.
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3 Public Sector Plans
For state or local government plans, I believe conservatism is no
longer appropriate. Because we can assume that plan sponsors have
perpetual life, 14 the overriding consideration should be equity between
generations of taxpayers, not protection of participants. Participants
are protected already by the impossibility (as a matter of practical politics) of benefit reductions. In many states, there is explicit constitutional, statutory, or case-law protection. Many of the actuary's almost
instinctive reactions of private sector experience do not hold in the
public sector. 15
Conservatism in assumptions is appropriate in the private sector because employers may go out of business. But why should contributions
have a safety margin to guard against a nonexistent risk in the public
sector? If today's taxpayers make contributions containing a safety
margin, in all probability 16 they are simply paying in advance contributions more properly attributable to the next generation of taxpayers.
Conservatism in assumptions, deliberately applied, means that average
experience is expected to be more favorable than the assumptions over
the long run; such an approach does not fit the public sector environment. When the objective is equity between generations of taxpayers,
it is appropriate that the assumptions be unbiased so that long-run,
average experience is as close as possible to the assumptions.
This argument also applies to funding. In an ideal world all pension
plans, both public and private, would be set at liberal levels from the
beginning, avoiding any necessity for future benefit increases. Full contributions would be made from the point where the first employee was
14It is important to note that it is the plan sponsor, not the plan itself, that is assumed
to have perpetual life. Public plans can be, and have been, terminated or frozen, but
this possibility does not affect the argument of this paper. Also, as one referee pointed
out, the argument would not hold for a very small local governmental unit that was on
its own for pension purposes and not participating in a larger plan such as the statewide plans that many states maintain. Today's healthy little mining town could well
be tomorrow's ghost town.
15In public sector plans the choice of assumptions (and methods) often is not the
actuary's domain. This contrasts with the situation under ERISA where the enrolled
actuary is required to certify, on Form 5500, Schedule B, that the methods and assumptions represent the actuary's "best estimate" of future experience. Therefore,
recommendations that "the actuary" proceed in a particular way should be addressed
to the actuarial decision maker: in some cases, this is the actuary, while in other cases
it is a board of trustees acting on actuarial advice (or sometimes without, or in spite
of, actuarial advice). This qualification applies throughout.
16The expression "in all probability" is used because future experience inevitably will
depart from projections and what is intended as today's conservative assumption could
be tomorrow's reality.
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hired; grants of past service would not be needed; and all plans would
be fully funded at all times. All plans would have actuaries who could
project future experience precisely; and plans would run indefinitely
paying this year's cost plus expenses and avoid surpluses or deficiencies entirely.
We do not live, however, in an ideal world. Pension plans-both public and private-seldom start when the first employee is hired; plans
usually are established later, often at modest levels, and are liberalized
when the sponsor can afford additional benefits. Thus, most plan contributions are paying the cost of benefits attributable to the current
year (normal costs in actuarial parlance), additional catch-up amounts
to fund the cost of benefits attributable to earlier periods (actuarial
accrued liabilities or prior service costs), and additional contributions
to provide a safety margin. Just as most actuaries select conservative assumptions, they also tend toward conservatism in recommending
catch-up contributions. The objective of the actuary is to bring the plan
to full funding and maximum benefit security as quickly as possible. I?
Public sector plans also do not exist in an ideal world. Such plans
were not funded from day one, and prior funding often may have been
at relatively low levels as compared to private sector plans. Public sector plans, therefore, may have a large overhang of benefits attributable
to prior years that must be provided eventually. Focusing on intergenerational equity, we should reflect that such funding did not happen
in a way that imposes the resulting extra cost equally on all future
taxpayers. IS This means that we should not require any later generation of taxpayers to pay high catch-up payments at the level required
to meet the cost of these benefits in full. In actuarial terms, I suggest
an open group aggregate funding approach where contributions pay
only the amounts required to avoid an increase in plan liabilities as a
percentage of payroll,I9 but that the actuary need not amortize these
liabilities. In everyday language, future taxpayers should go some way
17 Once again, this can be taken to extremes: it would be unreasonable to accelerate
such payments to an extent such that benefit levels were unreasonably depressed in
the early years. This is the major fallacy in legislation that treats maintaining a lessthan-fully-funded pension plan as an antisocial act and the sponsor of such a plan as
a pariah. This point is developed more fully in Jones (1994).
18There is, of course, no way to impose them on the prior taxpayers who initially
consumed the services.
19This is a lesser requirement than is called for in ERISA and also less than the traditional pre-ERISA standard of interest-only funding. Even that standard usually had an
element of funding conservatism in that it maintained the liabilities at a constant level
in dollars which usually meant a decrease as a percentage of payroll. In the private
sector, however, there are declining (not to mention vanishing) industries, so there can
be significant risks in such funding. This is not the case in the public sector.
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toward making up the shortfall of interest earnings resulting from the
shortfall of contributions in the early years, but need not make additional contributions to fully replace these missing contributions. 2o
The above recommendations cannot be absolute. In very difficult
economic times, it may be appropriate to cut pension contributions 21
in order to avoid cuts in essential services. Intergenerational equity may
have to take a back seat to harsh reality. On the other hand, it may be
appropriate to fund at higher levels than are suggested above-in particular to fully or partly amortize the costs attributable to prior yearsif a plan sponsor is experiencing unusually good times. For example,
this might be particularly desirable where a plan sponsor is enjoying
high tax revenues from a nonrenewable natural resource. 22
It is a fact of political life that in some situations it is necessary to
make a gradual transition to the recommended funding levels over a
period. This means that the shortfall described above would continue
to increase, both in dollars and as a percentage of payroll, during the
transition period. If so, there does not seem to be any good reason
to treat such increases differently. The same is true of actuarial gains
and losses. 23 All of these reflect events that cannot be carried back to
the taxpayers on whose watch they arose-therefore, the costs of these
events should be spread over all future generations.

4

Summary

The past and its effect on public sector pension plans are water over
the dam. The public sector actuary's task is to look forward and to es20This would produce contributions that should remain essentially level as a percentage of payroll for the indefinite future; each generation of current and future taxpayers
will pay its own costs and an equal share with other generations of prior shortfalls.
The above proposal would not produce exactly level costs under various actuarial cost
methods that might be used for a particular plan. The most direct method of computing a level-percentage-of-pay contribution would be an open group aggregate funding
calculation producing a single percentage-of-pay recommended cost. These ideas on
open group aggregate funding date back at least as far as Trowbridge (1952).
21 Or, which amounts to the same thing, to lend plan assets back to the
sponsor/employer.
22It is also true that the ability of a state or municipality to borrow at low tax-exempt
rates and to invest the proceeds in regular securities within its pension funds opens
the possibility of a risk-free arbitrage gain, but this obviously raises questions beyond
the scope of this paper, especially in the mind of bond analysts.
23It is not inconsistent with the above, although it is not essential, for asset gains
to be dampened by one of the common smoothing techniques used to determine an
actuarial value of assets differing from pure market value before gains and losses are
computed.

202

Journal of Actuarial Practice, Vol. 3, No.1, 1995

tablish (or recommend) a level of contributions that strikes a long-term
balance between future generations of taxpayers. There is no reason to
impose disproportionate costs on one group of current or future taxpayers, regardless of whether these costs were created by a new plan,
by an amendment liberalizing benefits under an existing plan, by past
levels of funding or lack of funding, or by experience in gains or losses.
Whenever possible, the objective of the actuarial exercise in the public
sector should be to develop a level-percentage-of-payroll contribution,
based on the most realistic possible assumptions, designed to remain
level indefinitely. This is the way to reach intergenerational equity.
Contributions above or below this level (however desirable they may be
in the private sector in order to enhance participants' benefit security)
are not appropriate in public sector actuarial work.
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Discussion of Brian Jones' "Actuarial Conservatism:
Not in Public Sector Defined Benefit Pension Plans"
Richard Daskais*

I agree entirely with Mr. Brian Jones' support for the use of unbiased
rather than conservative assumptions. The actuarial profession will
be more respected if actuaries avoid assumptions that obviously are
designed to misstate costs.
There are two aspects of the paper on which I wish to comment (i)
conservatism in private plans, and (ii) intergenerational equity.
Conservatism in Private Plans: I wish that I could agree with Mr. Jones'
view that actuaries choose conservative actuarial assumptions for
private pension plans because of their concern for security of participants' benefits. I believe that actuaries choose conservative
best estimate assumptions when they have been encouraged or
directed to do so by the plan sponsor or when they anticipate the
plan sponsor's desires.
Most conservative assumptions typically are used for plans where
the plan sponsor has an economic interest in maximizing contributions. Two common types of plans for which the actuary
chooses conservative assumptions are:
• Tax-shelter pension plans of professional corporations and
other small employers where the owner or the employer is
the principal beneficiary of the plan; and
• Large companies whose pension contributions are largely or
wholly reimbursed by a third party, such as the federal government for defense contractors or ratepayers for regulated
public utilities.

*Richard Daskais, F.S.A., F.C.A., has been a consulting actuary specializing in pensions since 1957, except for a period from 1985 to 1989 when he was a vice president of
Goldman, Sachs & Co. He was a member of the firm Daskais and Walls, Inc. in Chicago
from 1966 to 1984.
Mr. Daskais' address is: 1174 Shellburn Lane, Ventura CA 93001-4055, USA.
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Intergenerational Equity: Intergenerational equity often is considered
in designing funding policy for public plans. In an efficient (and
perhaps oversimplified) world, pension plans need not be funded
with intergenerational equity considerations explicitly in mind.
Intergenerational equity, however, will be reflected in the local
taxes (such as sales taxes amI property taxes) imposed to deal
with the benefits or problems associated with pension overfunding or underfunding.

For example, property in a political subdivision where tax rates
are high because of past pension under funding (or where tax rates
can be expected to rise) will sell for less than similar property in
another political subdivision with lower tax rates due to smaller
pension costs. The property owners who benefited from low taxes
because of low pension costs will pay some of the deferred pension costs indirectly when they sell their property. Of course, if
they hold on to their property they eventually will pay high taxes
to cover the higher pension costs. Conversely, property values
will be higher in communities with low taxes due to low pension
costs.
There is no free lunch.

Authors' Reply to Discussion
Brian A. Jones
I thank Mr. Daskais for his discussion, though I suspect his agreement in the first sentence actually buys a little more than I was selling:
my opposition to conservative assumptions does not extend beyond
the public sector.
It is true that conservatism often flows from an "economic interest
in maximizing contributions" and deductions. I think, however, abuse
in small plans is due less to actuarial choice than to the requirement
that the plan document spell out assumptions for options, particularly
lump-sums, which opens the way for the drafter to distort the calculations. (I still treasure an old Private Letter Ruling in which the IRS
National Office agreed with me that it was absurd for the Brooklyn District Office to demand that the assumptions appear in the document.
Revenue Ruling 79-90 eventually went the other way and the absurdity
ended up in the Internal Revenue Code, the home of pension absurdity.)
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I agree that there are ripples from my recommended approach to
intergenerational equity and that they go far beyond the pension contribution. I do not think, however, this is an argument against my basic
thrust towards a level percentage of pay as the way to achieve equity.
I am not even sure that the factors Mr. Daskais cites would tend to
smooth out fluctuations if pension contributions are set in some other
way, such as a front-loaded pattern with rapid amortization; they may
well amplify what I would see as distortions.

